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PROLOGUE 
"Original forms of thought are their own introduction: their history 
is the only form of 1 exegesis 
they tolerate, and their fate the only 
form of criticism. " 
Spatial images are the dreams of society. Wherever the hieroglyphics 
of any spatial image is d5ciphered, there the basis of social 
reality presents itself. 
Thought is no longer theoretical. As soon as it functions it offends 
or reconciles, attracts or repels, breaks, dissociates, unites or 
reunites; it cannot help but liberate and enslave. Even before 
prescribing, suggesting a future, saying what must be done, even 
before exhorting or merely sounding an alarm, thought, at the level 
of its existen5e, in its very dawning, is in itself an action -a 
perilous act. 
If something new has appeared in philosophy and that "this work is as 
beautiful as those it challenges" 
4 
we shall see that it all takes place 
in a new dimension, "which we might call a diagonal dimension, a sort of 
distribution of points, groups or figures that no longer simply act as 
an abstract framework but actually exist in space". 
5 
The spaces that 
constitute this immanent dimension are topological or as Foucault says - 
"heterotopological". 
6 
We shall designate these heterotopologies: 
Knowledge, Power and Self. Although these sites are irreducible to each 
other they seep into and 'capture' each other through a series of 
multiple and complex relations in such a way as to suspect, neutralise 
or invert the set of relations that they happen to designate, mirror or 
reflect. If within these sites subjects, objects and concepts disappear 
it is only in order to 'disperse' or 'distribute' them according to 
their variable functions and make them reappear again, released of their 
'self-evidence', in a new space of immanence. Each heterotopology is 
capable of juxtaposing within itself and outside of itself, or rather 
across its folded surfaces, several formed spaces that are not 
isomorphic or even compatible but are heterogeneous and communicate with 
or 'encounter' each other through a pure transmission of elements. 
2 
In order to map the formation, displacement and transformation of 
Knowledge, Power and Self, it will be necessary to analyse these 
surfaces constituting a series of topologies of thought. Ultimately 
Knowledge, Power and Self are the recursive spaces of a problematisation 
of thought, a series of irreducible yet interconnected maps of immanence 
and Foucault gives us a new history and conception of philosophical 
thought, an endless questioning of what is at stake in living and 
thinking without foundation. 
That Foucault is a philosopher of space, spacing, spatiality and 
spatialisation in the most complex and difficult way should be clear to 
those inspired by Deleuze's attempt to read Foucault topologically. The 
advantage of this reading is that it allows us to emphasize, at once, a 
rigourous topo-logic of immanenent conditions of existence and not 
transcendental conditions of possibility; the subordination of abstract 
first principle (cogito, subject, consciousness, etc, ) to the spaces of 
its historical actualization; a concentration on the material spaces of 
force and not the ideality of form; an affirmation of the difference of 
thought (and the thought of difference) and not the dialectical negation 
of the same; a focus upon processes of individuation and not the 
individual produced. In short, it allows us to read Foucault's mobile and 
constantly changing analytic frameworks as driven by an impulse to mix, 
connect, reassemble and fold the conditions of thought (the 
possibilities of knowledge, power and self) in a prodigious 'encounter' 
with the Outside. 
3 
Reading Foucault topologically we will discover how concepts of space 
are problematised as they inform the questions of thought that are 
raised. The question of thought, ("the arrow first fired by Heidegger 
and then again by Foucault" 
7) in its 'perilous' action, cuts across the 
primary dimensions of knowledge, power and subjectivity that constitute 
Foucault's texts. By problematising and rethinking the concepts of space 
these domains are profoundly disturbed since, in Foucault's 'diagnosis' 
of thought, space is the unthought: "the dead, the fixed, the 
undialectical, the immobile. Time on the contrary was richness, 
fecundity, life, dialectic". 8 Effaced in consciousness and dissolved in 
time, space is 'neglected' and 'devalued' particularly in the 'time- 
consciousness' of the philosophers: 
Among all the reasons which led to spaces suffering for so long a 
certain neglect, I will mention just one, which has to do with the 
discourse of the philosophers. At the moment when a considered 
politics of spaces was starting to develop, at the end of the 
eighteenth century, the new achievements in theoretical and 
experimental physics dislodged philosophy from its ancient right to 
speak of the world, the cosmos, finite or infinite space. This 
double investment of space by political technology and scientific 
practice reduced philosophy to the problematic of time. Since Kant, 
what is to be thought by the philosopher is time. Hegel, Bergson, 
Heidegger. Along with this is a correlative devaluation of space, 
which stands on the side of the understanding, the analytical, the 
conceptual, the dead, the fixed, the inert. 
It will not be a question of reversing the polarities, of attributing to 
space the properties here assigned to time, but of constructing space- 
time multiplicities of and for knowledge, power and self; a problematic, 
immanent map of the interrelation of space and time as a constitutive 
4 
fold of the action of thought. The idea/problem of space-time relations 
that 'insist' and through which the question of thought 'ceaselessly 
stirs': 
Far from being the still incomplete and blurred image of an idea 
that eternally retains our answers in some upper region, the problem 
lies in the idea itself, or rather, the idea exists only in the form 
of a problem: a distinctive plurality whose obscurity is 
nevertheless insistent and in which the question ceaselessly stirs. 
What is the answer to the question? Thl0problem. How is the problem 
resolved? By displacing the question. 
The question of thought is displaced and transformed by an idea/problem 
in topological proximity. Foucault's topological idea/problems are not so 
much concerned with the category, form, structure or code of spatial 
configurations as with their differentiating, serializing system of 
relation and the mode of their 'connectivity' to the Outside, the 
immanent relations between points, lines and surfaces in a moving, 
configurational network. Paraphrasing Deleuze on Donzelot we might say 
that: 
Foucault's method consists in isolating pure little lines of 
mutation which, acting successively or simultaneously, go to form a 
contour or surface, a characteristic feature of the new domain. 11 Thought is located at the intersection of all these little lines. 
It is through the practical relations of knowledge, the strategic 
relations of power and the techniques of the relation to self (rapport a 
soi) that the idea/problem of space-time relations, with all their 
little moving lines of mutation and passages to the Outside are 
insistently enveloped and displaced in the question of thought. Space 
and time are constructed through these relations just as the relations 
of knowledge, power and self are constructed through space and time. If 
5 
Foucault gives a certain 'privilege' to space ( "the anxiety of our era 
has to do fundamentally with space, no doubt a great deal more than with 
time" 
12) it will not be to 'spatialise time, but to show that their 
relation is an everchanging 'non-relation', a series of indefinite and 
reversible relations organised and conditioned by the tacit forms of 
thought that underlie them. "It is not possible to disregard the fatal 
13 
intersection of time with space. " 
If space is dominant in the non-relation of the 'present' it is because 
"our experience of the world is less that of a long life developing 
through time than that of a network that connects points and intersects 
with its own skein". 
14 
It is a question of the ways in which the 
'history of the present', the relation between 'history' and the 
'actual' , the 'fibrillation' between the 'not yet' and the 'no longer', 
appears as an immanent "distributive operation" for a space of a 
becoming 'in- between', a folding in between the threads of our 'skein' 
that opens a space of difference, a 'thinking otherwise', a space that 
can be developed into a 'smooth space' of thought, a space teeming with 
force, resistance, chance and becoming, a space that affirms the throw 
of the dice, that affirms difference differentially, a space outside of 
the stratifications of metephysical and anthropological thinking, a 
space of unpredictability that opens up new thought and new mixtures. 
Foucault's topological system of thought-spaces is organised by an 
endless desire to escape itself, to reconnect elsewhere, to escape the 
territorialities of identity, representation and the same which imprison 
thought through a 'force of flight' in which "an exchange starts and the 
6 
within, despite itself, begins to open onto the birth of a space". 
15 The 
whole system of thought-spaces in Foucault are shaped by the oscillation 
of the interior onto the exterior, the birth of an inside space from an 
outside space, the birth of an outside space from an inside space across 
an immanent plane of thought: 
The inside as an operation of the outside: in all his work Foucault 
seems hauntedlýy this theme of an inside which is merely the fold of 
the outside.. 
And these spaces are always born from something other than themselves, 
from something elsewhere, a transmission of unique relations and forces. 
We will see how Foucault's topologies of thought introduce this 
'something other', this outside, into the image of thought, reinjecting 
space into thought and space-time relations into knowledge, power and 
self making thought a becoming-other, a thinking-otherwise and 
resistance to knowledge, power and self in the present, in favour of the 
'actuality' of a 'heterotopia' of a different thought to come: 
The object was to learn to what extent the effort to think one's own 
history can free thought f5om what it silently thinks, and so enable 
it to think differently. 
PREFACE 
Knowledge 
1. It will first of all be necessary to analyse knowledge through several 
formed spaces that correspond to a formal and experiential impulse that 
Foucault's 'early' work generates. These are the surfaces of literature 
and madness. "What interested and guided him was a certain form of the 
presence of madness in literature". 
18 That certain form of presence is 
7 
paradoxically an absence, an "absence d'oeuvre" 
19 that is not 'in' 
literature but the absent opening 'outside'. In these absential, split and 
drifting spaces "strange bonds are knit". 
20 
Through their mutual 
intrusions and "destructive invasions" 
21 
an avalanche of 'mad' images 
penetrates to the core and 'communicates' with a language that can only 
"turn back on itself in an endless reflexivity". 
22 
A blind word and a 
mute image 'unworking' and transgressing the limits of reason from a "fund 
beyond control". 
23 
The effect is a space of transgression that places 
word and image together disjunctively, articulates them on the basis of 
their difference producing new thought, a new way of reading the 
productions of knowledge. Already an exploratory topology of thought, a 
'diagnosis' of the spaces that trap thought and an experiment with going 
beyond them - already a map of immanence and a "thinking otherwise". 
It begins, then, in the "interior of the exterior and inversely" 
24 
or 
the doubling of madness and literature. A mute vision and a blind word: 
this is not madness. The 'encounter' between madness and literature 
takes place in a zone where the author has disappeared, the death of god 
has been 'announced' and the transgression of limits becomes possible. 
If the 'being of language' shines through this zone it is because it 
reposes on a voided image, on a groundless space hollowed out through 
its own passage to the Outside. We need, then, to map the relations 
between madness and literature as exterior surfaces superimposed upon 
one another, silent yet 'communicating' to each other, 'dispersed' 
across a space turned inside-out. This is the immanent space of 
transgressive thought, a thought of difference that articulates the 
'enclosure' of thought within a knowledge of the same, diagnoses its 
8 
conditions of confinement, and thereby "opens onto a scintillating and 
constantly affirmed world. " 
25 
2. Within this space a new experience and action of thought is made 
possible that Foucault will call archaeology. ("And one wonders whether 
'topology' would not have been more apt than archaeology". 
26 
The great 
George Steiner concurs with us! ). Archaeological thought will 
redistribute the experiential and affective elements of transgressive 
space by locating literature and madness as one transgressive series in 
an expanded space of immanence that Foucault will map as 'positivity', a 
space "whose necessity has its roots in a vast configuration in which 
the whole structure of our thought and our knowledge is traced. " 
27 
Archaelogical work will map the 'positive exteriority' of this 
configuration by seeking to formalise the relations or 'non-relation' 
between statements and visibilities as the exteriorities of knowledge or 
'forms' of the outside. These forms or vectors are operative in 
archaeological analysis through a stratification that locks them into a 
set of historical conditions ('concrete apriori', 'historical apriori'. 
"The a priori of positivities is not only the system of a temporal 
dispersion; it is itself a transformable group" 
28) 
whose local and 
regional discontinuities can be juxtaposed like a series of interlocking 
surfaces which constitute an 'episteme' and an 'archive'. 
Archaeological space relays transgressive space though a "positive 
unconscious of knowledge", 
29 
a material, anonymous, transmission 
network, a network of practices: practices of saying and seeing that 
constitute an audio-visual archive. The enunciable and the visible ( the 
9 
being of language and the being of light) are spaces of emergence and 
becoming that are intimately bound up with historically given forms of 
the discursive /non-discursive with their deposits of strata and the 
unique sets of relations they organise. They are exterior spaces of 
multiplicity that condition what can be said and what can be seen. The 
archaeological space of multiplicities, of plural and diverging series, 
that cross, bifurcate and overlap in their 'non-relation', throw up a 
unique double function which "cuts across a domain of structures and 
possible unities and which reveals them, with concrete contents in space 
and time". 
30 
Everything is on 'display' in the space of enonces even as 
( and because) the topologist defines this functional space as "neither 
visible nor hidden. " 
31 
Archaelogical space is 'sectioned' and segmented 
in triplicate in order to map and connect the immanent bifurcations and 
divergences, the curves and features of a specific series enabling the 
examination of relations within and across its corpus of enonces. 
Archaeological thought invents a new immanent 'architectonic' space from 
which the topo-archivist will construct an immanent relational 'plinth' 
or 'stand' in order to read anew the productions of knowledge. 
We need only know how to read, however difficult that may prove to 
be. The secret exists only to be betrayed, or to betray itself. Each 
age articulates perfectly the most cynical elements of its politics, 
or the rawest elements of its sexuality to the point where 
transgression has little merit. Each age says(enonce) everything it 
can accordl5g to the conditions laid down for its statements. 
(enonce). 
Power 
3. The 'dispersion' or transmission of elements throughout the spaces of 
enonces, the 'encounter' between them forced through the archaeological 
method, enables the discovery (or rather 'eventalisation') of a new fold 
10 
or dimension investing the topological structure of knowledge. This new 
dimension is immanent to and constitutive of the spaces of knowledge which 
are 'conducted' and shaped by its movement. This is the dimension of 
power-relations, a dimension 'outside' topologically folded 'inside', the 
fold of their relation ensuring that "there is no exteriority, even if 
they have specific roles and are linked together on the basis of their 
difference". 33 A regime of power-knowledge. 
Foucault explicitly develops the 'thought from outside' as a stategy for 
'eventalising' the immanent fold of power-knowledge relations, exposing 
the unseen and unsaid 'self-evidences', upon which the relation is 
built, to criticism. Foucault will demonstrate that the possibilities of 
knowledge distributed throughout the enunciable and the visible, as 
potential spaces of emergence, are defined and articulated through the 
events of power. Power is exercised through relations of force (non- 
relation) that "come from everywhere", 
34 
a "non-place" 
35 (outside). In 
eventalising these relational spaces Foucault will show that there is 
always 'something else', 'somewhere else', an unthought, an 'Outside' of 
thought that eludes power even as it makes it possible. 
Power is born out of a plurality of relationships which are grafted 
onto something else, born from 92mething else, and permit the 
development of something else. 
From this point on the episteme and the archive are entirely worked 
through and doubled by the 'event', the 'diagram' and the 'dispositif' 
following a "general line of force... in any relationship from one point 
to another.,, 
37 
Lines of force don't just make up the surfaces of 
thought but run through them pulling at them and this implies a whole 
11 
series of driftings, transformations and mutations, breaking through 
thresholds that might have been seen as aesthetic, philosophic, 
political or scientific, that might be seen as theoretical or practical 
etc. The events of outside thought traverse audio-visual mediums, a 
reassemblage that moves toward the Outside, ceaselessly connecting and 
bifurcating. The cartographer will emphasise the possibilities of 
resistance in this multi-relational force-field by concentrating on 
'lines of fracture' and 'breakage' and will multiply the "points, knots 
and focuses" 
38 
of resistance by characterising and making visible the 
historical image of the events, transformations and resistances of power 
as a diagrammatics. 
4. The diagram expresses an open and fluid cartography of the strategies 
of power that create space and time in their own image ensuring the 
replication of those strategies, and the creation of forms of resistance 
that thwart those strategies, folding them back onto themselves and 
opening them to transformation. Diagrams function as 'informal' maps, 
virtual multiplicities of force relations actualised or 'swallowed up' in 
the differential concrete assemblages of the enunciable and the visible. 
Foucault will concentrate, develop and make visible those diagrams of 
force in continuous variation that trip across the surfaces of knowledge 
in order to produce so many disciplinary mechanisms. The variations 
from one point of power to another, from one form of visibility and 
enunciation to another will be seen to depend upon the strategies of 
power that organise 'bodies' and 'individuals' in space and time through 
normalisation. Normalising space: flexible, interchangeable, 
12 
indefinitely reversible and without exterior. It is across this supple, 
extensive surface that disciplinary instruments (hierarchic 
surveillance, examinations etc) 'manufacture' bodies and individuals 
according to an economy of force ("it was a question of constituting a 
productive force whose effect had to be superior to the sum of 
elementary forces that composed it". 
39) 
stratified into visible and 
enunciable multiplicities. The 'logic' of individualisation along with 
its visibility makes every-body and individual into a 'case' and the 
norm appeals to nothing other than that which it works on and makes 
visible. It is "an art of light and the visible" 
40 
working in 
'conjunction' with the great mechanisms of the articulable: hierarchical 
observation and normalizing judgement, technologies of 'seeing' and 
procedures of 'expression' 
The spaces of the norm generate a 'politics' that ranges from the 
intensification of an "anatomo-politics" of the body into a °bio- 
politics" of the life of populations. And here Foucault traces other 
lines and diagrams of force from 'biopower' and 'pastoral power' to 
'governmentalisation'. Foucault's texts on power culminate in a 
'triangulated' diagram of forces that 'individualises and totalises' 
human multiplicities in space and time. If sex is one of the primary 
axes through which the life of bodies and populations are governed then 
we must 'invent' new modalities of (de)sexualisation in "a different 
economy of bodies and pleasures", 
41 
a new modality of thinking as a 
resistance to the government of the self and the government of life. 
13 
Self 
5. Foucault does, in fact, discover a new economy of bodies and 
pleasures, and in another deployment of power and knowledge, but which 
will offer the possibility of practices of 'liberation' in a new 
dimension derived from power and knowledge but not dependent on them. 
Perhaps a topological shift was necessary in order to access this new 
dimension but, in any case, it was always a question of knowing "how and 
to what extent it might be possible to think differently instead of 
legitimating what is already known". 
42 
The final fold in Foucault's 
topology of thought is, then, the effort to think differently the 
application of the Outside to oneself, to think the immanent conditions of 
a new economy of bodies and pleasures through a 'problematization' of the 
internalization of power. This is the dimension of 'self', a relational 
and folded 'inside-space' co-extensive with the outside, folding the 
forces of the outside through processes and practices of "subjectivation". 
Foucault's final fold of the question of thought inserts itself into the 
problematic space of a self-relation and a process of subjectivation. And 
43 
"perhaps he even had to go back to the greeks" 
If you want an image, think of a network of scaffolding that 
functions a 4a point of relay 
between a project being completed and 
a new one. 
There is no rupture, 'return to the subject', but a continued questioning 
of its identity, origin and unity. "The subject does not disappear; rather 
its excessively determined unity is put in question". 
45 
Foucault had 
always placed the unity of the subject in question but he now found "the 
impasse to be where power itself places us, in both our lives and our 
thoughts, as we run up against it in our smallest truths. " 
46 
The rigid 
14 
striation, fixing and segmentation of lines of force making it impossible 
to "cross the line" 47 and making the search for and invention of a space 
of radical questioning all the more intense and necessary. Foucault's 
"problematization of the self" accesses a new dimension of immanence, 
expressing a new diagrammatic map of the interiority of thought where 
the outside affects itself, where power over the other is doubled by 
power over the self. Foucault does not return to any "sovereign, 
founding subject, a universal form of subject to be found everywhere. " 
He insists: 
I am very sceptical of this view of the subject and very hostile to 
it. I believe, on the contrary, that the subject is constituted 
through practices of subjection, or, in a more autonomous way, 
through practices of liberation, of liberty, as in Antiquity, on the 
basis, of course, of a number of ruffs, styles, inventions to be 
found in the cultural environment. 
Foucault's work on the practices or technologies of the self presuppose 
an undifferentiated matter (inside of the outside) and self-organising 
processes of becoming (subjectivation) that fold the chaos, force and 
chance of the outside into a new relation (self) with the inside. Self 
as relation (rapport a soi), subjectivation as process( the 'four- 
fold'). Foucault's interiority of thought is the development of a self- 
organizing form connecting and bifurcating, diverging and folding with 
the chaotic matter of the Outside: it is the becoming of a Nietzschean 
"dancing star". This new relation to self (as the interiorisation of the 
other - both the other 'outside' the self and the other within the self) 
is a locus of resistance, flight and transformation, an ever changing 
pool of potentia that has the power to affect and be affected depending 
on the processes of subjectivation and the existing relation to self. 
15 
The production of selves and the process of individuation are separate 
from yet conditioned through the productions of Knowledge and Power. 
They are 'lines of flight' or escape and it will be necessary to assess 
each form of subjectivation according to the blockages, supports or 
resistances it offers. This is Foucault's attempt to "refuse what we 
are", 
49 
to "get free of oneself" 
50 
and invent, not discover, "new forms 
of subjectivity". 
51 If Foucault embraced the Kantian 'Ausgang' it was 
because it corresponded to that "permanent provocation" or "agonism" 
52 
of 
the self found in his last books. And if 'aesthetic' criteria provide a 
model for this exit or line of flight toward the creation of "new 
subject formations" it was only to replace transcendental judgements 
with immanent evaluations. To search, invent, create and experiment with 
the "trace of that which escapes", 
53 
this is the Foucauldian 
acategorical imperative, an imperative guided by a "thinking otherwise" 
about Knowledge, Power and Self which leads ultimately to new thought, a 
new image of thinking, an imageless, foundationless freedom of immanent 
thought in space-time. 
We will attempt, then, to develop a reading of Foucault's thought as a 
philosophy of immanent freedom, a thought that Deleuze's work has 
generated and that Foucault always practised - particularly with 
Nietzsche: 
The only valid tribute to thought such as Nietzsche's is precisely 
to use it, to deform it, to make it groan and protest. And if 
commentators then say that I aT4being unfaithful to Nietzsche that 
is of absolutely no interest. 
16 
1. LITERATURE, MADNESS AND THE SPACE OF TRANSGRESSIVE THOUGHT 
From Writing to Cartography 
We are all agreed that your theory is crazy - the question which 
divides us is whether it is crazy enough. 
By the madness which interrupts it, a work of art opens a void, a 
moment of silence, a question without answer, provokes a breach 
without reconciliation where the world is forced to question itself. 
2 
Intensity is silent. It's image is not (I love everything that 
dazzles me and then accentuates the darkness within me). 
And if seeing was fire, I required the plenitude of fire, and if 
seeing woýld infect me with madness, I would madly want that 
madness. 
Tragic consciousness never ceases to be vigilant. It communicates with 
the 'lost' cosmic time of madness and the cries yet to come. Michel 
Foucault will not just play witness to this 'verticality', closing his 
eyes and plugging up his ears but he will write, he says, the archeology 
of its silence. The impossibility of this task, to say madness itself, 
to have a language speak that "sticks in the throat, collapses before 
having attained formulation and returns without incident to the silence 
from which it had never been freed, " 
5 is by a paradoxical twist the very 
possibility of the enterprise. If Foucauldian discourse can twist into 
and out of the void without identifying or equating with it (which would 
be negative transcendence or theology) and thus maintain a "relativity 
without recourse" 
6 
then the problem of elocution or articulation can be 
displaced. Out of the void emerges the possibility of 'thinking 
otherwise', a critical / transgressive thought that begins in non- 
recognition. 
17 
1. Madness. 
Partage/memory. The decision or gesture of division that organises the 
spaces of the book (Madness and civilisation) does not attempt to say 
madness 'itself' but to discover the "perpetual exchange, the obscure 
common root-the confrontation.. " 
7 
that constitutes and reconstitutes the 
figure of madness. Partage is the topological structure of the 'history' 
of madness: 
but only insofar as division is not understood as a cutting gesture, 
or the establishment of a separation or the measuring of a distance, 
only retaining that in it which may designate the existence of 
difference. 
The division is not outside history but is the outside of history at the 
limit of historicity: the difference of history. Madness is always 
already "a not yet divided experience of division itself" 
9. 
From the 
distance of the partage established Outside, the variable divisions and 
limits are constituted inside. Or rather, the limit insists and subsists 
in the fold or 'edge' between inside and outside, same and other, reason 
and non-reason. 
Madness and non-madness, reason and non-reason are inextricably 
involved: inseparable at the moment when they do not yet exist, and 
existing for each othefb in relation to each other in the exchange 
which separates them. 
The 'caesura' that separates and joins madness to the 'not yet' of the 
outside is an original feature: "What is originative is the caesura that 
establishes the distance between reason and non-reason" 
11. 
The 'caesura' 
is a topological figure of the limit because it is simultaneously inside 
and outside. "Limitations are not historical because they are constitutive 
of all possible history. "12 If the distance between reason and its other 
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becomes 'absolute' and their relation is formally broken in the classical 
age, the partage of this 'broken dialogue' or 'non-relation' is not 
forgotten but retained in an asignifying outside, an invisible fold or 
condition for madness to signify as deraison. The asylum is the 
architectural figure of a memory that must be forgotten. The Outside is 
retained in forgetfulness - the Eternal Return of madness. 
Madness and Civilisation offers a history of the 'return' of the tragic 
memory of madness that bursts into a transgressive 'present', a 
historical 'noumenalism' of its silent image that conditions the entire 
network of its phenomenal appearance and disappearance. Its phantoms 
and menace, its secret tragic destiny are obscurely preserved in Bosch, 
Brueghel, Thiery bouts and Durer. At the birth of the classical when 
literary, scientific and philosophical discourse are engaged in 
capturing madness ( General hospital, birth of the asylum, Cartesian 
philosophy, etc) Foucault returns to the moment of the classical 
partage. If "with Erasmus, with the whole humanist tradition, madness is 
caught in the universe of discourse", in painting something else 
occurs: 
on one side Bosch, Brueghel, Thiery bouts, Durer... madness 
possesses there a primitive force of revelation: the revelation 
that the dream state is real, that the fragile surface opens onto an 
undeniable profundity, and the reverse but equally painful 
revelation that the entire reality of the world will some day be re 
absorbed in the fantastic image, in this moment betweenlýeing and 
nothingness which is the delirium of pure destruction. 
A moment between being and nothingness, a transgressive immanent 
revelation of an experience of madness: a 'pure', fantastic, ecstatic 
destiny. The 'pureness' of the experience of madness constantly risks, 
in order only to be 'itself', being nothing, a non-experience. 
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The world is already no more, but silence and the night are not yet 
entirely closed in on it... This entire network of appearance and the 
secretive, of the immediate image and the hidden enigma, is depicted 
in the painjing of the fifteenth century as the tragic madness of 
the world. 
Reserve/Distance. This 'experience' does not exist but 'subsists' in 
the outside of tragic revelation. This subsistence is not confined to 
the visible. The potency of tragic madness made into an immediate 
experience in the field of discourse, drained of its powers and 
prestige, is nevertheless not exhausted by it. Certain texts retain the 
primitive vivacity of the tragic, they capture the "lost time" of 
madness but also communicate with a future time. They constitute a 
transhistorical fund or reserve bringing together past and future in an 
invisible present. Shakespeare and Cervantes 
both testify more to a tragic experience of madness appearing in 
the fifteenth century, than to a critical and moral experience of 
unreason developing in their own epoch. Outside of time, they 
establish a link with a meaning about to be lost and f4ose 
continuity will no longer survive except in darkness. 
The forgetting of this reserve, of its pathos, is the history of 
madness, its lyricism "ceaselessly snuffed out. " 
16 
Classical (tragic) 
madness is silenced by the cartesian gesture which in the very movement 
of proceeding towards truth "renders impossible the lyricism of 
unreason. " 
17 
The 'critical and moral experience' of madness is an already 
tamed and reflexive a posteriori experience of decision: 
The division (partage) has already been made: between these two 
forms of experience of madness, the distance will not cease to 
increase. The figures of the cosmic vision and the movements of 
moral reflection, the tragic element and the critical element, will 
go their own way from this moment on, separating themselves from 
each other to an ever increasing extent, and opening inlhhe profound 
unity of madness a void that will never more be closed. 
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The ever increasing distance between the two forms of madness does not 
place tragic madness 'at a distance' since the void is inscribed so 
completely 'within' unreason: 
It will not be said that we were at a distance from madness but 
within distance of it. The Greeks, similarly, were not distanced 
from 'hubris' because they condemned it; they were rather within 
reach of Jýis excess located at the heart of the distance where they 
kept it. 
The Fold. The lyricism of unreason re-emerges within the distance of the 
discourse of Rameau's nephew, a space that remains invisible to the 
eighteenth century but which is visible to us. This space enables 
Foucault to make visible the vast structures of unreason which lay 
dormant in western culture which in a flash sketches the contours of the 
great unbroken topological line from the ship of fools to the last words 
of Nietzsche and beyond. The space created by Rameau's discourse is a 
hinged heterotopic space, 'insisting' in a fold at the limit of the 
classical, topologically linking inside and out, a virtual space 
actualised through differentiation; it is the non-space into which 
Foucault's discourse disappears and reemerges tracing out the limits of 
epistemological space. 
What is the significance of this unreasonable existence which 
Rameau's nephew figures in a manner that remains a secret for his 
contemporaries but which is decisive for our retrospective 
perspective? It is an existence which is rooted very far back in 
time. . . and announcing also the most modern forms of unreason, those 
which are contemporaneous with Nerval, Nietzsche, and Antonin 
Artaud. To interrogate the paradox of the existence of Rameau's 
nephew, which is so visible to us and yet which remained invisible 
to the eighteenth century, is to place oneself slightly in retreat 
from the chronicle of evolution. But it is at the same time to 
allow oneself to perceive in their general form, the vast structures 
of unreason-those which lay dormant in Western Culture, a little 
underneath the time of historians... it is necessary to investigate 
it [Le neveu] as a condensed paradigm of history. Because for the 
flash of an instant, it sketches the great broken line that goes 
from the ship of fools to the last words of Nietzsche and perhaps 
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even up to the cries of Artaud... The history that we will have to 
write in this last part ing8alls itself in the space opened by the 
discourse of the Nephew. " 
Foucault's discourse inserts itself into that space of lyrical excess, 
of "torn presence, " out of a necessity which would otherwise make of his 
discourse a treatment excluding the "lyric glow of illness. " 
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Foucauldian discourse must of necessity move into this space but must do 
so temporarily, testing its limits, reversing any orders that it accepts 
and finally moving beyond them. Foucauldian discourse thus 
'participates' in madness, in pathos, yet simultaneously in logos. 
This critical space or non space provides Foucault with a perspective on 
the limits of epistemic order, where orders dissolve and are reborn and 
where transgression becomes possible. This space is the 'exteriority' 
of discourse, it subsists in the 'in-between', in those gaps within and 
across discourses where they are separated from themselves, from their 
own disappearance, or merging with other discourses or a return to 
22 
silence. 
2. Literature. 
The great unbroken line of madness made visible in a flash of lightning 
before fading back into the invisible is a recurrent image in Foucault's 
book. Certain texts, by virtue of their (non) expression, are marked by a 
rent, cut or fold that (momentarily) opens their limit to an Other, an 
Outside, a transgressive space that involutes the ordered transparent 
spaces of reason. The transparent spaces of classical representation are 
profoundly disturbed when 'literature' is born, in a lightning flash, 
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opening up a transgressive space of dispersion and difference that will 
fold into the 'void' of madness. Literature begins where rhetoric ends at 
a "moment.. . when a language appeared that appropriates all other languages 
(religion and classical discourses) in its lightning flash, giving birth to 
an obscure but dominant figure where death, the mirror and the wavelike 
succession of words to infinity enact their roles. " 
23 
If religious discourse occupied that space poised against death then for 
literature to be born atheistic discourse will not be enough; language 
must murder God and take the place of the word. Sade and Holderlin are 
the midwives of this birth. Tragic consciousness has been awoken, then, 
with the last words of Nietzsche and the last visions of Van Gogh and it 
is this consciousness that is expressed in a certain experience of 
madness: 
"it is these extreme discoveries and these alone that permit us 
today to determine therefore, that the experience of madness which 
extends from the sixteenth century up to the present owes its 
particular figure and origin of itself, to thi54absence to this 
night and to everything that constitutes it. " 
The tragic structure of madness from which history proceeds is the 
refusal and silent fall of madness through history. The 'memory' of this 
structure is reawakened in the division, distance and reserve of the 
aleatory relation between madness and literature. 
Absenting language. Madness, Foucault says, is doubtless the absence of 
work: "where there is a work there is no madness. " 
25 
The paintings and 
texts of the tragic are not works but transgressions of the limits of 
works, in an absence or recess of discourse, which cannot be mastered. If 
Foucauldian discourse situates itself in relation to this absence it is 
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only to question itself, transgress and (de)position itself. Foucault 
finds this strategy at work in Raymond Roussel: 
It is Roussel's linguistic space, the void from which he speaks, the 
absence which binds and mutually excludes his work and his madness. 
This void is not to be understood as a metaphor. It is the 
invsolvency of words which are fewer in number than the things they 
designate, 
2 gnd 
due to this principle of economy must take on 
meaning. 
Roussel's language wanders on a tightrope over the void, constantly 
doubling and dividing itself. Foucault's Roussel is a rebus which shows 
what it shows but not what in it is shown. "Language is that space by 
which a being and its duplicate are united and separated: it's a 
relation of that hidden shadow which shows things by hiding their 
being. " 
27 
Roussel's language doesn't want to conceal anything or set up a 
fundamental division between the visible and the invisible so much as 
show that the visible and the invisible repeat each other infinitely. 
Foucault finds machines that "enclose the procedures in which they are 
enclosed", 
28 
systems which repeat and reverse themselves, a whole panoply 
of tropes and figures, fantastic machines and bizarre stories which all 
cover the void: 
He does not want to duplicate the reality of another world, but, in 
the spontaneous doubling of language discover9an unsuspected space 
and cover it with things never before said. 
The 'being' of language that Foucault finds in Roussel and Modern 
literature exemplifies the space of transgressive thought because it 
both 'binds' and 'mutually exludes' its relation to madness. It does not 
gather itself into a unity or totality of the same but 'disperses' its 
statements into a space of exteriority, an absence and impossibility 
hollowed out through its own redoublings: 
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it is time to realise that the language of literature is neither 
defined by what it says, no more than it is by the structures that 
make it meaningful. It has a being and it is in terms of this being 
that it is necessary to question it. This being, what is it 
actually? Something without a doubt that has something to do with 
auto-implication, wiýý the double, and with the emptiness that is 
hollowed out in it. 
In all of Foucault's writings on 'literature' the movement of language 
to its own disappearance, the instability and disorder within language, 
the limits of language and the place where it splits apart are teased 
out. 
No doubt it is like a dark machine for creating repetition and thus 
the hollowing out of a void where being is swallowed up, where words 
hurl themselves on pursuit of objects 3ind where 
language endlessly 
crashes down into this central void. 
In fact, language is teased out not to be interiorised (to state nothing 
but itself) but to show itself 'outside' of itself, to escape the mode 
of being of discourse - the great dynasty of identity and representation 
- in order to affirm "its own precipitous existence. " 
32 
This precipitous existence is precisely its hollowness to infinity "its 
uncontrollable flight to a hearth which is without light" 
33 
which no 
culture can immediately accept. The language of literature is 
transgressive not in its meaning or its verbal matter but in its playful 
movement to the outside. From its play of double designation and 
endless reduplication, follows the proliferating emptiness of language, 
its capacity to say "all things, to lead them to their luminous being, 
to place in the sun their 'mute' truth, to 'unmask' them. " 
34 
Transgressive literature speaks "in a language stripped of dialectics. " 
35 
It is located "at the centre of the subjects disappearance" 
36 
where it 
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proceeds to the limit and to that opening onto the Outside " where its 
being surges forth, but where it is already completely lost, completely 
overflowing itself, emptied of itself to the point where it becomes an 
37 
absolute void. " 
3. Literature and Madness. (The transgressive fold). 
The poet and the madman, work and madness, communicate with each other 
and exclude each other through a fundamental absence which opens out 
onto an exterior, an outside that nevertheless responds to its own 
internal and differential articulation. Madness is not found in, 
literature if it poses a challenge and limit to discourse this is 
because literature links up with the absent opening outside seperating 
discourse and madness. 
"Hence also this strange intimacy between madness and literature to 
which one should not lend the meaning of a psychological relation 
finally revealed. Uncovered like a language silencing itself and 
superimposing itself on itself madness doesn't manifest or recount 
the birth of an oeurve, it designates the empty form whence the 
oeuve derives, that is to say the place from which it never ceases 
to be absent, where one will never find it because it was never 
there. In this pale region this essential hiding, the common 
incompatibility of the oeuvre and madness reveals itself. It i8the 
blind spot of their possibilities and their mutual exclusion. " 
The highest transgression, which is the blindspot of their possiblities 
and their mutual exclusions (work, madness) exposes in its performance 
the code of its utterance: language silencing itself by folding into 
its outside, carving itself from within to infinity. Indeed, The Order 
of Things tells us that there is no language more transgressive than 
literature; a non-discursive language "folded back upon the enigma of 
its own origin and existing wholly in reference to the pure act of 
26 
writing. " 
39 
A language which "curves back in a perpetual return upon 
itself", 40 as if its discourse could have no other content than the 
expression of its own formative process. The ultimate transgression is 
"a silent, cautious deposition of the word upon the whiteness of a piece 
of paper. " 
41 
Sex/Death. Transgressive language carves out its own immanent space outside 
in the absence of god and simultaneously produces and assimilates a 
prodigious sexuality: 
on the day that sexuality began to speak and be spoken language no 
longer served as a veil for the infinite; and in the thickness it 
acquired on that day, we now experience finitude and being. In its 
dark domain, we now encou er the absence of god, our death, limits, 
and their transgression. 
Sexuality is "the limit of language, since it traces the line of foam 
43 
showing just how far speech may advance upon the sands of silence. " 
Transgression is the very language of sexuality. "Since Sade and the 
death of God, the universe of language has absorbed our sexuality. " 
44 
It 
speaks from where it falls, from precisely where words escape. 
Sexuality is not a 'theme' of transgression since it is inscribed 
completely in the fold of the outside (the structure of the outside 
within) as the transgressive structure. Bataille's language "describes 
a circle; it refers to itself and is folded back on a questioning of its 
limits"; 45 In questioning its limits, Bataille's language opens violently 
onto the outside, cleaving a sexuality that desginates us: "sexuality is a 
fissure - not one which surrounds us as the basis of our isolation or 
individuality, but one which marks the limit within us and designates us as 
46 
a limit. " 
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Transgression means not only to 'communicate' through sex but it is also 
its impossible root, it is the "excessive distance which it opens at the 
heart of the limit. " 
47 Sex in transgression is violation at the limit of 
being, the shattering of unity and the approach of death. But this movement 
does not exhaust it. Opening "violently onto the limitless" 
48 
serves as a 
"glorification" of that which is violated: transgression carries the 
violated away with it - an affirmation of annihilation. Transgressive 
sex is not the transcendence of loss but its transvaluation. It is a 
profanation of the 'sacred' and the mark of a new sacred which attempts 
to "overcome the limits to the death of God; " 
49 in excess of God's death 
it is not God or religion that are transgressed but the "limited and 
positivistic world, " 
50 
a world of discourse. 
Literature is posthumous speech. It is a non-discursive absential language 
that "transgresses the limit of death through its reduplication in a 
mirror. " 
51 Languages' affinity with death functions through its movement 
to the outside (through "a tear in the fabric of language" 
52) in which it 
is "fulfilled by this alien plenitude which invades it to the core of its 
being" 53, the opening up of a virtual space on the limit of death and its 
pursuit to infinity. "Death is undoubtedly the most essential of the 
accidents of language.,, 
54 
Bataille's death, Foucault wrote, was an event 
encountered by his language. Foucault wanted to speak "from where 
Bataille's death has recently placed his language. " 
55 
The language of 
literature is organized by its immanence to the singularizing and enabling 
space of death: 
It is quite likely that the approach of death - its sovereign 
gesture, its prominence within human memory - hollows out in the 
presentsgnd in existence the void toward which and from which we 
speak. 
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We live death as it organizes our relation to sex and language, in our 
madness and our literature; we live death as it organizes our relation 
to the outside: 
Perhaps their exists in speech an essential affinity between death, 
endless striving, and the self-representation of language.. from the 
day that men began to speak toward death and against it, in order to 
grasp and imprison it, something was born, a murmering which 
repeats, recounts, and redoubles itself endlessly, which has 
undergone an uncanny process of amplification aý9 thickening, in 
which our language is today lodged and hidden. 
4. The transgressive double. 
Language is lodged and hidden, then, in the 'communication' between 
literature and madness, at the absential, erotic and cadaverous site of 
transgression where the 'mute' consciousness of tragic madness links up 
in a complex relation with the blind streaming of anegoic 'literature'. 
Within this relation an immanent, transgressive space of the outside is 
produced for thought and History: 
The dissolution of a work in madness, this void to which poetic 
speech is drawn as to its self-destruction, is what authorises the 
text of a language common to both (work and madness). These are not 
abstractions, but historical relationships whic8our culture must 
eventually examine if it hopes to find itself. 
If our culture is starting to examine itself in literature, or to 
examine its madness in literature, in the writings of the Marquis de 
Sade Foucault proclaims that "the western world gathered the possibility 
of overcoming its reason in violence and of reviving the tragic 
experience beyond the promises of the dialectic. " 
59 
Dialectic and 
discourse, or the traditional referential language of philosophy are 
being transgressed in the revival of tragic experience. This revival 
promises the possibility of transgressing the boundaries of the modern 
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episteme. Foucault discovers this possibility in those artists whose 
madness is indicative of a new form of art in which "language and 
delirium are interlaced. " 
60 
Language and delirium are tied together 
through the site of the tragic. Madness functions as something like a 
silent transhistorical fund or reserve, whose structural 'exclusion' or 
limit is isomorphic with the non-existence of 'literature' before the 
dissolution of representation. Language functions in this double-space: 
the space of the language of a work that constitutes what the work says 
and the groundless space of a 'blind' delirium "through which it 
speaks. " This language says what it says but it adds a blind and mute 
outside, a surplus that "enunciates what it says and according to which 
code it says what it says". This transgressive space is like "an 
essential fold of the utterance. A fold that hollows it out from within 
and perhaps to infinity" 
61. 
The doubling of transgression is blind and 
mute even as it lets 'see' and 'say' in a new way simultaneously 
transforming the limits of its 'own' space and the limits of the space 
it transgresses. Madness and work are articulated onto each other 
through a doubly enigmatic space of the same that gives birth through 
its limit to a space of difference. 
These two forms of discourse obviously manifest a profound 
incompatibility, even though an identical content is put to 
profitable use in either discourse; the simultaneous unravelling of 
poetic and psychological structures will never succeed in reducing 
the distance which separates them. Nevertheless, they are extremely 
close, perhaps as close as a possibility is to its realisation. 
This is because the continuity of meaning between a work and madness 
can only be realised if it is based on the enigma of similarity, an 
enigma 9 ich gives rise to the absolute nature of the breaking 
point. 
Profoundly incompatible, yet as close as possibility is to its 
realisation, the double relation between madness and literature 
fluctuates between discursive continuity and ecstatic fragmentation, 
between infinite possibility and the precision of meaning. 
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Madness is the absolute break with the work of art; it forms the 
constitutive moment of abolition, which dissolves in time the truth 
of the work of art; it draws the exterior edge, the line of 
dissolution, the contour against the void. Artauds oeuvreexperiences 
its own absence in madness, but that experience, the fresh courage 
of that ordeal, all those words hurled against a fundamental absence 
of language, all that space of physical suffering and terror which 
surrounds or rather coincides with the void - that is the work of63 
art itself: the sheer cliff over the abyss of the works absence. 
S. The absence of work. (writing/reading otherwise). 
Madness and work inhabit this vertiginate and shattering space, the 
double and voided space of a transgressive outside that (modernist) 
language finds in itself. The host / parasite structure that conditions 
the relation of madness and work opens onto an enigmamatic space where 
one cannot tell them apart or hold them together: such is the 'enigma of 
their similarity'. In this neuter (neither positive or negative) yet 
reversible space madness and work 'give rise to the absolute nature of 
the breaking point'. It is a transgressive space that does not confirm 
madness in its interdiction but produces it as a moment of its own 
impossibility. It designates the outside as out of reach: accessing the 
inacessible, crossing the uncrossable. Poetic language particularly 
'performs' and enacts the 'essential hiding' of literature and madness 
at the limit of a transgressive outside: 
But a discourse (similar to Blanchot's) which places itself within 
the grammatical posture of the "and" that joins madness and an 
artistic work, a discourse which investigates this indivisible unity 
and which concerns itself with the space created when these two are 
joined, is necessarily an interrogation of the Limit, understood as 
the line gýere madness becomes, in a precise sense, a perpetual 
rupture. 
'Desoeuvrement' 
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names the 'work' or process that enables the production 
of this ruptured space. Desoeuvrement is the immanent spatial logic of 
the outside that articulates madness and literature as a disjunctive 
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word-image; it is the unsayable invisible source from which the work and 
madness emerge and into which it would disappear. Desoeuvrement is both 
the division or 'partage' that articulates the modern relation between 
madness and literature but also the functional 'Limit' or unworking of 
this 'partage' relation. This Limit that Foucault's writing interrogates 
and is orientated and directed beyond is designated as a 'hollowed 
void', a 'white space': 
it creates the partage which gives it the face of its positivity6 
there one can find the originary thickness where it is formed. 
Foucault interrogates the ruptured space of desoeuvrement, "which is 
like the birth itself of its history" 
67 by making visible the divisions, 
folds and interlacings of its 'originary thickness' and attempting to 
see beyond them. Desoeuvrement is both the condition and occasion for 
the madness / literature relation but also the condition and occasion of 
Foucault's archaeology of silence as an experiment in both 'writing' and 
'reading' otherwise that dissolves itself, a new way of reading and 
writing history as desoeuvrement that necessarily seeps into the folds 
of aesthetics, epistemology, politics etc. Desoeuvrement is a feverish 
and shattering effort at thinking 'impossibility' or 'absence' as the 
unthought thought of thought. It is the 'passion of the outside'68. There 
is an unthought (madness) from which thought tries constantly to free 
itself and Foucault's practice of desoeuvrement aims to transform the 
spaces through which the 'madness' of history is made (in)visible 
through its unthought, its absence of work, its unworkness. Foucault's 
great book (Madness & Civilisation) is a writing that absents itself, a 
work that transgresses itself by disappearing into the space of the 
outside that it both summons and produces. Foucault's book is a vehicle 
for a writing that transgresses itself through its own worklessness. 
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writing passes through the book, accomplishing itself tare even as 
it disappears there; yet we do not write for the book. 
The writing exceeds or transgresses the book in a complex topological 
absence that doesn't just disposess or displace the author so much as 
suicide his (im)possibility: 
I would like that this object-event (madness and civilisation), 
almost imperceptible among so many others, re-copy, fragment, 
repeat, simulate and double itself, (and) disappear finally without 
ever allowing the one who happened to produce it to be able to claim 70 
mastery over it, to impose what he meant, to say what he had to say. 
The writer has no tenure, no legible space from which the work could be 
lead into the light, despite making himself 'extravagantly seen' in the 
process of writing. The book, in fact, functions as a peculiarly dense 
transfer point or attractor of the outside through which the work 
collapses under its own weight like a dying star. The work absents the 
'author' and involutes its own force relations into the impossible space 
of its 'production'. The work 'can not yet say' and 'no longer 
represent' and in this we should hear the echo of Blanchot who offers a 
trajectory of the writer: 
From the 'not yet' to the 'no longer' - this is the path of what we 
call the writer, not only his time, which is always suspeýjed, but 
what brings him to life through an interrupted becoming. 
Foucault's early path of 'writing' doubles Blanchot's to the extent that 
the 'doubly impossible' task of Madness and Civilisation simulates the 
rigourous logic of Blanchot's literary production. From the 'not yet' 
to the 'no longer' in a 'single layer of language', Foucault's book 
functions as the 'object-event' through which the writing moves towards 
its absent opening outside, a transition from the personal je to the 
impersonal il. Before the writing the writer is not there and after the 
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writing the writer is no longer, dissolved in the impersonality of a 
'one writes, ' 'one dies. ' The 'he', 'it', or 'one' does not occupy the 
place taken by the subject but fragments and disperses its space, 
pluralising and repeating its absence; a space from which 'it' is 
missing, remaining empty, but producing and forcing open a surplus of 
space, a multiplicity of hypertopic spaces out of which emerges a new 
transgressive relation between madness and work, between writing and 
reading, between thought and the outside. 
What remains or dwells in the hypertopic absence of the book is a 
cadaverising madness or a madness cadaverised. The 'absolute memory' of 
madness retained in the grave of Madness and Civilization. The 'project' 
of madness and Civilisation seals the grave of madness: 
since it would enjoin us to reconstitute the dust of those concrete 
sufferings, of those insensate words which nothing moors to time, 
and especially since these sufferings and words only exist and are 
only given in themselves and to others in the gesture of division 
which already denounces and masters them ... the perception that 
seeks to grasp them in their pure form 95cessarily belongs to a 
world that has already separated them. 
The materiality of language seeks to recover that which it had to 
destroy in order to come into existence. The 'object-event' that is 
Madness and Civilisation attempts to replace the object proper that was 
previously eliminated recognising all along the impossible, double 
impossible nature of the task. The materiality of language reinforces 
the restraints covering what has been lost. Writing does not resurrect 
madness 'itself'. Madness 'itself' is lost in the space of its 'literary' 
production, and language, in attempting to 'revive' madness loses 'itself' 
in a 'deafening night'. If madness 'itself' is always already captured in a 
gesture, a historically variable gesture of division that gives it its 
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figure, the simulacrum of madness that Foucault's text releases in its 
desoeuvrement - as a simulacrum of a simulacrum - unworks any gesture of 
division in directing its 'expression' into the contaminated space of 
transgression that carries the gesture away with it. Foucault's text 
functions as a transgressive simulacrum of madness by contesting decision 
or division through loss, disempowerment, and forgetting. 
Yet the cadaver addressed by the 'reader' opens the grave of the book. 
"Such is the nature of that 'opening' that reading is. " 
73 
The 
call or silent appeal of the text opens a space for reading to dwell, a 
space of "participation in that open violence, the work. "74 Reading the 
absence of the book, erasing all its names including its own, delivers a 
freedom that "says yes, can only say yes" 
75 
to the work. Reading 'makes' 
the book 'become' a work, not a production since it makes 'nothing' but 
through a pure affirmation that clears a space for its 'interrupted 
becoming'. There is no content only a pure affirmation: 
the affirmation that it is - nothing more. 
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Reading Madness and Civilisation, listening to the silent call of 
madness, opens the grave of this book, "lifts the book to the work which 
it is" 77 and the cadaverous text pro-jects itself. Reading enters into a 
properly Nietzschean becoming: "a helplessly joyful dance with the 
'tomb'" 
78 
of madness. 
The freedom of readings yes, its 'helplessly joyful dance' is a response 
to the call that turns the reader "away from ordinary relations and 
toward the space in whose proximity the reading, by abiding there, 
becomes the approach to the work... " 
79 
Reading and writing are bound 
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together in a fragmentary, indefinite and reversible topological 
relation that opens the absence of the work into a productive becoming. 
In approaching the space of the work, the absence which is outside it, 
by abiding there, reading confronts the great witnesses of madness in 
their 'absence d'oeuvre. ' Reading's affirmation is compelled 
'helplessly' to reinscribe the names, to pursue them to the outside, 
because it is before what they name. This 'family' of names is by now 
familiar enough: Artaud and Van Gogh, sometimes Holderlin, Roussel, 
Diderot, Nerval and, above all, Nietzsche. Their excess, "the madness 
in which the work of art is engulfed, " 
80 is the 'gulf', 'abyss', 'void', 
'nothing' or 'outside' (all of Foucault's words) which opens, as Foucault 
says, "the space of our enterprise. " 
81 
The space of Foucault's enterprise carves out a 'becoming-other' for 
thought between madness and literature that is transgression. Madness is 
lost, reading can not make it 'appear', but it will take us to a 
threshold before which 'We' or 'the world' are summoned. Reading is 
not authorised beyond this limit space and begins to flounder in its own 
impossibility. noli me legere, 'you will not read me. ' It does not 
interrogate, examine, objectify, open a conversation or demand an 
explanation. 
The moment when, together, the work of art and madness are born and 
fulfilled is the beginning of the time when the world finds itself 
arraýgned by that work of art and responsible before it for what it 
is. 
Constituted 'outside' by the non-discursive discourses of Nietzsche, 
Artaud, et al, 'reading' "a work opens a void, a moment of silence, a 
question without answer, provokes a breach without reconciliation, where 
the world is forced to question itself. " 
83 
The history of madness (and 
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the mobile, fragmented, divided 'we' of reading) assumes 
'responsibility' for that which is named by Nietzsche, Artaud etc. 'We' 
are arraigned by madness, "the enigmatic 'we' for whom a history of 
madness opens today, for whom the door of today is cracked open so that 
its possibility may be glimpsed. " 
84 
The cracked open door of today is the 
fault-line, through which we are arraigned by madness, through which we 
are measured by the immeasurable but without measuring and limiting the 
immeasurable: 
The world that thought to measure and justify madness through 
psychology must justify itself before madness, since in its 
struggles and debates it measures itself by the excess of works like 
those of Nietzsche, of Van Gogh, or Artaud. And nothing in it, 
especially not what it can know of madness $5assures the world that 
it is justified by such works of madness. 
6. Cartographies of immanence. 
Foucault images a new 'plane of immanence' whose contours are folded 
into a 'no longer' and a 'not yet', a 'lost time, of madness and a 
future not yet in time, ' past and future conjoined in an invisible and 
unsayable 'present'. It is a fractured present, a 'time out of joint' 
that no longer confirms the teleological passage from past to future but 
opens onto an Outside, a virtual temporality that bursts into an 
affirmation of becoming. There is a 'pure empty form of time, that 
relates madness to its relative pasts, presents and futures, and 
Foucault spatialises (topologises) the 'time' of madness, replaces a 
history of madness with a 'stratigraphic' time of madness that 
superimposes the various layers and curvatures of space-time strata in 
an infinite, or as Blanchot would say, an 'interrupted becoming. ' The 
history of the 'devinir- autre', of the becoming-other of the 'event' of 
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madness 'insists' and 'subsists' in its 'present' as what we are no 
longer and in its 'actuality', as what we are not yet, the future of an 
'infinite now. ' The actuality of madness as 'the now of our becoming: ' 
Perhaps someday we will no longer know what madness could have been. 
Its figure will have so closed in on itself as no longer to allow 
the traces that it will have left behind to be deciphered. At best 
they will be among the configurations that we today would not be 
able to draw, but which in the future will be indespensable grills 
for interpreting us and our culture. Artaud will then belong to the 
grounds of our culture and no longer to the break with it; 
neurotics, to the constitutive forms (and not the deviations) of our 
society. Everything that we experience today in the form of a limit 
or as foreign or insupportable, will have taken on the serene 
characteristics of what is positive. And what for us tggay 
designates this exterior risks one day designating us. 
The 'today' of our becoming-mad, Nietzsche and Artaud as the 'ground' of 
, our, culture in a fold of its exteriority in which 'we' are no longer 
but always becoming, the history of madness drawn on the plane of 
immanence, that which must be thought and that which cannot be thought. 
The unthought within thought. The extimacy of madness 'within' thought, 
"intimacy as the outside, the exterior become the intrusion that 
stifles, and the reversal of both the one and the other. " 
87 
The Passion of 
madness outside, simultaneously a displacement and an intensification, a 
constantly repeated (Nietzschean) 'going-under' of history "in the 
interior of the exterior and inversely" as Madness and Civilisation puts 
it. Foucault elsewhere calls this an "autochthonous transformation, " 
88 
the 'configurations that we today would not be able to draw' function as 
the autochthon of 'our' becoming mad, madness in our actuality, whilst 
'today' in our present it is that which is our 'stranger': 
What was Autochtbonous becomes strange; what was strange beocmee 
Autochthonous. 
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Foucault maps out 'in the future' a plane of immanence that would 
deterritorialise our autochthon, our plane of today, by reterritorialising 
our stranger in a new plane of immanent madness that would designate us. 
And 'we' as a 'transitory postulate' are already no longer': 
a denouement is already in process: madness and mental illness are 
undoing their affiliation to the same anthropological unit. This 
unity itself is disappearing along with the human as a transitory 
postulate. Madness, the lyrical halo of illness, continues to 
extinguish itself. And at a distance from pathology, from the 
vicinity where language folds in upon itself still saying nothing, 
an experience is about to be born where our thought is headed. This 
imminengS, already visible but absolutely empty, remains to be 
named. 
This is not a utopic space of the future, but the ectopic space of our 
becoming, the heterotopic space of the 'now. ' And Foucault's great book 
represents his first 'diagnosis' of our becoming, a first effort as 
'physician of civilisation, ' a diagnostics of Madness and Civilisation 
as a topology of thought, a thinking-otherwise about the spaces that 
confine thought in order to contest them and transform them. 
Foucault's immanent cartography of madness and work traces the 
deterritorialised /reterritorialised system of spaces that constitute 
their 'encounter' or 'relation. ' It maps the absence through which work 
and madness communicate with and exclude each other. The writing of the 
work is an exercise in mapping and deterritorialisation. 
Deterritorialising the writing of the work through a space of 
impersonality, inscribed in the alea of its production, leading to the 
dissolution of its authority in an 'absence d'oeuvre. ' The writing of 
the book folds and refolds into the 'torn intimacy' of madness, into the 
space of its simulated 'object'. 
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all those words deprived of language whose muffled rumbling, for an 
attentive ear rises up from the depths of history, the obstinate 
murmur of a language which speaks by itself, uttered by no one and 
answered by no one, a language which stifles itself, sticks in the 
throat, collapses before having attained formulation and returns 
without incident, to the silegie from which it had never been freed. 
The charred root of meaning. 
How to map the absence of the book? How to map the "obstinate murmur of 
a language which speaks by itself, uttered by no one and answered by no 
one"? Derrida, who is otherwise unable to map the absence of this book, 
suggests that madness is articulated through pathos: 
What I mean is that the silence of madness is not said, cannot be 
said in the logos of this book, but is indirectly made present, 
metaphorically, if I may say sog2in the pathos -I take the word in 
its best sense - of this book. 
A madness consumed by its own fiction, blind to itself in its own loss 
of mastery and meaning, suffering in silence the tragic loss of its 
'lyrical presence' in an excess of pathos. A pathos that cannot be 
formulated only mapped and 'practised', and can only be made 
(indirectly) present through a complex topological 'absence': - yet also 
a pathos that is "the most elemental fact from which a becoming and 
effecting first emerge". 
93 
The Greeks thought differently from us about the tragic effect; it 
was brought about by way of the great Bathos scenes. . . where action 
meant little but lyricism everything. 
Foucault's text articulates madness, "under the sun of the great 
Nietzschean search, " 
95 
through a cartographic scenography of pathos and 
great bursts of 'lyrical explosion' in order to insert itself into the 
'torn presence' of a pathetic resonance. Madness and Civilisation 
denounces "the modern worlds effort to speak of madness only in the 
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serene, objective terms of mental illness and to obliterate its pathos. " 
96 
The text constantly attempts to elevate or make visible, through its 
lyricism, scenes of pathos that activate an 'unthought' of thought - 
"the lyric glow of illness. " 
97 
The 'history' of madness is the 
dissolution of this fiction: "Madness, the lyric glow of illness, is 
ceaselessly snuffed out. " 
98 
Foucault's pathos scenes are lines of light 
whose paths make particular features visible in a relation between 
forces. In these 'description - scenes' the text gives us a vision of 
the other, a scenographic map of the other whose glow or luminosity is 
ceaselessly extinguished in the course of its recuperation by 
reflection: "embraced by lyrical experience, this recognition is still 
rejected by philosophical reflection. " 
99 
In the absence of this book 
there is a diagram of forces realised "both in description-scenes and 
statement-curves. " 
100 
The relations between the scenes and curves is 
asignifying and we must consider Foucault's map-book as a "small 
asignifying machine: the only problem is - Does it work and how does it 
work? " 
101 
It works by continually absenting itself, producing itself 
through its own impossibility, breaking down and re-connecting with 
other lines of force, other lines of intensity and it presents these new 
'regimes' as an asignifying relation between curves and scenes of 
historically varying intensity. Foucault's book demands a new way of 
reading the asignifying relations between discursive and figural 
intensities. As a Nietzschean book of madness it is written for all and 
no one simultaneously: 
Simultaneously battle and arms, strategy and shock, struggle and 
trophy (or wound), lg2njuncture and vestige, 
irregular encounter and 
repeatable scene. 
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The question of reading here is determined precisely by how one plugs 
into this book-machine, making its intensities function to produce other 
lines of flight: "There is nothing to explain, nothing to understand, 
nothing to interpret. It can be compared to an electrical connection. 
A body without organs. " 
103 
Rather than make intense, electrifying 
connections with the pathos of Madness and Civilisation Derrida is 
content to read its thematics into a philosophical body, infect it with 
organs, to 'organise' the book, block its affective-machines and intense 
becomings by reterritorialising it on the signifer and the form of the 
concept: 
The concept of madness is never submitted to a thematic examination 
on the part of Foucault, but isn't this concept - outside of 
everyday popular language which always drags on longer than it 
should after being put in question by science and philosophy - isn't 
this concept today a false concept, a concept so disintegrated that 
Foucault, by refusing psychiatric or philosophic tools, which have 
done nothing but imprison madmen, ends up making use - and he has no 
alternative - of184common, equivocal notion, borrowed from a fund 
beyond control. 
Madness is indeed 'a false concept' but one which corrosively unworks 
conceptuality down to its 'charred root', unbinding it from any thematic 
examination, losing itself in a 'fund beyond control'. "What then is 
madness? Nothing, doubtless, but l'absence d'oeuvre.,, 
105 
An absence of 
work, mastery, meaning and control. An(archy). Dissolution in arrival 
and arrival in dissolution. A chiasmic paradox of movement - equivocal 
and common - 'borrowed from a fund beyond control'. The fund cannot be 
thematised - rendered into an equalibrium of stable points - because its 
movement in speed, its 'metastable', vortical or swirling connections 
forge intense, rhizomatic lines of becoming that are endlessly 
transformable, imploding into a permanent trans-fusion across its 
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surfaces: the fund can only be mapped. The 'principle' or dynamic of 
the fund, the source of its transgressive force, is its spatialised and 
spatialising movement: a destabilised and displaced energetics beyond 
control. 
106 
Foucault attempts precisely to 'put in question' the 'control' that 
philosophy and science claim to exert over this fund; and Derrida wants 
to arrest Foucault's questions, stake out his 'positions' with respect to 
the concept of madness, fortify control over the fund through a 
'thematic examination', maximising its meanings. Foucault's 'schizo 
stroll' with madness, however, unworks philosophy's interrogations in 
its affinity with athleticism and nomadism wandering off, changing 
places, connecting and reconnecting elsewhere in a becoming other. It 
is a question of mapping madness onto: 
fields of intensity on the body without organs, identifying 
personages with states that will fill these field 167and with effects 
that fulgurate within and traverse these fields. 
The 'fund beyond control' is precisely a wave of 'fields of intensity' 
on the body without organs of madness traversed by the personages of 
Artaud, Nietzsche and Foucault, perhaps also Freud, the tragic Freud of 
the metapsychology papers, the Freud who 'talks' it out with madness and 
death. All of these proper names designate an effect that ramifies and 
'fulgurates' within these fields superimposing states in an infinite 
process of becoming - tragic states, intense states, states of new 
consciousness: 
Beneath the critical consciousness of madness and its philosophical, 
scientific or moral and medical forms, a mute tragic consciousness 
did not cease its vigil. It is this latter consciousness that 108 
Nietzsche's last words and Van Gogh's last visions have revealed. 
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The mute tragic consciousness of madness is lodged in a fund beyond 
control, retained in a field or patterning of intensity across its body, 
nested in the fold of its (non)expression. Foucault designates this 
space "structurally esoteric. " 
109 
The structurally esoteric space of 
madness is positioned within a "fold that hollows it out from within and 
perhaps to infinity. " 
110 
It is the violent and violating play (and not 
its meaning a'la Derrida) of this fold, its 'uncontrollable flight' that 
transforms the field of intensity into a transgressive space. 
Madness and Civilisation and the early texts on 'literature' forge 
'head-on' into this transgressive fold, consenting to come undone like 
an incendiary device, "battle and arms, strategy and shock, struggle and 
trophy" detonating their own form of expression and charring their own 
roots of meaning in the burn-core of a becoming-intense, stripping them 
of any possible relation with axiomatics. 
Writing only interests me in so far as it can be incorporated into 
the reality of a combat ... I would like my books to be sorts of 
scalpels, Molotov cocktails or mingffelds and that they would 
explode after use like fireworks. 
The 'after-effect' or 'fall-out' is a Guattariesque 'a signifying 
semiotic': a flow of non-repeatable signs, lines of flight that 
chaotically traverse a fund beyond control, unilateral differences 
expressed through the pathos of gesture and cry -a whole theatre of 
madness, a hieroglyphics of the body. Foucault's book functions as a 
'war-machine' by destroying the sovereignity of the signifier-madness, 
detaching it from the concept of a primary Logos and incorporating those 
'words deprived of a language' into the actions of Pathos - flows and 
lines of word-affects penetrating the body and assuming their function 
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as cry and gesture, "retransforming words into theatre. " 
112 Foucault's 
text is a combatant in a 'theartre of war' which is not waged on behalf' 
of madness itself but in the invention and 'occupation' of a smooth 
transgressive space in order to "make thought a war machine". 
113 
Foucault's 'scalpels, ' instruments or weapons ( "all my books are little 
tool kits" 
114) function as a regime of affects, mobile, rapid discharges 
"carried along by the same speed-vector": "weapons are affects and 
115 
affects are weapons. " . Foucault elsewhere calls this single 
mechanism a 'word/projectile' a 'verbo-ballistic invention' a 
'discourse-weapon., 116 The fund is exacerbated beyond control by an 
'arsenal' of word/affect/weapons that exert a pull or attraction 
triggering relays in, or 'out', 'up' or 'down' the fund. This is no 
doubt a strange ani(mad)version of Zeeman's 'catastrophe machine' and 
Foucault's book gives us explosive maps of madness, the catastrophic 
moves in and out of the virtual fund, their denouement, unravelling or 
unfolding, a recoiling or turning, an undoing or unworking mapped 
through a differential topology: a morphogenesis of madness. 
I am shocked that anyone could call himself a writer. I am a dealer 
in inst" its,.. a cartographer, a surveyor of plans, a manufacture 
of arms. 
Foucault's 'topo-analyse' of madness is, then, generated through a war- 
machine-book that functions through smooth absential spaces enabling the 
mapping of systemic but discontinuous states whose operative units 
(intensities, personae, effects etc) are defined relationally. The 
great states of strata are layered together 'ply over ply' transparently 
overlaid. Each pause in time ('the great internment', the birth of the 
asylum') simulates a disjunction in space, an arrest of the line along a 
bifurcative path: an unforseen node eluding any dichotomy of structure 
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and event. Foucault's analyses map these nodal problematics of history 
in terms of a spatial economy of control( e. g. the nomadic multiplicity 
of renaissance madness, 'ship of fools, ' smooth space of the sea 
reterritorialised on to the striated space of the asylum/hospital 
machine through internment). Foucault's texts are able to map, invent 
and fiction these nodes because they are immanent to their conditions of 
existence, an immanence derived from the complex topological and 
transgressive discursive practice they engage. Each 'form' of madness 
can be mapped to its unthought, the relation of forces that compound it, 
by tracing its archaeology through the continuously variable spatial 
relations immanently constructed. 
Michel Serres has pointed out the extent to which Foucault's book 
presents a 'geometry' of madness through a "language ... of 
negativities, " 
118 
a series of negative images or visions of madness 
articulated through a geometric/poetic multiplicity and this is 
Foucault's first attempt at a 'thought of the multiple. ' Serres goes on 
to suggest that the multiple negatives inscribed in Foucault's geometry 
of language link up transversally with a history of the other: 
it can be used to explain the Greek and the classical meaning of the 
other, its logical, existential, ontological, moral, epistemological 
and religious meaning. It can be used to express under one 
denomination, Platonic otherness, Marxist 11jenation, medical 
alienation and existentialist foreigness. 
Foucault's war machine attempts to constuct and manoeuvre the fund of 
otherness into a space of confrontation or contestation through a topo- 
history of limits that will fold the exterior into the same. 
Transgressive space is a fold, zero, blank or neutered space inscribed 
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with "those obscure gestures, forgotten as soon as they are 
accomplished, by means of which a culture rejects something and makes it 
the Exterior". 
120 
In Foucault's early work the madness/literature nexus is mapped as that 
'zero point' or transgressive space of immanence where history escapes 
from itself towards the unthought that conditions it, it reveals the 
"great immobile structure ... the point where 
history is immobilised in 
the tragic which both founds and challenges it. " 
121 
The space or site of 
tragic madness is "that constant verticality which confronts European 
culture" 
122 
with the possibility of its transgression. 
What, then, is this confrontation beneath the language of reason? 
Where can an interrogation lead us which does not follow reason in 
its horizontal course, but seeks to retrace in time that constant 
verticality which confronts European culture with whaý it is 
not, establishes its range by its own derangement? 
12 
We are led by this interrogation to the transgressive 'hollow, ' 'fold, ' 
'void, ' 'double, ' 'absence, ' and 'emptiness' outside (topologically 
inside) the language of reason that conditions its interior composition. 
All of these terms operate in Foucault's first works as mechanisms of 
relay and trigger that release the apriori into a transgressive space. 
Dreams and madness, sex and death , language and the figural are the 
vertical coordinates of a 'cruel and infernal knowledge' that displaces 
'reason in its horizontal course' onto its own impossibility. It is 
only when that "useless and transgressive fold we call literature" 
124 
opens out onto an absent outside that tragic madness 'returns' in a pure 
space of transgression. It is in this impossible space or blind-spot that 
the "possibility of each to become the other and of their mutual exclusion" 
125 is articulated. Foucauldian transgressive space is organised almost 
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entirely around this blind spot. It is "a fold of the spoken that is an 
absence of work. " 
126 
7. The mapping of transgressive thought. 
Foucault's early texts, then, weave or fold together (and simultaneously 
hold apart) a space of transgression that violently unworks the self- 
same interiorities of reason and a space of 'non-positive affirmation' 
that has nothing to do with negation but inscribes itself within 
'contestation. ' 
Contestation does not imply a generalised negation, but an 
affirmation that affirms nothing, a radical break of transitivity. 
Rather than being a process of thought for denying existences or 
values, contestation is the act which carries them all to their 
limits and, from there, to the Limit where an ontological decision 
achieves its end; to contest is to proceed until one reaches the 
empty core where being achieves its limit and where the limit 
defines being. There, at thelý5ansgressed limit, the 'yes' of 
contestation reverberates... 
Without recourse to any notion of evolution or 'transitivity' 
irreducible opposites involute each other through an 'empty core, ' the 
capitalised 'Limit' of a silent zero space - Foucauldian sunyata. 
The 'yes' of contestation, the 'droit de cite' is the affirmative 
expression that Foucault's texts cannot yet represent since it is 
unrepesentable but communicate through their pathos in drifting silent 
spaces linking up with the formless night of tragic madness: 
And this madness that links and divides time, 
into the ring of a single night, this madness 
experience of its contemporaries, does it not 
able to receive it, to Nietzsche and Artaud - 
voices of classical unreason, in which it was 
nothingness and night, but amplifying them no, 
that twists the world 
so foreign to the 
transmit - to those 
those barely audible 
always a question of 
a to shrieks and 
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frenzy? But giving them for the first time an expression, a droit de 
cite, and a hold on Western culture which make$_ ossible all 
contestations, as well as total contestation? 
Perhaps the 'model' par excellence of transgressive space - that holds 
together all the Foucauldian problematics of an expansionist force of 
rationality frustrated by an ever contracting vertiginous space of the 
outside limit - is the model of the Orient: 
Within the universality of Occidental ratio there is to be found the 
dividing line that is the Orient: the Orient that one imagines to 
be the origin, the vertiginous point at which nostalgia and the 
promises of return originate; the Orient that is presented to the 
expansionist rationality of the Occident but that y ains eternally 
inaccessible because it always remains the limit. 
The 'geographical' Orient is obliterated in a geometry of diminishing 
scale, a fractal topology that folds space into a dividing line and 
limit and then into an ever receding point of origin. The orient is 
figured as a space on a path or trajectory to zero, lost in a 
vertiginous vortex, a space that involutes its own structure. Yet this 
zero point or voided space still yields a flickering presence in its 
oscillations between the 'dividing line' and the 'limit. ' 
It is within this flickering presence, the 'not yet' and the 'no longer' 
of transgressive space, that lines of flight are emitted, new enonces 
produced: great volleys of lyrical intensity compounded into scenes of 
tragic pathos. 
We now know ... that language owes its power of transgression to an 
inverse relationship, that existing between an impure word and a 
pure silence, and that it is in the indefinitely travellTgospace of 
this impurity that the word may address such a silence. 
Scenes of pathos always operate in Foucault on the lip of silence. 
Utilising the "non-dialectical language of the limit" 
131, language of the 
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'not yet' and the 'no longer' with its "calcinated roots, its promising 
ashes" 
132, 
Foucault's texts lead us to the paradoxical precipice of the 
'language of silence', a strange language that "places us at the limits 
of all possible languages" 
133 
and causes us to "lose language in a 
deafening night. " 
134 
Pathos scenes articulate the silence of madness 
through an ultimate 'communication', between an impure word and a pure 
silence, a communication that presupposes the cessation of the speaker 
and the absence of the listener. In Bataille's beautiful words, which 
Foucault repeats for us, the 'communion' of the mad is expressed through 
"an immense alleluia lost in the interminable silence. " 
135 
Foucault endorses a language of silence for every one and no one a 
"unique Discourse which no one, perhaps, will be able to hear. " 
136 
Foucault's impossible language functions through discursive mechanisms of 
revocation and suspension in a self-consumptive drive to zero and silence. 
It is a Saturnian language "that devours all eventual words" 
137 
that 
paradoxically we must ceaselessly speak in order to "succeed - if not in 
silencing and mastering it - in modulating its futility.,, 
138 
The language of silence ( and the silence of language) in Foucault 
functions as a 'heterotopic' space, a space of pathos and otherness 
distributed 'beneath' the language of reason in its horizontal course. 
It offers the (im)possibility of transgressive 'interpretation' 
what is in question at an interpretation's point of rupture, in a 
interpretations tendency towards a point that renders it impossible, 
could well be something like the experience of madness. Such an 
experience of madness would be the sanction for a movement of 
interpretation which approjgýes the infinitude of its centre and 
collapses, turned to ash. 
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Foucault maps the 'archaeology of silence' of madness onto the rupture 
of trangressive interpretation by collapsing the very possibility of 
language, (this has nothing to do with any 'gap' or absence that is 
considered to be constitutive of language) into its own 'finitude' and 
'death'. 
The futility of a language that merely folds back on itself and consumes 
itself evades contradiction and dialectics by passing through the 
passage of paradox, a 'perverse' space constructed through a certain 
game of philosophical pedagogy through the space of paradox. To 
approach this space one must "remain motionless to the point of 
stupefaction in order to approach it successfully and mime it... and to 
await, in the always unpredictable conclusion to this elaborate 
preparation, the shock of difference. Once paradoxes have upset the 
table of representations, catatonia operates within the theater of 
thought. " 
140 
In this theatrical staging of catatonic thought the space of 
transgressive paradox with its 'disreputable bias' unworks the spaces of 
representation with its logic of negation toward an "acategorical 
thought" beyond crisis: once thought is "freed from its catatonic 
chrysalis" 
141 it will rise renewed and completely transformed. The space 
of transgressive thought between work and madness is the limit-space 
induced to catatonia - an opening for thought, a 'thinking otherwise. ' 
Embracing the space of paradoxical silence though perversity and ill- 
humour, Foucault hastens the appearance of a new transgressive thought 
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and language: asignifying, acategorical, incoherent, non-dialectical and 
discontinuous. 
This space of transgressive thought, in the zone of silence and paradox 
in which the communication between madness/literature culminates, 
transgresses itself by transgressing the Limit. 
Transgression is an action which involves the limit, that narrow 
zone of a line where it displays the flash of its passage, perhaps 
also its entire trajectory, even its origin; it is likely týaý 
transgression has its entire space in the line it crosses. 
The space of the limit, as 'pure' limit, gives itself to be seen by 
being crossed. Transgression is always already a complex relational 
spatiality that presupposes that which it transgresses. Transgression 
transgresses a limit, a connective relation of lines, points, sites and 
enclosures which is bounded by a mode of order, rationality, self, 
being, or thought. The violence of transgression is directed toward 
this limit space which it both constitutes and is constituted by, both 
the necessary and sufficient condition for the possibility of its 
transgressing. 
The limit and transgression depend on each other for whatever 
density of being they possess: a limit could not exist if it were 
absolutely uncrossable and, reciprocally, transgression would be 
pointless1 it merely crossed a limit composed of illusions and 
shadows. 
A limit is made visible at the point of its transgression, a moment 
which forces the limit "to experience its positive truth in its downward 
fall. " 
144 
The 'lightning flash' of transgression traces the very line that 
it cancels. In each case transgression unfolds upon and creates the 
space of the limit which it then transgresses; transgression is wedded 
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to the limit through its annulment and erasure: transgression gives 
birth to a space of the limit by its abortion. The limit, in turn, has 
no meaning, structure or organisation without transgression. The limit 
contains within itself the possibility of its transgression 
constitutively, of being unbounded and opened to a space outside of 
itself which was always already inscribed within itself, an invisible 
fold or condition of its existence. 
Transgression carries the limit right to the limit of its being; 
transgression forces the limit to face the fact of its immanent 
disappearance, to find itself in what it excludes (perhaps, to be 
more exact, to recognize itself for the fligt time), to experience 
its positive truth in its downward fall. 
Transgression's immanence to the limit necessarily involves perpetual 
repetition, its play repeated in an infinitesmal, 'timeless' instant, 
between a 'not yet' and a 'no longer'. Transgression operates within a 
'between-time' mechanism, a time of chaos and becoming, a time of 
waiting and passage, of arrival and departure whose spiralloid, fractal 
structure -a fold within a fold - squeezes out any continuous 
chronological time in its movement: 
Transgression incessantly crosses and recrosses a li6which closes 
up behind it in a wave of extremely short duration. 
The between-time of transgression Foucault often figures as a 
(Nietzschean) lightning flash which cannot be tied to any specific 
action, activity or movement and it is this that entails the 'death' and 
displacement of any 'originating' or grounding function. In fact, this 
function is an effect of transgressive activity, a shadow in its 
lightning flash. The 'content' of a particular act of transgression is 
given to it by the limit it transgresses and yet transgression as such 
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is de-void, not that it contains nothing, but that transgression 
'exists' (insists, subsists) in its performance of a relation, the 
activation of a new zone or space, constituted through its activity, its 
transgressing. Transgression, for Foucault finally cannot be located 
within a negative or positive polarity but in the affirmation of a 
(Blanchotian) neuter: 
Transgression contains nothing negative, for it affirms limited 
being - affirms the limitlessness into which it leaps as it opens 
this zone to existence for the first time. But, correspondingly, 
this affirmation contains nothing positive: no content can bind it, 
since, by definition, no limit can possibly restrict it. 14ýerhaps 
it 
is simply an affirmation of division ... of difference. 
Transgression is a self-organising space of difference that continually 
produces itself in its own moment of occasion or event, it takes place 
in a neuter space that it knits out of itself, a space marked and 
delimited by the surfaces and lines it crosses. Transgression exposes 
this limit space in a brilliant flash that simultaneously reveals the 
limits of the being it circumscribes and also the limitlessness of all 
that the limit fails to contain. But transgression as such is neither 
bound nor defined either by this limited being which it transcends nor 
the unlimited space of existence toward which it leaps. Transgression 
cannot be "a victory over limits" 
148 
and neither does it transform the 
other side of the limit "into a glittering expanse. " 
149 
Transgression is 
an affirmation of difference, an affirmation that confirms the otherness 
of the different: transgression is a space of pure difference. 
The limit by definition cannot affirm difference but neither is it a 
simple negation of difference. The limit denies difference, says no to 
it and opposes it, appropriating it under the identity of the same. 
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Disowning difference through an appropriation, owning the limited by 
disowning difference. Nietzsche had already said that concepts 
originate through equating what is unequal and that truth "is formed 
through an arbitrary abstraction from ... individual differences, 
through forgetting the distinctions. " 
150 
Delimitation refuses difference and subordinates it raising its no- 
saying to the level of taboo and prohibition. Both Foucault and 
Nietzsche trace back this ordering of being to Plato's "delicate sorting 
operation" 
151 
which subordinated appearances to essences. And since then, 
in each case "difference is transformed into that which must be 
specified within a concept, without oversteppings its bounds. " 
152 
The 
subjection of difference under the domination of concepts, categories, 
representations etc. constitutes what Foucault and Nietzsche articulate 
as Western thought's relentless 'will to truth', as a violence of the 
limit that abstracts from 'singularities' a structure of identities and 
similarities and organises differences into systems of resemblance. The 
limit overcomes difference by apprehending "global resemblances. . . at the 
root of what we call diversity. " 
153 
Lying at the centre of this appropriation, subordination and exclusion 
of the space of difference is 'good sense': 
Good sense is the world's most effective agent of division in its 
recognition, its establishment of equivalences, its sensitivity ý? 4 
gaps, it gauging of distances, as it assimilates and separates. 
Good sense is a 'metrication' of space, a precise accounting that always 
leads back to a form of interiority, an identity across its variations 
constituted through delimitation, categorisation, circumscription, 
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abstraction and theorisation; this is the basis for 'understanding. ' 
Good sense is an instrument of exclusion and domination, a way of 
encircling, delimiting and 'occupying' the space of 'becoming'. 
The absence of good sense (ignoring it or simply lacking it) involves 
placing outside, going out of bounds', risking scandal, stupidity, rage 
and 'uncertain madness' in the face of beauty, knowledge and truth. A 
form of moralisation (of limits) always sanctions good sense and also 
empowers it, limits always invoke good sense justifying the limit as 
such through the apprehension of good sense. In this apprehension "we 
encounter the tyranny of good will, the obligation to think in common 
with others ... 11 
155 Good will functions along with good sense to sanction 
its violence of the limit and its refusal of difference by forcing it 
into an obligation. Transgression is always a refusal of complicity 
with an ethics. Transgression liberates difference from good will whose 
violence it hears 'instinctively. ' The limit prohibits such violence 
but because it carries the possibility of its transgression 
constitutively it can never completely prohibit. Instead the limit 
mobilises guilt in order to stave of its own inner possibilities but 
this risks increasing the intensity of the violence of transgression 
whilst offering an opportunity to reappropriate and reassimilate 
transgressive acts. But it can only do this negatively turning the act 
into a limit - the limit of the limit. Yet transgression refuses guilt 
in its movement and this refusal is to "begin thinking from it and the 
space it denotes. " 
156 
Foucault's delineation of this space dissociates 
transgression from the negative; it must be affirmed. This 
affirmiation, the 'dangerous maybe' of transgression forces thought into 
a new space: 
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Transgression opens onto a scintillating and constantly affirmed 
world, a world without shadows or twilights without that serpentine 
'no' that bites into fruits and lodges their contradlgions at their 
core. It is the solar inversion of satanic denial. 
The affirmation of transgression means affirming a space of difference, 
of forcing thought into a new space, a space that unfolds outside of 
the domination of the limit. "Difference can only be liberated through 
the invention of an acategorical thought. " 
158 
Acategorical thought plays 
on the surfaces of events, phantasms and simulacrum, plays on these 
surfaces and between them without this play being organised or subsumed 
by any unity. Transgressive play inhabits a space 'outside' of 
representation organised and conditioned by good sense and good will. 
"Let us pervert good sense and allow thought to play outside the ordered 
table of resemblances. " 
159 
To inhabit this space of transgression we must 
become perverts: 
The philosopher must be sufficiently perverse to play the game of 
truth and error badly; this perversity, which rates in paradoxes, 
allows him to escape the grasp of categories. 
In Foucault's 'early' work perversity runs 'head-on' into this 
acategorical transgressive space whereby raging contradictions are 
allowed to fester and swell bursting into a difference of thought. 
Transgressive thought affirms the affirmation of this space of 
difference since it was always a doubled thought, a thought that 
copulates with itself, producing itself out of itself; giving birth to 
new thought. Yet we must not valorize difference "we must avoid 
thinking ... the form of a content which is difference. " 
161 
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Difference must not be thought as a category or a concept that organises 
a philosophy of difference. The space of transgressive thought is 
continually being reknitted or refolded carrying within itself its own 
erasure constitutively thus preempting the possibility that difference 
might solidify or stagnate into a 'truth. ' The affirmation of 
transgressive space necessarily involves the transgressing of that space 
itself. 
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2. THE EXTERIOR LIMITS OF KNOWLEDGE 
Statements and Visibilities. 
It is in vain that we see what we say; what we see never resides in 
what we say. And it is vain that we attempt to show, by the use of 
images, metaphors, or similes, what we are saying; the space where 
they achieve their splendour is not that deployed by our eyes but 
that defined by the sequential elements of syntax. 
For Watt now found himself in the midst of things which, if they 
consented to be named, did so as it were with reluctance.... Looking 
at a pot, for example, or thinking of a pot, one of Mr. Knott's 
pots, it was in vain that Watt said, Pot, pot. Well, perhaps not 
quite in vain, but very nearly. For it was not a pot, the more he 
looked, the more he reflected, the more he felt sure of that, that 
it was not a pot at all. It resembled a pot, it was almost a pot, 
but it was Sot a pot of which one could say, Pot, pot, and be 
comforted. 
To speak and t3 show in a simultaneous motion.. a prodigious 
interweaving. 
The space of transgressive thought opens out onto an experience and 
action of thought that Foucault will call archaeological, a new fold in 
a topology of thought, a new series of spaces to enable the 
archaeologist to 'think otherwise'. This new space assimilates and 
redistributes the coordinates of transgressive space to "the level 
proper to archaeology" . This new fold will continue to "define a 
4 
particular site by the exteriority of its vicinity" 
5 but will concentrate 
on the exteriority of the enunciable and visible sites themselves, in 
their 'positivity', as they traverse and constitute the practical 
assemblages of knowledge. Foucault had already created a transgressive 
archaeology of the 'present', in this sense, by relaying the 
'visibilities' of madness with the 'expressions' of literature emerging 
out of the archaeological space of silence and this formed one series in 
the possible permutations of the enunciable and visible 'archive'. And 
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this space of silence is now inverted and folded, stretched and 
multiplied into a space that conditions 'things said, and 'things seen' 
and makes an 'archaeology of knowledge' possible. 
Archaeological space is a 'pure' positivity, a "positive unconscious of 
knowledge" 6 expressed through enonces: the forms of the statable and the 
visible. These forms are like patches, patternings or collections of 
stratified space that are juxtaposed, intermingled and overlap forming 
'deposits' that accumulate into the enonces of a specific knowledge - 
formation. Each knowledge-formation (episteme) is composed of particular 
variations and combinations of technologies of the visible and 
procedures of the enunciable. These technologies and procedures of space 
positively produce knowledge in each formation as historical 
aprioris. They are irreducible, heterogeneous and isomorphic each having 
their own spaces, rhythmns and history and, as exteriorities, they do 
not derive from ideas, concepts, subjects or 'mentalities' since they 
make these possible: they are spaces of emergence and becoming. The 
archaeologist will analyse the relations between these spaces in order 
to foreground and actualise their potential as zones of otherness, 
difference and becoming. Ultimately, the aim of archaeological thought 
is to make it possible to think difference; it attempts to establish 
that "we are difference, that our reason is the difference of our 
discourses, our history the difference of our times, our selves the 
difference of masks. " 
7 
The crisis of thought has enabled it to "avoid 
the difference of our present". 
8 
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l. a. The space of the invisible visibility (medicine) 
To begin to think the difference of our present the archaeologist will 
focus on one set of spaces bound up with the "over-all architecture of 
the human sciences" 
9, 
a space of thought that is "fully engaged in the 
philosophical status of man. " 
10 
And the archaeological method will segment 
and section this space in order to maximise the legibility of its 
sedimentations of the visible and the articulable. It will describe "the 
common structure that carves up and articulates what is seen and what is 
said" 
11. 
The Birth of the Clinic will be "an archaeology of medical 
perception" 
12 
or an archaeology of the 'gaze' (regard) only in relation to 
the statements that are produced disjunctively beside them: a simulacrum 
or 'aparallel evolution'. The objective of the book is to examine "the 
silent configuration in which language finds support: the relation of 
situation and attitude to what is speaking and what is spoken about. " 
13 
The organization of the clinic - its invention of techniques of 
observation, the ways in which it establishes 'knowledge' through a 
certain disposition of bodies and gazes- all of this is tied to the 
problematic of 'language', of what can be expressed, and the visibility 
of the body, of what can be seen. 
In Madness and Civilisation Foucault mapped the "not yet divided 
experience of division itself" 
14_ 
as a space of anteriority conditioning 
what can be said/seen - through a complex, transgressive space of 
absence: an "absence d'oeuvre". This absence is transformed in 
Foucault's archaeology of medicine into a desire to remain "at the level 
of the fundamental spatialisation and verbalisation of the pathological, 
where the loquacious gaze with which the doctor observes the poisonous 
heart of things is born and communes with itself. " 
15 
This will entail 
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excavating and making legible a space "where 'things' and 'words' have 
not yet been separated, and where - at the most fundamental level of 
language - seeing and saying are still one. " 
16 
If Foucault criticised the 
notion of an 'experience' of madness and comes to reject the 'gaze' as a 
"synthesis of the unifying function of a subject" it is only in order to 
scrupulously maintain the "dispersion that we are,, in the relations 
between words and things, and to insert his discourse into that space of 
17 
'non-discursive' language. 
We should not be surprised that in the period in which Foucault was to 
write on Brisset, Roussel, Blanchot, Holderlin he should also have been 
drawn to the heavy, descriptive, qualitative 'being' of language that he 
finds at the heart of the clinic. Equally, in the same period, Foucault 
was drawn to Magritte, Manet, Klee and Kandinsky and the question of the 
'being' of light or visibility dispersed throughout aesthetic space. 
The Birth of The Clinic, its 'obviousness', was fundamentally tied to 
the conditions of possibility of a way of seeing and saying that 
culminated in a structure of perception that Foucault called 'invisible 
visibility. ' 
18 In the structure of invisible visibility or of non- 
discursive language Foucault extended the 'vertical' space of 
transgression to bring to light a new 'fold' in our knowledge revealing 
that clinical medicine has a "fundamental place in the overall 
architecture of the human sciences. " 
19 
For this place to be established 
we should not expect the gradual unfolding of the 'gaze' to the point 
where its power is finally recognised in the clinic, but a "formal 
reorganisation in depth" 
20 
of the conditions, hidden to the age in which 
they operated that structure the domain of clinical experience. It is 
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in the search for the 'concrete a priori' that Foucault opens out the 
axes of space, language, and death. 
For clinical medicine to have become possible as a form of perception a 
new modality and organisation of space was necessary from that which 
operated in eighteenth century classical medicine. The 'geography' of 
disease in relation to other diseases, to the individual and to the 
social space of medical institutions and practices undergo a 
transformation informed by a "spontaneous and deeply rooted convergence 
between the requirements of political ideology and those of medical 
technology. " 
21 
Revolving around the revolutionary abandonment of 
privileged centres, the politicisation of doctoring, the problem of 
assistance etc, medicine is displaced from specialised institutions and 
its forms are regrouped through the function of a 'generalised 
vigilance' across all social spaces: 
one began to conceive of a generalised presence of doctors whose 
intersecting gazes form a network and exercise at every point in 
space, and at the same momený2in time, a constant, mobile 
differentiated supervision. 
The doctor as one of the first architects of panoptic space: "Doctors at 
the time were among other things the specialists of space. " They were 
"along with the military, the first managers of collective space. " 
23 
Answering to a theme of 'medicine in liberty' 
24 
the clinic could appear in 
this new collective space and generate a new type of theoretical knowledge 
in which medicine constructed not so much an "encyclopaedic knowledge" as a 
form of "constantly revised information, where it is a question, rather, of 
totalizing events and their determination than of enclosing knowledge in a 
systematic form. " 
25 
The clinic of 'ideology', or the 'semio-clinic' of 
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Condillac, relies as much upon language and its relation to enunciation and 
perception as the anatomo-clinic of Bichat and both are the 'isomorph of 
ideology' 26. Both forms of clinic find the conditions to attach 
themselves to the 'armature of the real' predicated on a model of language. 
But the semio clinic transforms the relation between speaking subject and 
the disease spoken about, the site from which this subject spoke, and the 
way in which speech was relayed to others. In this form of clinic the 
'being' of disease is completely coincident with what the doctor is able to 
state. If, in a previous 'botanical' model the disease revealed its 
'essence' through the sign, in the semio clinic the sign becomes the 
effect of the doctor working upon the sympton: "it is the sovereignty 
of consciousness that transforms the sympton into a sign. " 
27 
From now on 
the 'being' of the disease can be understood as coinciding only with its 
statability by a doctor. The model of a 'complete description' 
28 
of 
disease which emerges (although a failure) indicates an alignment of the 
heterogeneous spaces of the doctor and the disease. 
The medical field was no longer to know these silent species, 
whether given or withdrawn; it was to open on to something which 
always speaks a language that is at one in its existence and its 
meaning with the g55e that deciphers it -a language inseparably 
read and reading. 
That disease could obviously become available for new perception and 
knowledge involved, then, a passage through what Foucault calls 
'ideological' philosophy. The practical emphasis that emerges as a 
result of this passage, at the centre of clinical practice, is that one 
learns by seeing. The teacher does not have to instruct the pupil in 
the nature of diseases for the whole of pedagogical space undergoes an 
inversion which enables the disease to 'speak' to the pupil and teacher 
simultaneously as they watch: "The genesis of the manifestation of 
truth is also the genesis of the knowledge of truth. " 
30 
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This new time and space of disease although 'open' becomes more 
intricate, complicated and uncertain and the notion of an individual 
'case' involves an "inversion of complexity" as diseases no longer 
display essences that are simple combinations but now combine diverse 
elements into a complex and unique individual form. The assumption that 
'the symptom' become a sign places on the "horizon of clinical 
experience the possibility of an exhaustive, clear and complete reading" 
31 
of disease. Yet the semio clinic privleged the functions of 'saying' 
over 'seeing' and it is only when the technical as much as the 
grammatical notion of disease is abandoned in favour of a proto-gaze -a 
'glance'- that medical consciousness and its object are able to enter 
into more productive relations. In fact, now a "tangible space of the 
body becomes possible for the gaze. " 
32 
Contingent transformations and modifications to spatial and linguistic 
structures in relation to medicine had now furnished a "domain of clear 
visibility" 
33 for the gaze; that is, a space that would be visible for 
Bichat. Indeed Foucault even refers to clinical experience as a 
"speaking eye" that "would scan the entire hospital field, taking in and 
gathering together each of the singular events that occured within it; 
and as it saw, as it saw ever more and more clearly, it would be turned 
into speech that states and teaches. " 
34 
The postulate of the organisation 
of the clinic is that the visible is expressible and it is visible 
because it is expressible. This is the 'dream' of the clinic ("more the 
dream of a thought than a basic conceptual structure" 
35), 
and as 
Foucault's analysis of Magritte makes clear, is nothing but a pipe- 
dream. What The Birth of the Clinic had uncovered then was an 'absolute 
gaze, a 'virtual visibility, ' a 'visibility outside the gaze' which ran 
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through perceptible experiences summoning up not just sight but also 
hearing and touch. The glance was unlike the 'gaze' in that it was 
sensory and direct, touching the surface of the body with an eye and 
here the gaze takes on clearly its apriori functions as it lays 
visibilities open not just to sight but to the other senses, each 
according to certain combinations so that for example, the tangible is a 
visible that conceals another visible and this is particularly apposite 
when considering the clinic of laennec: even the stethoscope remains 
for Foucault under the 'dominant sign of the visible'. 
36 
Thus: " in its 
sovereign exercise the gaze took up once again the structures of 
visibility that it had itself deposited in its field of perception. " 
37 
The last of these structures is finally uncovered by Bichat and 
represents for Foucault "the great break in the history of Western 
medicine, " 
38 
the opening of the anatomo-clinic to pathological life. 
With Bichat, knowledge of life finds its origins in the destruction 
of life and in its extreme opposite; it is at death that disease and 
life speak their truth; a specific, immediate truth, protected from 
all assimilations to the inorganic ýý the circle of death. that 
designates them for what they are. 
For Bichat death is not just a negation of life, or a refusal of it, but 
a 'positivity' that invades life with a "teeming presence. " Death is 
not just the condition of visibility of the disease (at post-mortem) but 
also the ultimate source of disease during life. Life and disease are 
no longer thought as an oppositional structure but through the addition 
of that 'third term' 
40, 
as Foucault calls it, of death, the three terms 
are articulated together. Foucault invents from Bichat a new kind of 
vitalism that defines life as those set of functions which resist death. 
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Bichat relativized the concept of death, bringing it down from that 
absolute in which it appeared as an indivisable, decisive, 
irrecoverable event: he volatilized it, distributed it throughout 
life in the form of separate, partial, progressive deaths, deaths 
that are so slow in occurring that they extend beyond death itself. 
But from this fact he formed an essential structure of medical 
thought and perception: that to which life is opposed and to which 
it is exposed; that in relation to which it is living oppostion, and 
therefore life; that in relation to which it is analytically 
exposed, and therefore true. 
Vitalism appears against the background of this 'mortalism. ' 
41 
Vitalism appears as a modulation of this mortalism since disease is no 
longer a foreign entity threatening life but a new historical mode of 
life which the new pathological anatomy of tissues could render visible, 
from the moment of its insertion until its 'death', with the organism, 
as the proliferating spread of lesions. The 'space' of disease with its 
historical character became identical with the body. And this is no 
doubt Foucault's historicisation of Canguillhem's thesis in relation to 
the originality of the 'vital order': it is not the eternal 
confrontation or frustration between Doctor and the sick that makes 
possible the appearance of the 'vital order' so much as the emergence of 
the internal space of the organism as corpse. The gaze is silenced, 
divided from the enunciable, becoming the "non-verbal order of contact". 
42 
It now requires specific technologies to translate the invisible 
interior of the body into a recognizable order of signs that will 
document and classify. Not just Canguillhem and Bichat but also 
Schopenhauer and perhaps even Freud and Illich are captured here with 
the question of how such a conception could become possible; how could 
the specificity of life as a configuration of illness be thought 
possible except through the articulation of death, the thought of death 
as an epistemological category? 
67 
Clinical medicine, more than just necromancy, makes the 'individual 
fact' possible. The space of death is not reductive of individuality but 
constitutive of it and this passage through to the 'reversible surface' 
of death was necessary for the individual fact to emerge as a problem of 
knowledge. The significance of the 'invisible visibility' of death in 
clincial medicine lies in the space that it occupies in the 'overall 
architecture of the human sciences', indeed it "marked at the empirical 
level, the first opening up of that fundamental relation that binds man 
to his original finitude. " 
43 
Finitude is given a positive content and 
Foucault's archaeology of medicine shows that death is at the limit of 
those sciences that study the life of man: 
it will no doubt remain a decisive fact about our culture that its 
first scientific discourse concerning the individual had to pass 
through this stage of death. Western man could constitute himself 
in his own eyes as an object of science, he grasped himself within 
his language, and gave himself, in himself and by himself, a 
discursive existence, only in the opening created by his own 
elimination: from the experience of Unreason was born psychology, 
the very possibility of psychology; from the integration of death 
into medical thoughý4is born a medicine that is given as a science 
of the individual. 
Here, no doubt, one could stream together a confluence of spaces of 
thought that traverse Foucault's texts from Binswanger's Dream and 
Existence where dreams insert in life a space of death to a madness that 
occupies that same enclave. Although flowing along opposing vectors 
(life and death) and emerging out of heterogeneous regimes (sleeping/ 
dreaming, madness/ unreason), these forces move to expression through 
the forms of exteriority, of statements and visibility, the 'being' of 
language and the being of 'light' that interface all of Foucault's 
texts. 
68 
It is likely, however, that this specific movement of death into the 
life of the individual culminates in the 'reversal' of visibility that 
one finds in those pages of Discipline and Punish where the extension of 
disciplinary machinery, in the context of confession, is forced to 
maintain the life of the body in order to accede to 'truth'. The 
individual invented in the Birth of the Clinic is not the individual of 
'discipline' (of course this knowledge would be useful for it), but the 
fact of a particular entity whose very possibility - in medicine, in 
eroticism, in lyrical poetry - is death: 
"Death left its old tragic heaven and became 4the 
lyrical core of man; 
his invisibile truth, his visible secret. " 
1. b. The space of the invisible visibility (the literary double) 
The invisible visibility as that space in which the invisibility of death 
is made visible in language ("the anatomo-clinic method" 
46) has a precise 
analogue in Roussel as the set of relations between space, language and 
death are developed further and inform Foucault's analysis of the work of 
Raymond Roussel in Death and the Labyrinth. Ultimately, Foucault is less 
concerned with Roussel's linguistic machines, than with the death that 
makes them possible. 
Roussel invented language machines that have no other secret outside 
of the process than the visible and profound relationship that all 
language maintains with, V sengages itself from, takes up, and repeats 
indefinitely with death. 
Roussel's death is the key to all of his linguistic procedures: "his first 
person narrative in the posthumous revelation" 
48 
The mechanisms of Locus 
Solus and those of How I wrote certain of my Books are reciprocally opened, 
69 
suggests Foucault, by a space of death that is not redeemed or resurrected 
into life, but conserved and prolonged in death. 'Vitalium' and 
'ressurectine' do not give life and certainty not an afterlife, but a 
ventriloquised death as Danton's mouth moves in a morgue for agitated 
corpses. The space of Locus Solus for Foucault is 'empty', "its emptiness 
is like that of an easter sunday which remains empty. " Canterel tells us 
to look amongst the dead for the 'one' who is there, that is where he is, 
he has not been resurrected. 
49 
Though dead, the corpse 'pretends' to be dead just as it did when it was 
alive: 
That which in life which is repeated in death, is death itself. The 
scene death plays as it imitates life imitates death which is as 
lifelike as it had been when lived in life. The boundary which 
resurrectine could not abolisýorepeats life in death and in life 
that which was already dead. 
Foucault's reading of Roussel organised around the space of death is 
structurally analagous to the spatial logics of Birth of the Clinic. 
The two books are twins, sharing the doubly 'mute' and 'blind' space of 
death that nevetheless makes a new vision and a new relation to language 
possible. In the Birth of the Clinic Bichat finds in the corpse the 
posthumous text from which he is able to 'read' the secrets of the 
lesions and discover the 'nerve structure' of the text/corpse. As in 
Roussel, death is an uncrossable mirror structure which is nevertheless 
topologically linked to a knowledge of life through a reversible 
surface: 
as if perception, in order to sgT what there is to see, needed the 
duplicative presence of death. 
70 
Foucault tells us further that the medical perception of death, "from the 
time of Bichat", has transformed its relationship with life, it "is 
'staggered' in relation to life and is separated from it by the uncrossable 
boundary of death in the mirror of what it observes itself. " 
52 Vision is 
unable to extinguish itself, caught in the death-mirror of its own 
impossibility. The 'gaze' is fastened onto that which limits or abolishes 
it. The 'purity' of sight, or the light that allows us to see, is violently 
contaminated by a blindness or death-vision that is not merely a 
deprivation of light but a "visibility separate from being seen". 
53 The 
blindness that infects sight from a space 'exterior" to it and that cannot 
simply be aligned with any (metaphysical) figures of absence, loss, 
deprivation or end culminates in the displacement of the identity of vision 
and thought, and of both with spontaneity (the Cartesian, Kantian or 
Husserlian constitutive activity of the subject) that Foucault explicitly 
contests. 
The Birth of the Clinic attacks the vision of the eye, the seeing 
subject as the fundamental site of medical knowledge. Foucault 
articulates an experience of perception made for "no one. " In fact, 
this perception is made "on the basis of death", "of the corpse" 
54, 
a 
perception which invests death with visibility. Medical perception "is 
no longer that of a living eye but the perception of an eye which has 
seen death. " 
55 
The eye which has seen death inhabits a space of radical 
exteriority, a 'blind spot' or unthought of thought. 
56 
Foucault had already traced a 'blind spot' in Bataille, the eyes blindness 
to itself, an eye confronted with its own socket: 
71 
the globe of darkness whose sphere is closed by the unsocketed eye 
which stands before it, depriving it of the ability to see and yet 
offering to the absence the spelt acle of the unshakable core which 
now imprisons the dead vision. 
The 'spectacle' is without spectators, an empty theatre engaged in an 
experience that no one experiences, a theatricality with the death of 
God. The ultimate blindness of sight, the opacity of the transparent, 
forces language to its limits exploding "in laughter, tears, the 
overturned eyes of ecstasy, the mute and exorbitated horror of 
sacrifice. " 
58 And Foucault will sum up these themes in the searing phrase 
"a sun that rotates and the great eyelid that closes upon the world. " 
59 
2. The visible and the Articulable. 
Roussel's great eyelid is an "empty lens" which invokes "images visibly 
invisible, perceptible but not decipherable given in a lightning flash 
and without possible reading, present in a radiance that repelled the 
gaze. " 
60 
Light is absorbed into a "mutism of objects" and we are 
continually confronted with the "interlacing" of the visible and the 
invisible in "exactly the same tissue, the same indissoluble substance. " 
61 
Death and the Labyrinth examines statements and visibilities in order to 
locate them in both a space in which "the verbal thread is already 
crossed with the chain of the visible" 
62 
and their "system of dispersion". 
This space will later be analysed in terms of discursive relations, 
discursive practices (the space of enonces as a mixing of expressive 
forms) and their 'distribution'. At this stage, Foucault's account 
attempts to circumnavigate a route around Roussel's "small spatial cells" 
63 
with their "chatty landscapes" 
64 
and is itself circular and doubled. 
72 
The route around things is simultaneously their arrangement - their 
configuration, mode of connectivity and distribution. The temporal 
sequence of things Foucault admits is "lost in space" 
65, 
chronological 
time is eliminated "by the circular nature of space. " 
66 
The strategy that 
Foucault highlights in Roussel short circuits the possibility that 
thought, committed to ever deepening or refined layers and levels, can 
work itself out through linear or 'progressive' time revealing 
'essences', 'identities' or 'fundamentals. ' The old structure of 
'metamorphosis' is 'reversed' in Roussel leaving only "a joining of 
beings which carries no lesson: the simple collisiom of things. " 
67 
The 
space of words/things left in Roussel is still present but folded and 
doubled over, a commutation that breaks open continuity and any simple 
inside/outside structure. Foucault lays out the paths: 
Thus are constructed and criss-crossed the mechanical figures of the 
two great mythic spaces so often explored by Western imagination: 
space that is rigid and forbidden, surrounding the quest, the return 
and the treasure (that of the geography of the argonauts and of the 
labyrinth); and the other space - communicating, polymorphous, 
continuous and irreversible - of the metamorphoris, that is to say, 
of the visible transformation of instantly crogged distances, of 
strange affinities, of symbolic replacements. 
The path that Foucault shows Roussel is leading us to is a metamorphosis 
or rather a juxtaposition of forms contesting their own space. Or as 
Foucault says "the meeting of beings occuring in the broad daylight of a 
discontinuous nature. " 
69 
These forms or beings "must cross a whole 
intermediary gamut in order to be joined. " 
70 
That they can be joined 
without 'hierarchy' renders uncomfortable "the old principle of the 
continuity of beings. " 
71 
Roussel's language endlessly pursues this 
conjunction of forms and things, continually making the hazardous 
journey across the 'intermediary gamut', proliferating and multiplying 
73 
itself to the point where it falls back into the "empty labyrinthian 
space" of silence since silence resides on the edge of the surfaces of 
words and things. 
Roussels language turns toward things, and the meticulous detail it 
constantly brings forward is reabsorbed little by little in the 
silence of objects 12It becomes prolix only to move in the direction 
of their silence. 
That there is finally nothing more to be said beyond the surface of 
things and that "the discourse which describes them in detail is finally 
the one that explains them" 
73 leads to the irreducibility of words and 
things such that the things encountered and described 
appear in their insistent, autonomous existence, as if they were 
endowed with an ontological obstinancy which breaks with the most 
elementary rules of ... relation. Their pr, ence, like a boulder, 
is self-sufficient, free of any relation" 
Utilising a phrase from Blanchot, Foucault will insist that the relation 
between words and things is a 'non-relation', amd the distance 'in- 
between' them traverses a 'non-space' - the space of the 'outside. ' For 
both Foucault and Roussel (even Blanchot) one can dream of isomorphism, 
stacking statements on top of visibilities in order to unlock their 
'secrets' and yet with Roussel's How I wrote certain of my Books the 
holding up of a 'mirror' on his own oeuvre, "the mirror deepens in 
secrecy. " 
75 
In fact, the archaeologist refuses to stack things on top of 
one another and order them hierarchically but disperses them across a 
hypothetical space, across their differences, in order to remove or 
'problematise' their 'self-evidence' revealing that the rules governing 
this 'system of dispersion' are nothing but "the ways the statements are 
actually related. " 
76 
The actual relation of statements concerns their 
'geography' - the distances between them an index of their difference: 
74 
There is no privileged point around which the landscape will be 
organised and with distance vanish little by little; rather there's 
a whole series of small spatial cells of similar dimensions placed 
right next to each other without consideration of reciprocal 
proportion ... Their position is never defined in relation to the 
whole but according to a system of directions of proximity passing 
from one to the other as if following the links in a chain: "to the 
left, " "in front of them to the left, " "above, higher, " "further, " 
"further continuing on the left, " "at the end of the beach, " "still 
close enough to them, " "a little more on the left on the other side 
of the arcade. " Thus spreads the sand of La Vue, in discontinuous 
grains, uniformly magnified, evenly7 ýlluminated, placed one next to 
the other in the same noonday sun. 
The distance between things their 'to-the-rightness' or 'to-the- 
leftness', their 'aboveness' or 'belowness' are, apart from the 
saturation of detail, amongst the few organising devices that Roussel 
permits himself in order to "eliminate ... the distance of language from 
things. " 
78 
This dream that statements might directly express the vision 
of an 'absolute eye' is taken to its limits by Roussel (whose pen emits 
rays of light that must be confined), whose labyrinthian language 'moves 
towards infinity' attempting to cover over everything but fails and 
folds back on its own 'poverty, ' 'scarcity' and 'finitude' enabling the 
visible to appear in its own 'dazzling superficiality. ' 
79 
In Death and the Labyrinth Foucault, then, has already 'archaelogised' 
the surfaces of the visible and the articulable, analysed their 
relations and ordered their geography: The 'criss crossing' of the 
labyrinth and the metamorphosis. 
If Roussel had attempted to merge the orders he only demonstrated the 
distance between them: 
75 
It is the structure of the labyrinth which completely upholds 
Roussels plays, as if it were a matter of eliminating everything 
that goes into its theatricality, to let appear as visible on stage 
only the shadow play of the secret. By contrast, never is it more a 
question of masks, disguises, scenes, actors and spectacles than in 
the nontheatrical texts: the metamorphoses are only brought forth 
on stage through a narration, therefore changed and caught in the 
labyrinth of a discourse given second - or thirdhand. 
The system of statements (in Roussel's case the labyrinth) evacuate the 
visible leaving only a 'light', a 'sparkle' a form of luminosity which 
is pure surface. The statements themselves create their own forms (the 
tableness of the table) which are invisible. On the other hand the 
'thereness' of the table demonstrates the inability of statements to 
cover the 'metamorphosis' of the visible with chains of history and 
explanations (origins, causes etc). These two forms exterior to each 
other, contest each other through that 'insufficiency of being' and come 
together in the 'sun of language': the source of light cannot be looked 
at and the source of sense or non-sense cannot be articulated. In their 
coming together the visible and the sayable fall away from one another. 
In Foucault's text on Brisset the relations between the exterior surfaces 
of knowledge are developed further and linked in such a way as to set in 
motion various 'writing machines. ' 
81 
This language before discourse is 
not read for its value in making visible the discursive constraints of a 
tradition nor for isolating any factors that may account for Brissets 
'delirium. ' The specific linguistic procedures of Roussel and Brisset 
begin to operate as writing machines when "the relationship of words to 
things is no longer one of designation, when the relationship of one 
statement to another is no longer one of signification and when the 
relationship from one language to another (or from one state of language to 
another) is no longer one of translation. " 
82 
The procedure in each case 
76 
modulates the things intricated in the words and for each case a different 
organ of the body - the eye in Roussel, the ear for Brisset - constitutes a 
"machinery of domination and transformation. " 
83 
For Foucault Brisset constructs a language through etymology and 
homophony, in a state of primitive multiplicity. It is not a language, 
however, from which another, more modern, language derives but a 
language that exists in a 'fluid, mobile, indefinitely penetrable 
state, " 
84 in which there is "the possibility of circulating in every 
direction, the field open to all the transformations reversals, cut- 
outs, the multiplication at each point, in each syllable or sonority, 
of powers of designation. " 
85 
This language is in a 'state of play' 
permeated by chance so that each sound or syllable is like a dice whose 
faces each have a different meaning and are endlessly retossed to form 
new combinations with other dice. 
Brisset manufactures his language by breaking up words into constitutive 
sounds or syllables and rearranging them in order to release a semantic 
network, thorugh which enonces or statements are produced. Instead of 
tracing a multiplicity of words back to a root Brisset proliferates the 
possible phonetic combinations or 'anterior states' to which they may be 
linked. Individual words are filtered through this method with 
different results each time. Further, by breaking words down into micro 
or elementary combinations Brisset uncovers 'archaic states', which 
through a "compressive play or settling down, contractions, phonetic 
modifications proper to each one ... end up converging toward a single 
and sole expression that regroups and contains them. " 
86 Brisset's 
assumption is that a first language contains neither a set of 'word 
77 
treasures' or expressive cries but a multiplicity of enonces. With this 
means of producing phrases he uncovers not a set of "morphological 
constaints' but a 'stream of spoken things, ' of wishes, commands, 
desires, questions etc. His analysis does not fold around an emerging 
linguistic system or symbolic order of signifiers but projects itself 
toward an outside facing violent scenes of battle and struggle. The 
word possesses neither morphological, semantic or referential unity: 
words exist to link up with visibilities or rather to cut into them: 
to join (literally: to form a body with) a scene in which it surges 
up as cry, murmur, command, story; and its unity it owes on the one 
hand to the fact that, from scene to scene, despite the diversity of 
the decor, the actors, and the upsets, is the same sound that runs 
throughout, the same sonourous gesture that detaches itself from the 
melee, and floats an instant above the episode, like its audible 
sign, on the other hand, to the fact that these scenes form a 
history, and are connected in a sensible fashion, according to the 
necessities of our ancestral frogs. A word -its the paradox, the 
miracle, the miraculous hazard of a same noise that, for different 
reasons, for different characters, aiming at different things, 
resounds throughout history. Its the improbable series of the die 
which seven times in succession turns up the same face. Little 
matter who speaks, and, when he speaks, why and in employip what 
vocabulary: the same clattering, unreasonably, resounds. 
What interests Foucault is the way that Brisset defines words through a 
"scenic homophony" and how through a 'phonetic scenography' words are 
forced to penetrate and become part of the body again and to assume 
their functions of cry and gesture. 
88 
Brisset places words back into the 
mouth and disperses them around the sexual organs. The intrication of 
words into scenes of struggle with their 'incesscent play of appetites 
and violence' gives them their body, and through their repetition 
insures their form. Around every word alliterate cries will swarm 
linking up with other words in a chain of immemorial scenes evoking war, 
sexual savagery and devastation. 
78 
By "retransforming words into theatre, putting sounds back into croaking 
throats, mixing them again with all the tatters of torn and devoured 
flesh, raising them up as a terrible dream, and contraining men to once 
again bow down. " 
89 
Brisset has restored words to the noises from which 
they issue and placed them back into the scenes of violence and assault 
from which they generate. For Foucault's Brisset words have the power 
of bloody deeds because they are fully immanent to those scenes. Thus 
what Foucault found in Roussel and in a different way in Magritte and 
what he could have found in a different sense in film is the audiovisual 
battle, the double capture, "the noise of words that conquered the 
visible, the fury of things that conquered the articulable. " 
90 
It is precisely these themes that inform I, Pierre Riviere but placed in 
such a context whereby historical and psychological dimensions are 
intermingled to enable a new problematic to emerge. Although I, Pierre 
Riviere is contemporary with Discipline and Punish it is not the twin 
of that book in the way the Raymond Roussel doubled Birth of the 
Clinic. In fact, the whole problematic of I, Pierre Riviere remains 
contemporary with Roussel and the Clinic since the text arises out of 
Leiris' 'tauromachic' writing, in the performance of which, the death of 
the author is integral. 
For Foucault Riviere enters into the category of 'the posthumous 
revelation of the first person' because after writing his memoirs "a 
newspaper report tells us that in his prison he considered himself 
already dead. " 
91 
The full title of the work already inscribes within 
itself the difference that will inform the text: I, Pierre Riviere, 
having slaughtered my mother, my sister and my brother are the first 
79 
words of Pierre Riviere's account and the subtitle 'a case of parricide 
in the 19th Century' establishes the document as a case-story set in a 
relationship with other documents that surround and contextualise it, 
but also with a historical discourse and commentary that will reveal its 
status and importance. it is the difference between a singular 
constative enunciation and an institutional, anonymous power. 
Foucault's contribution to the collection focuses on the intricate 
entwining of the deed and the writing of the deed and on its capacity to 
silence commentary: 
Rivieres own discourse on his act so dominates, or in any case so 
escapes from every possible handle, that there is nothing to be said 
about this central point, this crime or act, that is not a step back 
in relation to it. We see there nevertheless a phenomenon without 
an equivalent in either the history of crime or discourse: that is 
to say, a crime accompanied by a discourse so strong and so strange 
that the crime ends up not existing anymore; it escapes through the 
very95act of this discourse held about it by the one who committed 
it. 
The effect of Riviere's discourse can only be explained through a 
murder/narrative machine as if the "murder and the narrative of the 
murder were consubstantial. " 
93 It is through this consubstantial machine- 
space that "a twenty year old Norman peasant was able to make himself in 
two different ways but in virtually a single deed an author. " 
94 
Riviere's 
discourse is a tangled, doubled and folded tissue that rotates around 
itself creating a complex ensemble whose mechanism is analagous to 
Roussel and Brisset: "The text does not relate directly to the deed; a 
whole web of relations is woven between one and the other; they support 
one another and carry one another in ever changing relations. " 
95 
When 
Riviere's case comes to trial, his written account is used as evidence 
by both prosecution and defense since it contained 'signs of madness' as 
80 
well as 'signs of lucidity. ' But for both the account is integral to 
the crime and forms part of it. 
For Foucault this further exemplifies the "verbo-ballistic" nature of 
the text becuase the text and murder move around one another, capturing 
one another as functions of a single mechanism: 
The murder would rather appear to be a projectile concealed at first 
in the engine of a discourse which recoils and becomes unnecessary 
in the propulsion discharging it. We might well call this mechanism 
the mechanism of the 'calibene' or 'albalester' from the names of 
the instruments invented by Riviere, fabricated words, instruments 
to discharge arrows, weapons to bring down clouds and birds, wrought 
names that flought death and nailed animals to trees, all at the 
same time. 
The equivalence of weapon and discourse is compounded by Riviere's 
construction of a bow or 'arbalest' which functioned as a "mute 
declaration which became a substitute for the dark discourse engendered 
with the crime and intended to make him, by the narrating of it, 
glorious. " 
97 
The 'arbalest' is part of the instrument of conversion or 
catalyst of transformation on that day when what Riviere: 
"called his ideas and thoughts ... were transformed into 
discourse/weapon, poem/invectives, verbo-ballistic inventions, 
instruments for 'encepharing' (one of Riviere's invented words); 
into those engines of death whose names were fabricated and whose 
corpses were buried, those words/projectiles which were from now on 98 
never to cease springing from his lips and spurting from his hands. " 
Riviere's verbo-ballistic machines juxtapose and entangle the visible 
and the articulable through the production of a murder/memoire that 
makes it impossible to tell them apart and yet absolutely necessary to 
maintain their difference. This is further complicated by Riviere's 
self-proclamation as an 'author' who came to "lodge his deed and his 
speech in a defined place in a certain type of discourse and a certain 
81 
field of knowledge. " 
99 
Indeed Pierre Riviere's murder/memoire is made 
possible by it being bound up with an already constituted historical 
field of popular knowledge, memoires, broadsheets and narratives which 
already operate and have effects at a certain level of discursive 
practice and with the knowledge tied to it. But what is striking for 
Foucault is that "in the inextricable unity of his parricide and his 
text he really played the game of law. " 
100 Riviere plays this game 
simultaneously on both registers, as author of the crime and author of 
the text, as subject of the deed and subject of discourse which was not 
mad or irrational - but monstrous. 
Riviere's writing mechanism became, of course, an object of scrutiny 
outside the field constituted by the rules and assumptions of popular 
knowledge and became subject to a different question of truth. 
Riviere's "deed/text was subjected to a three fold question of truth: 
truth of fact, truth of opinion and truth of science. To a discursive 
act, a discourse in act, profoundly committed to the rules of popular 
knowledge there was applied a question derived elsewhere and 
administered by others. " 
101 This new context of truth disallows the 
'beauty' of Riviere's deed/text. Foucault's intervention authorises the 
document by dismantling the invention, production and construction of 
the author. The deed/text is released from its authorical functions and 
posthumously invented by Foucault by giving it a reader. The 'beauty' 
of the text is allowed to reverberate 150 years later through the 
'internal abstraction' of its author who considered himself 'already 
dead. ' And in this we might perhaps also see a process or movement 
away from the library, an 'external abstraction' bound to the authorial 
function which treats literature solely as 'documents through which are 
82 
102 
constituted central categories of individuality in our modern life. " 
Discipline and Punish situates literary discourse in relation to a 
larger configuration of documents which together constitute a specific 
historical reality. 
And if from the early Middle ages to the present day the 'adventure' 
is an account of individuality, the passage from the epic to the 
novel, from the noble deed to the secret singularity, from long 
exiles to the internal search for childhood, from combats to 
phantasies, it is also inscribed in the formations of a disciplinary 
society. The adventure of our childhood no longer finds expression 
in 'le bon petit Henri' but in the misfortunes of 'little Hans'. 
The romance of the Rose is writtey0ýoday by Mary Barnes; in place of 
Lancelot, we have Judge Screber. 
3. The historical and the Actual. 
The site or 'tropological space' that disseminates and distributes the 
articulable and the visible in Roussel, the immanence of language/desire 
in a space of battle and their composition into a violent 'body' in 
Brisset and the construction of a word/deed machine in the murderous 
crime/text of Riviere together constitute variations of the 
combinatorics of the space of enonces, a historically variable 
conjunctive /disjunctive relation between forms that constitutes 
knowledge. This process of spatialilising the enunciable and the 
visible gives onto a certain patterning of their relation and, following 
their repetition into a second phase, the miniscule difference between 
the two, the 'snag' between them and the twisting and doubling from one 
to the other, is one of the conditions for the 'twist, fold, stop' 
action or spatialising movement between surfaces that for Foucault 
conditions and produces knowledge (historical, aesthetic, 
philosophical, etc, ). 
83 
The snag is no longer the accident of the tissue but the new rule on 
the basis181 which the external tissue is twisted, invaginated and 
doubled. 
And the tissue of history is transformed, dispersed across a space 
turned inside-out. Each time it is a game of chance ruled by an iron 
hand. The surfaces and lines that Foucault traces are constantly in 
variation crossing each other, 'waging battle' and throwing up new 
combinations. Each time one set of variables is conditioned by the 
previous combinations and history becomes 'other, ' something new. For 
Foucault (as for Deleuze) the universal, the totality, the abstract 
explain nothing, it is the universal, the totality and the abstract that 
need to be explained. If there are constants in Foucault they are lines 
of enunciable and visible variation that are constantly forking and 
bifurcating, folding back in on themselves or other lines, or surging 
across each other connecting up and disconnecting through variable 
thresholds. In the interview with Raulet 
105, 
Foucault explains that these 
lines of variation are constantly composed and decomposed by relations 
of force creating little lines of mutuation and lines of 'fracture' that 
are to be mapped as an "endless, multiple bifurcation -a kind of 
abundant ramification" 
106. 
What Foucault finds in Roussel, Brisset and 
Pierre Rivierre is precisely this endless bifurcation of forms and 
relations of force that make and unmake the real. It is within the 
development and extension of this archaeological 'fieldwork' across all 
of the human sciences that Foucault will locate an "abundance of 
branchings, ramifications, breaks and ruptures" 
107 
that constitute 
historically determinate forms of rationality and the spatial resources 
to 'think otherwise' and beyond them. 
84 
I think, in fact that reason is self-created, which is why I have 
tried to analyse forms of rationality: different foundations, 
different creations, different modifications in whicý0iationalities 
engender one another oppose and pursue one another. 
Epistemes, archives, discourses etc are not universals operating on 
different levels, they simply name a set of variables (modifications, 
foundations, creations), forms of rationality in continuous variation. 
Epistemes, archives, discourses etc, are the co-ordinates of an 
archaeological system of space-time that make it possible to map 
'continuous variables' of difference. Variables, or lines of 
difference (enunciables/visibles) break into what Foucault has called 
lines or surfaces of "sedimentations, 
109, 
spaces that accumulate 
'deposits' of enonces glued together with lines of time, ("each 
transformation may have its own particular index of temporal 'viscosity"' 
iio ), or surfaces that stratify into definite contours and shapes but also 
open surfaces of creation and difference which belong to the 'present': 
that which belongs to history and that which belongs to a process that 
Foucault, along with Deleuze and Nietzsche, will call 'becoming. ' A 
'becoming' that entangles itself and bifurcates with the 'no longer' and 
the 'not yet' of history and Foucault will describe this 'untimeliness' or 
'unseasonableness' in the Archaeology: 
the archive comprises a privileged region which is at the same time 
close to us, but different from our present; it is the border of the 
time which surrounds our present, jutting over it and describing it 
by means of its otherness; it is that which is outside and delimits 
us. To describe the archive is to set out its possibilities on the 
basis of forms of discourse which have just recently ceased to be 
our own; the threshold of its existence is established by the break 
which separates us from what we can no longer say, and from that 
which falls outside our discursive practices; it begins with what is 
outside our own language, its locus being its distance from our own 
discursive practice Iii In this sense it becomes valid as a 
diagnostic for us. 
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Foucauldian 'diagnostics' and 'analytics' problematise forms of 
discourse and the non-discurive that 'have just recently ceased to be 
our own' by opening them to a space of otherness, difference or 
possibility in the present ("it now bursts open the other and the outside" 
112). 
Diagnosis and analysis cannot map out a future or say 'what must be 
done'. They "cannot establish the facts of our identity" 
113 
so much as 
dissolve and deprive us of such reassurance. The diagnostic and analytic 
elements of archaeological thought function as tools and instruments for 
'making' problems in the present, and one makes a problem by exposing 
lines of difference in the 'self-evidence' of what we can say and see, 
producing enonces as a problem in what we have been (history) in order to 
open up possibilities for what we are in the process of becoming 
(actuality). 
"History is what still separates us from ourselyTi, while actuality 
is this other with which we already coincide.,, 
The great archaeological descriptions of the archive deploy their 
possibilities and encounter their thresholds in the space that separates 
us from what we can no longer say or see: from the space of the 
'outside'. Their time is the time in between, the time of the no 
longer' and the 'not yet'. The space-time of the outside is precisely 
the point where a strategy of archaeological/ archival description can 
'begin, ' "its site is the between our own discursive 
115 
gap practices" 
analysing what we are no longer whilst, simultaneously, providing a 
diagnosis of becoming something other, something not yet. And thereby an 
'archaeology of the present' is made possible and made possible to the 
extent that "it establishes that we are difference. " 
116 
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That Foucault's diagnostic/analytic project can take place resides in 
the inhabitation of an archaelogical exterior, a series of 'empty', 
'blank'or 'impossible' spaces or slots within which the archaelogical 
'gaze' is temporarily sited. Foucault's texts 'fiction' or 'invent' 
temporary staging posts or 'stands' within particular discourses that 
have been opened by certain 'limit' texts. These openings or sites can 
then be defined "by the exteriority of its vicinity. " 
117 
In The Order of Things this exterior is defined less by the differences 
that limit the relations between the visible and the enunciable (the 
extimate Otherness to be shut away) as by those relations of 
resemblance and identity that yoke them together in the order of the 
Same. But the whole of the analysis, in any case, is leading to the 
point of their Fold because "it is.. concerned with showing how the 
Other, the Distant, is also the Near and the Same" 
118. 
And Foucault will 
demonstrate this through the 'heterotopic' spacing of certain 'limit' 
texts which mark each episteme. Heterotopic spaces are disturbing: 
probably because they secretely undermine language, because they 
make it impossible to name this and that, because they shatter or 
tangle common names, because they destroy syntax in advance, and not 
only the syntax with which we construct sentences but also that less 
apparent syntax which causes words and thijyg (next to but also 
opposite one another) to "hang together". 
In fact, the book as a whole, we are told, emerges from a "passage in 
Borges. " 
120 
This is not just a textual passage but also a heterotopic 
one, a passage that will "dessicate speech, stop words in their tracks, 
contest the very possibility of language at its source" 
121, 
a passage 
through which Foucault will pass all the organising terms of The Order 
of Things. The strange taxonomy of animals listed by Borges is an 
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example of the "exotic charm of another system of thought, is the 
limitation of our own, the stark impossibility of thinking that. " 
122 
Foucault's text is concerned with those categories which organise and 
condition the 'impossibility of thinking that', opening them to 
heterotopic spaces which fold the system back on itself, which double 
and repeat it, which turn space inside out: 
The central category of animals 'included in the present 
classification, ' with its explicit reference to paradoxes we are 
familiar with, is indication enough that we shall never succeed in 
defining a stable relation of contained to container between each of 
these categories and that which includes them all. If all the 
animals divided up here can be placed without exception in one of 
the divisions of this list, then aren't all the other divisions to 
be found in that one division too? And then again in what space 
would that single, inclusive division have its existence. Absurdity 
destroys the and of the enumeration by making iT3ossible the in 
where the things enumerated would be divided. 
The paradox of self-inclusiveness points to the disorder of order 
itself, to a chaotic, heteroclitic space 'outside' of itself organising 
the space of order: "The lawless and uncharted dimension of the 
heteroclite.... should be taken in its most literal etymylogical sense; 
in such a state, things are 'laid, 'placed', 'arranged' in sites so very 
different from one another that it is impossible to find a common place 
beneath them all" 
124. 
This space that the archaeologist will chart has 
nothing to do with reflexivity, or rather, it makes the appearance of 
reflexive order possible: 
Thus between the already 'encoded' eye and reflexive knowledge there 
is a middle region which liberates order itself ... this middle 
region, then in so far as it makes manifest the modes of being of 
order, can be posited as the most fundamental of all: anterior to 
words, perceptions, and gestures, which are then taken to be more or 
less exact, more or less happy, expressions of it (which is why this 
experience or order in its pure primary state always plays a 
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critical role); more solid, mor archaic, less dubious, always more 
'true' than the theories that attempt to give those expressions 
explicit form, exhaustive application, or philosophical foundation. 
Thus, in every culture, between the use of what one might call the 
ordering codes and reflections upon order itsellisthere is the pure 
experience of order and of its modes of being. 
Foucault will locate the 'pure' experience of order and its modes of 
being in the heterotopic space of archaelogy by determining those 
'historical aprioris' upon which the 'positivities' of seeing and saying 
are derived. The historically variable apriori combinatorics of 
visibilities and enunciabilities constitute the space of a 'positive 
unconscious' of knowledge. 
The pure experience of order and its modes of being (light, language) in 
the classical era are manifested in the instability of representation or 
the representation of representation. The relations between the 
'subject' functions in Las Meninas reveal the void at the heart of the 
space of representation, its limits and the limits of the entire 
epistemological space of the classical era. 
Las Meninas is a painting about painting. The painter is represented in 
the paintings at work on a painting that cannot be seen, he looks at the 
model who happens also to be the viewer. We thus enter into a labyrinth 
where the outside is brought inside and the inside is projected outside 
so that representational space is a folded pocket extending to the 
outside as it does the inside. The painting captures the painter at a 
moment between the visible and the invisible "caught in a moment of 
stillness ... halfway between the visible and the invisible. "126 The 
visibility of the painter in the painting renders his own painting 
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invisible to him "as though the painter could not at the same time be 
seen on the picture where he is represented and also see that upon which 
he is representing something. He rules at the threshold of these two 
incompatible visibilities. " 
127 
But the 'rule' can only be a 'moment' of the threshold since it in turn 
will be undermined by an "unstable play of metamorphoses" where "subject 
and object, spectator and model, infinitely reverse their roles.,, 
128 
The 
mirror in the picture offers Foucault "at last that enchantment of the 
double" 129 which multiplies the relations between visibility and 
invisibility. In fact, the mirror reflects the outside, what is not 
represented inside. The scene of representation is thus a complex 
involuted folding of (in)visibilities outside in and inside out. And 
yet at the 'completion' of representation there is "an essential void: 
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the necessary disappearance of that which is its foundation. " 
Foucault's whole analysis of Las Meninas determines the precise 
distribution of opacity and transparence, of the visible and the 
invisible in the space of classical representation. Light opens up this 
distributive network and conditions the permutations of perception or 
the combinatorics of the visible. "The light that is flooding the 
pictures from outside" 
131 
organises a system of opening and closing that 
structures the space of the "spiral shell" 
132 
of representation. The 
light from outside illuminates two "sagittal lines" 
133 
which traverse the 
space of representation and converge in an uncertain point: it is the 
uncertain point at which 'we cannot yet see' and 'no longer represent. ' 
In this °sagittal dimension" 134 the line of the inside (past), the line 
of the no longer visible, is folded into the line of the outside (future), 
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the line of the 'not yet' visible, "an oscillation between the interior 
and exterior. " 
135 
The space of the 'mirror' at the centre of the painting 
places us at "the threshold of ... two incompatible visibilies" 
136 
at the 
limit of the classical present. That the lines lose their shape at the 
fold of the limit ("they all lack a segment of their trajectories" 
137) 
attests to the 'void', 'hollow' and 'absence' at the heart of 
representation and to the presence of that "ambiguous visitor" who "is 
coming in and going out at the same time, like a pendulum caught at the 
bottom of its swing.,, 
138 In what we might call Foucault's pendulum we are 
given an archaeological snapshot or portrait of classical thought and 
its transformation through a 'sagittal dimension' with its arrows or 
lines of space-time that are drawn through a 'bifurcation' point or 
space of discontinuity between 'attractor' states. (i. e, the spontaneous 
transition from a point of equilibrium (infinity) to a state of 
oscillation (finitude)). It is a 'phase portrait' of the abstract, 
heterotopic space of the outside between the not yet and the no longer, 
a representation that can no longer represent and a finitude not yet 
visible. 
And Foucault's construction of an archaeological 'phase-space' will 
demonstrate that classical thought is continually driven into and losing 
itself in the attractor of infinite representation. This is why, in one 
sense, that "language in the classical era does not exist. " 
139 
Language 
loses its 'being' which is dissolved entirely in its representational 
function and exists in the 'hollow' that it creates for itself. Within 
this hollow language takes on its function as discourse distributed 
through a 'quadrilateral' table that attempts to represent, ultimately 
though the name and the picture, the order of beings to infinity. This 
91 
was equally the case with the other empirical domains. "As long as 
these empirical contents were situated within the space of 
representation, a metaphysics of the infinite was not only possible but 
necessary. " 
140 Representation as that historical apriori or archaelogical 
ground of classical thought unfolds the spaces of the enunciable and 
visible through each other all the better to unfold them through a 
continuum to infinity. Enunciable space must render all of visible 
space translucent to it at that infinite point where representation and 
being, nature and human nature intersect. 
What classical thought reveals is the power of discourse. In other 
words, language in so far as it represents - language that names, 
patterns, combines, and connects and disconnects things as it makes 
them visible in the transparency of words. In this role, language 
transforms the sequence of perceptions into a table, and cuts up the 
continuum of beings into a pattern of characters. Where there is 
discourse, representations are laid out and juxtaposed; and things 
are grouped together and articulated. The profound vocation of 
classical language has always been to create a table -a 'piT Yre' 
... it exists, therefore, only 
in order to be transparent. 
The simultaneity and transparency of enunciable and visible spaces to 
each other runs through the other empirical domains of natural history 
and wealth. Remarking on the curiosity that the classical age expressed 
through the establishment of botanical gardens and zoological 
collections Foucault says that their had, for a long time, been an 
interest in exotic plants and animals but that "what had changed was the 
space in which it was possible to see them and from which it was 
possible to describe them. " 
142 The conditions for the existence of 
natural history were thus established through the necessity to name things 
in accordance with a specific mode of seeing, made possible through a re- 
organisation of historical space. 
92 
What came surreptitiously into being between the age of the theatre 
and that of the catalogue was not the desire for knowledge, but123 
new way of connecting things both to the eye and to discourse. 
This is why, in one sense, "that life itself did not exist" 
144 in the 
classical age. The space through which it could be named and made 
visible (biological space) had not been constructed and could not have 
been. Foucault's archaeology of natural history demonstrates not only 
that 'life' as an object was not seen, but that it could not be seen. 
Natural history analyses 'living beings' into their functional variable 
components through a 'structure' of identies and differences that can be 
tabulated to the 'character' of genuine species, that brings words and 
things together in a simultaneous act of seeing and naming. Linnaeus' 
proposed calligrams, where the actual arrangement of words on the page 
represent the visual parts of the object ("that the printed text ... 
should have a vegetable structure" 
145) illustrates this structure. ( No 
doubt in the margins of Linnaeus' little epistemological dream we would 
find the inscription: this is not a plant). This structure is a 
historically specific "limiting and filtering" of the visible (the 
invention of the microscope was made possible by this contraction of the 
visible and its use merely extended this contraction) that makes 
146 
possible its transcription into language. 
In the 'analysis of wealth' labour does not exist, and for the same 
reasons that language and life do not exist. The exchange value of 
money is dissolved into its representational function as a sign of the 
value of other commodities. Money has no intrinsic value other than 
that "which permits wealth to be represented. " 
147 
The continued use of 
specific metals (gold, silver) is merely due to their "representative 
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function as signs. " 
148 
Because of certain material qualities (Foucault 
lists imperishable, easily divided, density (weight per volume), 
transportable, easily pierced) they retain a 'peculiar perfection, ' a 
perfection that favours them for infinite representation. From this 
perspective classical thought could develop a table of identities and 
differences through which all wealth, as components in a system of 
exchange, could be represented. 
General grammar, natural history and the analysis of wealth are modes of 
being through which classical thought constructs its order of things. 
All wealth is coinable; and it is by this means that it enters into 
circulation - in the same way that any natural being was 
characterisable, and could therefore find its place in a taxonomy; 
that any individual was nameable and could find its place in an 
articulated language; that any representation was signifiable and 
could find its place, in ordn9to be known, in a system of 
identities and differences. 
In each empirical region the spaces of the enunciable and visible 
produce a precarious compound form from those forces within (a certain 
mode of being for language, nature, need) in confrontation with those 
forces from outside. "Archaelogical mutation" consists in "an erosion 
from the outside,, 
150 
when the attractor state of classical thought 
(infinite representation) with its three axes or lines converging on a 
virtual point contract with new forces from the outside - life, labour 
and language - ("the force of labour, the energy of life, the power of 
speech" 
151) 
producing through these forces the form of that 'periodic' 
attractor - man - through the dense points of biology, economics and 
linguistics as both object of knowledge and subject who knows, as both 
positive foundation and fundamental limitation. 
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When these empirical contents were detached from representation and 
contained the principle of existence within themselves, then the 
metaphysics of infinity became useless; from that point on, finitude 
never ceased to refer back to itself (from the positivity of the 
contents to the limitations of knowledge, and from the limited 
knowledge of the contents) where upon the entire field of western 
thought was invented. 
152 
The exterior forms of content and expression no longer unfold adjacent 
and superimposed on one another and converging on a singular point but 
are now folded through a 'periodic attractor, ' a 'period doubling' or, 
as Foucault says, "an empirico-transcendental doublet which was called 
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man. " 
Hence the interminable to and fro of a double system of reference: 
if mans knowledge is finite, it is because he is trapped, without 
possibility of liberation, within the positive contents of language, 
labour and life; and inversely, if life labour and language may be 
positedljý their positivity, it is because knowledge has finite 
forms. 
All these contents that his knowledge reveals to him as exterior to 
himself, and older than his own birth, anticipate him, overhang him 
with all their solidity, and traverse him as though he were merely 
an object of nature ... Man's finitude 
iI5ýeralded - and imperiously 
so - in the positivity of knowledge ... 
Man is now constituted in that space of positivity that Las Meninas had 
reserved for him. It is the space of the "Fold (in which) the 
transcendental function is doubled over so that it covers with its 
dominating network the inert, grey space of empiricity ... 11156 Foucault's 
whole analysis of modern thought demonstrates that the folded space of 
finitude constitutes the compound 'man' across its surfaces only after 
hollowing out the being of representation, through a primary phase, that 
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breaks its links with infinity. The forces of finitude are already, in 
some sense 'present, '(insisting, subsisting), held in reserve and 
floating or hovering in the 'outside' limit of classical thought. 
Smith, Jussieu and Jones begin to assemble the space within which the 
outside (finitude) will be folded into the inside creating a new 
dimension or as Foucault says, a new 'configuration' 
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upon which the 
'mode of being' of words, classes and wealth will fold and become 
articulated. Within this development words and things acquire a 
historicity (first phase) which is given a foundation by being 
appropriated by man (second phase). 
Thus, behind the history of the positivities, there appears another, 
more radical, history, that of man himself -a history that now 
concerns man's very being, since he now realises that he not only 
'has history' all around him, but is himself, in his own 
historicity, that by means of which a history of human life, a 
history of economics, and a history of languages are given their 
form. In which case, at a very deep level, there exists a 
historicity of man which is itself its own history but also the 
radical dismsion that provides a foundation for all other 
histories. 
This is not a transition from the static tabula of classical order to 
History so much as a passage from the unified historical schema of the 
enunciable and the visible with the same space and chronology to a 
multiplicity of spaces and times each with its own form of historicity. 
This dispersion of history is only regrouped in its being when the human 
sciences organise themselves around the figure of man. But, the 
emphasis of the human sciences on historicity as a 'mode of being' could 
also be directed back on themselves as forms of knowledge undermining 
any effort to construct universal laws equivalent to those in natural 
science. Foucault's infamous provocations about Marxism ('storms in a 
childrens paddling pool') merely locate it as a child of its time whose 
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claims to scientific totality conceal its own historicity. Marxism is 
just one discursive practice amongst others in a broad epistemological 
arrangement of history which is itself a form of knowledge and a mode of 
being governed by a historical apriori. 'History' is a historical 
problematic through which difference and otherness return as a problem. 
The whole effort of The Order of Things is thus directed toward 
establishing the 'horizontal axis' 
159 
through which the differentiated 
exteriorities of knowledge, the 'play of dependencies', links and 
redistributions affecting the spaces of the enunciable and the visible, 
actively produce historical knowledge through the same/other rubric. 
The apriori of historical knowledges is itself historical: 
the apriori of positivities is not only the systeT68f a temporal 
dispersion - it is itself a transformable group. 
Foucault's texts renew history by demonstrating the non-arbitrary 
regulatory network that reconfigures epistemelogical space. Each 
mutation in the spaces of history systematically rearticulates the 
assembled spaces of knowledge, the already said and the already seen. 
Knowledge is immanent to and coextensive with the actioned spaces of the 
social/historical field. "Knowledge is a practical assemblage, a 
'mechanism' of statements and visibilities. There is nothing behind 
knowledge (although, as we shall see, there are things outside 
knowledge. )" 161 
Knowledge organises the internal space of each regime and the circle of 
articulations between them. In the modern regime 'man' attempts to 
close the circle of these articulations: 
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The question is no longer: How can experience of nature give rise 
to necessary judgements? But rather: How can man think what he 
does not think, inhabit as though by a mute occupation something 
that eludes him, animate with a kind of frozen movement thjý2figure 
of himself that takes the form of a stubborn exteriority? 
Man as that 'figuration of finitude', as a transcendental/ empirical 
doublet is born alongside an 'unthought', an excession of 
representation, an 'outside' topologically folded inside thought. The 
unthought outside reverberates across the spaces of knowledge (life, 
labour, language) as their deep interior, the other that traverses the 
same. 
Man has not been able to describe himself as a configuration in the 
episteme without thought at the same time discovering, both in 
itself and outside itself, at its borders yet also in its very warp 
and woof, an element of darkness, an apparently inert density in 
which it is embedded, an untýgyght which it contains entirely, yet 
in which it is also caught. 
Foucault joins the extimacy of the unthought with thought to the 
"retreat and return of the origin" 
164. 
Thus the 
transcendental/empirical, thought/unthought, original/originated are the 
archaeological phases or period doublings of the attractor of modern 
thought just as they are the aporetic spaces of an 'Anthropology' that 
ultimately collapses upon itself. 
Man is embedded within the interior cavities or strata of an 
epistemological space which is simultaneously embedded within man. The 
doubling and repetition of this space within itself is the dogmatic 
circularity of a bisected Anthropology that experiences itself as 
'vigilance' 165 even though it has closed its faculties down for the 
night. 
And so we find philosophy falling asleep once more in the hollow of 
this Fold; thiý6gime not the sleep of Dogmatism, but that of 
Anthropology. 
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"From Kant until our own day" Archaeology documents a circular dogmatism 
distributed across the surfaces of an "anthropological quadrilateral" 
which can only be displaced by saying farewell to the "face in the 
sand. " Archaeological thought understands the Kantian revolution as an 
anthropological turn that organises the entire epistemological space of 
modernity: it is the genesis of an "epistemological consciousness of 
man as such. " 
167 
The dissolution of representation heralds man as that 
"figure occurring between two modes of language" 
168 
that short-circuits 
and collapses empirical and transcendental spaces into each other. 
Simultaneously held together and apart it is only when this folded space 
is erased or dispersed into a new multiplicity that a thinking-otherwise 
becomes possible: 
It is no longer possible to think in our day other than in the void 
left by man's disappearance. For this void does not create a 
deficiency; it does not constitute a lacuna that must be filled. It 
is nothing more, and nothing less than th76 refolding of a space in 
which it is once more possible to think. 
Archaeological thought unravels and situates itself within a post- 
anthropological space that frees thought from within man. It is in The 
Archaeology of Knowledge that this space is drawn out and given its 
irreducible exterior form, a form "purged of all Anthropologism" 
170 
'Man' is a temporary functional space within the modern episteme soon to 
be declared useless by a contemporary formation displaying a new "cluster 
of transformations, " a new set of force relations. 
The archaeological principle that in each age everything is already seen 
and already said according to their anonymous conditions or apriori is, 
then, already present in The Order of Things and is taken up in The 
Archaeology of Knowledge not as a totality describing a period, a 
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structural key, overarching principle, weltanschauung, integral paradigm 
etc, but as that set of historical forces that condition the existence 
of specific forms of the visible and the articulable and their spatial 
relations of dispersion and displacement. These principles 
allow us to describe, as the episteme of a period, not the sum of 
its knowledge, nor the general style of its research, but the 
deviation, distances, the oppositions, the differences, the 
relations of its multiple scientific discourses: the epistemic is 
not a sort of grand underlying theory, it is a space of dispersion, 
it is an open field of relationships and no doubt indefinitely 
specifiable. They allow us furthermore to describe not the great 
history which would carry along all the sciences in a single 
trajectory, but the types of history - that is to say, of 
retentivity and transformation - which characterise different 
discourses ... the episteme 
is not a slice of history common to all 
the sciences: it is a simultaneous play of specific remanences. 
Finally they allow us to situate the different thresholds in their 
respective place: for nothing proves in advance ... that their 
chronology is the same for all types of discourse ... the episteme 
is not a general stage of M son, it is a complex relationship of 
successive displacements. 
The episteme then is a space of multiplicity cut across by other 
multiplicities - discursive and nondiscursive - in infinitely varied 
patterns of spatial movement. The episteme is a kaleidoscopic compound 
of visible and invisible space, the verbal and non-verbal nerve 
structure of the 'no longer' and the 'not yet. ' The archaeology of the 
'present' episteme is a map of what we are leaving behind and what we 
are in the process of becoming, a displacement of the past into the 
dispersion of the new. 
The archaelogist is above all fascinated with the emergence of these 
'other spaces' in the time of the 'not yet', fascinated with spaces of 
becoming, impossible heterotopic spaces that do not yet exist but insist 
or subsist within the fractures and splinters of the stratum; 
fascinated, above all, with how both the arbitrary and groundless 
interaction between contingent processes of spatial flux give rise to 
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subsequent spatial forms and how other relations and processes emerge 
between interacting ones. The archaelogists principle concern is to 
map, describe and rethink in its logic the endless interweaving and 
folding of epistemic multiplicities and the processes through which they 
constitute the pulse of the 'real. ' For the archaelogist can also claim 
"that he has written only what is real, and used what is real, for 
everything is real in the statement, and all reality in it is openly on 
display. " 
172 
Foucault's archaeological maps or phase-space diagrams of 
the real not only show how the possibilities of knowledge are defined by 
the way in which the enunciable and the visible produce and stratify the 
space of enonces but they also show (create and select) those points and 
spaces to destratify, inventing 'smooth spaces' and little lines of 
flight to the outside. The archaeologist will designate the space of 
enonces as the location of this contest over knowledge. 
4. The space of enonces. 
Enonces are the material expression, the collective assemblage of 
enunciation of the variable epistemic conditions that constitute the 
real. The archaelogist will map the spatial logics that inform this 
figure and we will come to see how enonces are shaken loose from their 
anchoring in any 'discursive unit, ' peeled away from any linguistic or 
'written' core and inserted into a radically positive exteriority or 
transversality at the heart of Foucault's 'empiricism' or 'positivism. ' 
In the books leading up to The Archaeology of Knowledge Foucault had 
explained that he was dealing with neither words or things, but what 
makes them possible. His work was not concerned with logical or 
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grammatical analysis, with objects, subjects or predicates and nor was 
it concerned with any kind of analysis of phrases or propositions. In 
fact, the Archaeologist attends to a topological dimension in order to 
apprehend what has not been read before. Moving along a diagonal line 
that cuts through the spaces of 'interpretation' or 'formalisation' 
Foucault presents the enonce(statement). An example is immediately 
forthcoming: "the keyboard of a typewriter is not a statement; but the 
same series of letters A, Z, E, R, T listed in a typewriting manual, is 
the statement of the alphabetical order adopted by French typewriters. " 
173 
Foucault's archaelogical instruments invent a new enunciative or 
expressive function and Dreyfus and Rabinow 
174, for example, will 
describe this function as a double phenomenological reduction bracketing 
sense and reference. The statement for them is a serious speech act (a 
seriousness that is suspended) offered up through the principle of the 
rarefaction of discourse, a rarefaction produced through some kind of 
'institutional test'. The statement is a form of residual materiality 
left over after the extraction of propositional, grammatical and 
analytical content making a pure description of discourse possible. 
This is barely adequate to the reach and originality of this 'concept'. 
It binds the statement to a 'linguistic' act, ties such acts together as 
discourse (so that discourse is merely a collection of oral or written 
statements, a version of speech act theory), deprives it of its complex 
relation to a 'visible' component and almost entirely suppresses, across 
the range of its articulations, its development as a complex figure of 
space, spacing and spatiality. If we accept Dreyfus and Rabinows 
understanding of the statement "we distort Foucault's conception of 
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history, but equally we distort his thought and his conception of 
thought in general. We make it into a variation of contemporary 
analytical philosophy, with which he has little in common. " 
175 
In fact, the archaeologist will establish the provenance of the space of 
enonces neither through a transcendental deduction nor through a 
phenomenological reduction (however radical) but through, playing on 
words a little, an immanent production. The enonce is a function of a 
composite, immanent space which yields, with mathematical rigour, a 
series of horizontal, vertical and diagonal dimensions compacted and 
stratified, stretched and folded into geomorphic lines and surfaces. 
These active spaces (correlative, complementary and collateral) that 
make up the inter, intra and extra dimensions of 'discursivity' require, 
for archaeological work, a non-linear geometry because of the complexity 
of their fractional form, their articulation through scalar difference, 
their proliferation through serial division and their profound affinity 
with chance. 
Associate or collateral space organizes the groupings of enonces, how 
they emerge and how they are disseminated, distributed and coalesce as 
historical formations. If Collateral relations define the stratification 
and layering of the articulable and the visible, then correlative space 
defines the organizing terms of their relation or how the legibility of 
subjects, objects and concepts emerge in the structuration of the 
articulable and the visible. Complementary space defines an 
institutional base determined by the relations between discourse and the 
non-discursive, the concrete mode of effectuation or inscription of the 
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outside. As we will see, these spaces cut across and through another 
creating complex intermediary and interlocking relations throughout the 
immanent corpus of enonces. Moreover, their realized state can be 
articulated like a (non-linear) differential equation mapping the 
relations between continuous variables. If Foucault offers an 'archive' 
of any specific equation it is in the sense that archaeological 
differential equations contain "two different realities. " The archive 
of a discursive formation will extract, exposit and produce an 
actual/virtual relation which determines the precise 'conditions of 
existence' of any corpus of enonces. The archive constitutes an audio- 
visual matrix that generates enonces in a series of tripartite, complex 
non-linear spaces in between and exterior to the visible and the 
expressible. 
It is here around the pivot of the double reality of enonces and the 
tripartitional immanent logic of space that produces them that Foucault 
constructs an exteriority for the archaelogical register: 
the analysis of statements treats them in the systematic form of 
exteriority. Usually, the historical description of things said is 
shot through with the opposition of interior and exterior; and 
wholly directed by a desire to move from the exterior- which may be 
no more than contingency or mere material necessity, a visible body 
or uncertain 159nslation - towards the essential nucleus of 
interiority. 
It is through the insistence of this exterior without interior that the 
archaeologist can map the spaces of the statement and that they may be 
organized as the 'structure' of discourse. The relations between the 
spaces of the statement "are not present in the object; it is not that 
they are deployed when the object is being analysed... They do not define 
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its internal constitution, but what enables it to appear... to be placed 
in a field of exteriority. " 
177 Statements inhabit, create or exist 
within relational spaces of exteriority that aren't buried or concealed 
in a nucleus of interiority in a manner that would require some kind of 
hermeneutics to uncover, bringing to light their concealed or repressed 
strata. Equally statements are not wholly visible to a phenomenological 
gaze or horizon that would restate them in and through a structure of 
intentionality. Archaeological thought functions in that paradoxical 
space of exteriority in which statements "are neither visible nor 
hidden. " 
178 
Whether exteriority, positivity or 'neutrality'179, the 
archaeologist demonstrates a technique of mapping that segments and 
sections discursive and non-discursive space in order to maximise the 
legibility of its sedimentations of the visible and the expressible. And 
this practice of archaeological reading will show that the statements of 
each historical formation "systematically form the objects of which they 
speak" 
180 
We need only know how to read however difficult that may prove to 
be. The secret exists only in order to be betrayed, or to betray 
itself. Each age articulates perfectly the most cynical elements of 
its politics, or the rawest element of its sexuality, to the point 
where transgression has little merit. Each age says everythinMt 
can according to the conditions laid down for its statements. 
The practice or technique of archaeological reading breaks with the 
accepted interiorities of author or book unities to offer a topology of 
discourse and the non-discursive based on positivities that "cannot be 
constructed from the grammatical features, formal structures and objects 
of discourse" 
182. 
Enonces are mobile, rare, configurations of 
exteriority andpositivity composed of singularities and multiplicities, 
empty spaces temporarily inhabited by subjects, objects and concepts as 
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repeatable regularities. "Each statement is itself a multiplicity, not 
a structure or a system". 
183 
Foucault insists on the 'rarity' of the statement-multiplicity and is 
the condition for the appearance of statements in general. If discourse 
is analysed so that different texts are organised around or into a 
single figure, coherent with institutions and practices, there is always 
a desire to reveal beneath the diversity of things said "a sort of great 
uninterrupted text, " revealing what men "really meant. " 
184 
Because this 
underlying formulation is arrived at by an individual act of 
interpretation a single manifest formulation will give rise to an 
endless number of latent meanings. Between the opposite poles of 
analysis whereby the many are reduced to the one or the one expanded to 
the many Foucault will create a new 'abstact' or 'virtual' space of 
multiplicity that does not contain any potential or possibility but 
remains at the level of what is said at a given moment, including any 
blanks and gaps. 
In this sense, discourse ceases to be what it is for the exegetic 
attitude: an inexhaustible treasure from which one can always draw 
near and always unpredictable riches ... it appears as an asset - 
finite, limited, desirable, useful - that has its own rules of 
appearance, ý also its own conditions of appropriation and 
operation. 
There is no sense of possibility or potentiality within the space of 
statements since they are the "pure positivity of the dictum" 
186 
with 
their own conditions and rules. Gliding through this space the 
archaeologist will show that statements of the same set may be compared 
with others on different levels or with other sets on the same level and 
that the relations between statements can only be analysed, and their 
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"points of diffraction" 
187 
established, according to the precise distance 
between them. Each time the geometry will vary and the 'diagonality' or 
transversality must be redrawn. And with this method one realises that 
"not only are few things said, but few things can be said. " 
188 
Statements exist, then, as functions within a space of rarity which 
cannot be understood in terms of creation, beginning or foundation and 
the mapping of their formation and transformation require another logic 
of space. A statement exists as "a transmission of particular elements 
distributed in a corresponding space" 
189 
and Foucault stresses that no 
originality is needed in order to produce them: "the originality 
/banality opposition is not relevant: between an initial formulation 
and the sentence, which years, centuries later, repeats it more or less 
exactly, (the archaeological description) establishes no hierarchy of 
value; it makes no radical difference. It tries only to establish the 
regularity of statements. " 
190 Regularity cuts through the problem of 
originality and is an effect of rarity of its space. Statements 
preserve themselves in their space while the space itself endures or is 
reconstituted. 
The accumlation of statements is like the building up of stock, the 
layering of deposits or the bedding together of all kinds of bastard 
'families' and, on each occasion, their empty spaces, gaps or absences 
are filled by variable and different subjects so that the statement 
resolves into a specific object in a particular discursive formation. 
Such a formation then is not a totality but a "distribution of gaps, 
voids, absences, limits, divisions". 
191 
The rules that govern this 
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distributive process are not found on some other level but on the same 
immanent level as the statement itself. 
The regularity of statements is defined by the discursive formation 
itself. The fact of (a statement) belonging to a discursive 
formatio195nd the laws (rules) that govern it are one and the same 
thing. 
This is Foucault's 'positivism' and in substituting the 'there is' of the 
Archaeology for the 'Being' of the Order of Things Foucault's 'ontology' 
is stripped of any vestiges of a "more fundamental opening or 
difference" that might be said to characterize other 'archivists' of 
Being and Difference. Indeed, substituting the 'positivity of the 
dictum' for the 'Being of language'(Order of Things) enables Foucault to 
state simply that "there is language", "things have been said" and in 
each case 'one speaks' through an anonymous murmur reverberating through 
a rift or fold of discourse into which even the archaeologist would like 
to lodge himself. Occupying the place of the 'one speaks' and the 'it 
is said' statements will be subjected to a systematic dispersion through 
which one uncovers "an order in their successive appearance, 
correlations in their simultaneity, assignable positions in a common 
space, a reciprocal functioning, linked and hierarchised 
193 
transformations. " 
The regularity of statements renders their occurence (whether for the 
first time or whether repeated or reproduced) an effect of the whole 
topological curve and must be associated with the whole of this curve 
and with the rules governing the particular space in which they are 
distributed and reproduced. Statements have nothing to do with any 
cogito, transcendental subject, ego, or spirit of the age etc, which 
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could originate, conserve, multiply, or destroy them.. Any individual 
can become the subject of a statement and a statement can be reproduced 
by many individuals. The statement, because of its variable functions 
accumulates into an object that can be transmitted, repeated or 
preserved. The spatial relation to other statements within the same 
group are formed by rules to be found on the same immanent level and 
these rules function through dispersion and heterogeneity as the 
statements within a group cross into other systems, cutting across 
institutions, observations and descriptions. So each statement is bound 
up with other members of its group which are conditioned by the inherent 
rules or lines of variation which define their 'regularity. ' 
Statements are also linked to other surfaces by the relations that they 
have with their own subjects, objects and concepts. The statement 
'refers' to spaces within itself, or rather expresses a set of derived 
functions that are extremely variable. The link that the statement 
holds with a variable subject in itself constitutes a variable that is 
intrinsic to the statement itself. The various positions offered by the 
statement depending upon the group and formation are not variants of a 
unitary subject but are depersonalised categories of subjectivity e. g. 
one speaks, he speaks, etc and emerge from an anonymous' murmur'. If 
this goes for the subject as much can be said for objects and concepts. 
Statements have their 'discursive objects' which don't refer to some 
extrinsic variable but in fact are defined by the limits to the lines of 
variation of the statement itself. Equally the concepts that emerge in 
statements are the "schemata" of the statement in terms of its role as 
primative function. Thus the statement contains its own functions of 
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subject, object and concept and these are like places or positions taken 
up within a family of statements. All of these places taken up within 
the statement are like moving points or dots joined up by the curve of 
regularity across an immanent surface. Inherent variation and intrinsic 
variable. This still leaves a third realm of extrinsic space, the space 
of non-discursive formations. Institutions imply statements and 
statements refer back to an institution which is necessary for the 
formation of the subjects and objects of statements e. g. the doctor in 
the hospital, the writer in society etc. There is no simple relation of 
causality or symbolism or parallelism or even isomorphism between the 
discursive and non-discursive since the non-discursive forms a kind of 
limit surface neither inside or outside statements but which enables the 
appearance of objects and their assignation within the statement itself. 
Because statements may be repeated, or rather that "only statements can 
be repeated" is no doubt due to their 'materiality' and therefore occurs 
only under very strict conditions. This internal materiality of the 
statement that makes repetition possible must, in each of its 
conditions, be the same for repetition to take place. 'Species evolve' 
is not the same statement when first used by an eighteenth century 
naturalism and then by nineteenth century biology. In fact the same 
statements belong to different discursive formations depending upon the 
precise factors associated with their reactivation. This has nothing to 
do with context since its nature is determined by the group of 
statements of the discursive formation under consideration. 
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Foucault's archaeology of the triple spaces of the enonces activates, 
then, a complex relational expressivity that traverses thresholds and 
breaks with all the old unities. 
a genealogical tree, an accounts book, the calculations of a trade 
balance are statements. ... an equation of the nth 
degree, or the 
algebraic formula of the law of refraction must be regarded as 
statements ... Lastly, a graph, a growth curve, an age pyramid, a 
distribution cloud are all statements: any sentences thIB4may 
accompany them are merely interpretation or commentary. 
Historical knowledges are embedded within the spaces of enonces "a 
function that cuts across a domain of structures and possible unities, 
and which reveals them, with concrete contents, in time and space. " 
195 
The problem is to map the 'how' of this embeddedness, to determine 
precisely the formation, transformation and deformation of the positive 
topological spaces that organise the shapes of enonces of thought in an 
epoch. In effect, with the thought of enonces Foucault invents a new 
kind of 'abstract expressionism' that does not traverse domains, 
disciplines, subjects, genres, etc, so much as constitute archaeological 
territories that extend to " 'literary' or 'philosophical' texts as well 
as scientific ones. Knowledge is to be found not only in demonstrations, 
it can also be found in fiction, reflexion, narrative accounts, 
institutional regulations, and political decisions". 
196 
Archaeological territories, historical formations, discursive and non- 
discursive multiplicities are compounds, "temporal vectors of 
derivation" 197, made up of deposits of strata that overlap and 
coexist, passing through varying thresholds and limits which are 
activated and reactivated according to the formation in question. 
Equally, other lines fade out or break up, diverge and become 
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redistributed elsewhere or are left in abeyance. In any case the 
mobility of the archaelogist will enable historical multiplicites to be 
surveyed and mapped "with concrete contents, in time an space" so that 
"thought is once again possible. " 
Foucault's archaelogical thought, as a rethinking of the logic of the 
space of enonces, serves as the media (audio-visual archive) through 
which the already said and already seen spaces of enonces (past), are 
made active to the present (the 'now' of what we can see/say), in a 
confrontation/resistance that forces thought into a 'thinking- 
otherwise, ' a becoming-other of thought, a release of new enonces 
(future). 
In developing this method to its limit Foucault will lock his 
'empiricism' onto specific thresholds that will mobilise the enonces of 
knowledge in other directions taking them to the point of their own 
'impossibility'. By breaking through certain 'aesthetic' thresholds, 
for example, Foucault will show how the space of enonces can no longer 
be understood through the exclusive determination of language or through 
the play of signifier and signified. Archaeological thought will begin 
to map knowledge onto another dimension, 'outside' yet immanent to its 
own internal composition. Foucault had already shown how the repetition 
of a statement entailed its difference, almost always repeating 
"something else", something paradoxically that "is strangely similar and 
almost identical to it" 
198. 
The material repeatability of the statement 
ensures that it is circulated and used, that it "allows or prevents the 
realisation of a desire, serves or resists various interests, 
participates in challenge and struggle, and becomes a theme of 
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appropriation or rivalry. " 
199 
And the spaces of knowledge are always 
already a battleground and a space of contest and struggle in which 
questions of power, desire and resistance are of crucial importance. The 
archaeological exterior is shifting and realigning genealogically as an 
explicit response to the realisation that the spaces of enonces are 
produced, stratified and coded through the invisible spaces of power. It 
is in those pages of The Archaeology of Knowledge devoted to the 
relations between painting and enonces and drawn out by This is not a 
Pipe, that Foucault begins to tease out those unseen and unsaid spaces in 
which the enunciable and the visible are articulated together and apart as 
the logic of power/knowledge. 
S. The force of painting. 
The relation of language to painting is an infinite relation. It is 
not that words are imperfect or that when confronted by the visible, 
they prove insuperably inadequate. Neither can be reduced to the 
other's terms: it is in vain ýý$t we say what we see, what we see 
never resides in what we say. 
The spaces of enonces and the system of thought they embody are cleaved 
open along the crack or fracture of their 'relation' and distributed 
into an isomorphic and asymmetrical series each penetrated to the core 
by their differental positivity. Archaelogical thought 
would not set out to show that the painting is a certain way of 
'meaning' or 'saying' that is peculiar in that it dispenses with 
words. It would try to show that, at least in one of its 
dimensions, it is discursive practice that is embedded in techniques 
and effects. In this sense, the painting is not a pure vision that 
must then be transcribed into the materiality of space; nor is it a 
naked gesture whose silent and eternally empty meanings must be 
freed from subsequent interpretations. It is shot through - 
independently of scientific knowledge (connaissance) and 
Fýjlosophical themes - with the positivity of a knowledge (savoir). 
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Painting can be analysed as a discursive practice not by transcribing 
the silence of the visible into the 'latent discourse of the painter,, 
202 
the commentary that would 'recapture the murmur of his intentions' 
203 but 
by mapping the system of practical 'visibilities, ' of which the painting 
would be a part, to its historical conditions of emergence/existence. 
Thus to analyse painting as a discursive practice would take us to the 
limit of practical knowledge since it would show not only that painting 
was more than an expression of aesthetic practice but is also more than 
the conceptual and institutional foundations of that practice: it would 
show the historical conditions of possibility/impossibility of painting 
as an expression of 'thought' in relation to other practices of thought. 
Foucault concurs with Magrite: painting names the problem of a "thought 
that sees and can be visibly described. " 
204 
Painting is reinscribed within a visible series generated through those 
spaces of positivity that make it historically possible (what could be 
painted, where, by whom, how? etc) which would connect to other complex 
spaces of discourse/knowledge. The problem of art or painting is not 
autonomous, yet painting is a node in a micro-network of practices 
(savoir) irreducible to 'philosophical themes' and 'scientific 
knowledge. ' 
Foucault is worrying away at a central (non-linear) dynamic that 
pervades his thought from beginning to end. It concerns the 
oldest oppositions of our alphabetic civilisation: to show and to 
name; to shape and to say; to reproduce and t20grticulate; to 
imitate and to signify; to look and to read. 
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In both transgressive space and the positive archaelogical space of 
exteriority Foucault's thought constitutes a vigourous assault on the 
identity, resemblance and self-evidence of these oppositions in order 
"... to keep the relation of language to vision open to stay as close as 
possible to both ... to treat their incompatibility as a starting point 
,.. ýý 
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The incompatible relation between statements and visibilities, 
word and image, discourse and figure, discursive and non-discursive, 
language and light is given its most rigourous 'starting point' in 
Foucault's reading of Magritte in This is not a Pipe where the relation 
is thought as 'non-relation': "the drawing ... and the text ... cannot 
find a place to meet ... " 
207 because the 'common space' between them is 
'hollowed out, and dissolved in "the slender, colourless and 
netural strip" 
208 
that links and divides, connects and separates text 
from figure. 
Foucault had already demonstrated how, in The Order of Things, the 
classical space of representation had placed limits around the 
productivity of this 'non-relation' by erasing it in the functions of 
designation and naming. It permitted classical thought the freedom 
"to pass surrepticiously from the space where one speaks to the space 
where one looks; in other words, to fold one over the other as though 
they were equivalents. " 
209 
The space of classical (aesthetic) thought governs a specific ordering 
of the system of enonces in the form of an equivalence of resemblance 
and the affirmation of a representative bond. The space of enonces 
could neither 'merge nor intersect' and yet they 'cannot be 
dissociated. ' The instability of this relation is regulated by the 
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subordination of one space to the other. Visibilities organise a system 
of resemblance that can only be elevated from their silence and affirmed 
through the referential power of (linguistic) statements. And this 
linguistic activity distributes the meaning of 'signs' across their 
differences. 
What is essential is that verbal signs and visual representations 
are never given at once. An order always hierarchizes2ýtem, running 
from figure to discourse or from discourse to figure. 
Resemblance and affirmation require a division between the plastic 
elements of representation which separate resemblances in the activity 
of representation and discursive reference which denies things their 
capacity to resemble by affirming their expression as linguistic signs 
in a referential network of meaningful differences. Although these 
orders are mutually exclusive and irreducibly divided, they form 
together a double articulation. 
Let a figure resemble an object (or some other figure) and that 
alone is enough for there to slip into the pure play of painting a 
statement (enonce) - obvious, banal, repeated a thousand times yet 
almost always silent. (It is like an infinite murmur - haunting, 
enclosing the silence of figures, investing it, mastering it, 
extricating the silence from itself, and finally reversing it with211 
the domain of things that can be named). "What you see is that. " 
If philosophy excludes the visible from the expression of thought by 
continually utilising it as a resource for its propositions, Foucault 
will mobilise the spatial practices of Klee, Kandinsky and Magritte to 
profoundly problematise the order of hierarchization that organises the 
play of discourse/figure. 
Between resemblance and affirmation there slips an enonce which cracks 
open any logic of propositions to the specifically historical visible 
and articulable conditions that make them possible. It is: 
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rather a question of the intersection within the same medium, of 
representation by resemblance and of representation by signs. Which 
presuppose5lýhat they meet in quite another space than that of the 
painting. 
This 'non-place' or absence of space "must be seen as a crevasse - an 
uncertain, foggy region now dividing the pipe floating in its imagistic 
heaven from the mundane tramp of words marching in their successive 
line. " 
213 
The thin strip or faultline that ensures that figure and text 
will displace each other, transforming the space of enonces, is produced 
through the calligrammtic 'logic' of Magritte's drawings. It is 
"an art more committed than any other to the careful and cruel 
separation of graphic and plastic elements. If they happen to be 
superimposed within the painting like a legend and its image, it is 
on condition that the statement contest the obviou5lidentity of the 
figure, and the name we are prepared to give it. " 
If the modern period folds enunciation and affirmation together in the 
proposition: 'This is a pipe' Foucault will show how Magritte's work 
explodes the collateral faith in the figure/text designation by 
streaming the series together and apart as the 'double-logic' of the 
calligrammatic sign. The calligram "never speaks and represents at the 
same moment. The very thing that is both seen and read is hushed in the 
vision, hidden in the reading. " 
215 
The calligrammatic 'trap' lures language into its object, shapes it into 
what it says, stripping it of its affirmative function by subjecting it 
to the force of resemblance. Yet, language parisitises the figure with 
'discontinuous letters, ' opens the silence of its 'uninterrupted lines' 
to interrogatioi and forces it to speak in the universe of discourse. ' 
216 
Once read the figure is shattered into affirmation by the name. This 
is indeed a "A double trap, pipe: p, unavoidable snare. " 
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Yet, in This is not a Pipe Foucault pushes the potential of Magritte's 
'unravelled calligram' beyond a suspension of the identities of 
discourse/figure into a space of becoming: the calligram 'can not yet 
say' and no longer represent' 
218 
and the spaces of enonces are 
unquestionably transformed in the actualisation of their becoming. This 
is not a Pipe releases the subversive potential trapped in the 
oscillations of the calligram by returning discourse/figure to their 
'proper' spaces and thus making their trap-gates visible: 
"Magritte reopened the trap the calligram had sprung on tý19thing 
it described. But in the act the object itself escaped. " 
When the two series are returned to their space the negation inscribed 
in each dissolves the oject by collapsing the frame of designation to 
which the calligram ultimately belongs. Foucault opens out a new 
problematic relation of becoming between discourse and figure linked by 
a "subtle and unstable dependency, at once insistent and unsure. " 
220 
Whilst remaining absolutely divided discourse/figure nonetheless 
'encounter' each other in an agonistic coupling. 
Between the figure and the text we must admit a whole series of 
crisscrossings, or rather between the one and the other attacks are 
launched and arrows fly against the enemy target, campaigns designed 
to undermine and destroy, wounds and blows from the lance, a battle 
... images falling into the midst of words, verbal flashes 
crisscro55ing drawings ... discourse cutting into the form of 
things. 
The relation of 'non-relation' between the regimes is one of mutual 
exclusion and reciprocal presupposition. Resemblance and affirmation are 
profoundly disturbed and transformed by "avalanches of images into the 
midst of word, and verbal flashes that streak and shatter the drawings. " 
222 
From the ruins of ressmblance and affirmation springs the space of 
similitude: the difference and repetition of the visible and the 
enunciable. 
118 
In This is not a Pipe the void or difference between the visible and the 
enunciable that dismantles "all the relations of designation, 
nomination, description and classification" 
223 between them is 
reconfigured as a productive absence or multiplicitous outside that cannot 
be reconstituted as origin or unity. It is a space of virtuality or 
becoming between text and figure, between the 'not yet ' and the 'no 
longer' that continually divides and regroups, bifurcates and 
disseminates meaning. Within the painting the identity of the enonces 
is split open along the seam of this space and hovers in an unstable 
relation between text and figure issuing three 'propositions' from their 
non-coincidence. In les deux mysteres this same operation produces 
"seven discourses in a single statement. More than enough to demolish 
the fortress where similitude was held prisoner to the assertion of 
resemblance. " 
224 
Foucault (and Magritte's) pipe-becoming ('This is a pipe' becoming 'This 
is not a pipe') is gauged by the extent to which similitude has replaced 
resemblance as the organising term or historical apriori within the 
space of paintings enonces. "Resemblance predicates itself upon a model 
it must return to and reveal, " 
225 
writes Foucault, but "similitude 
circulates the simulacrum as an indefinite and reversible relation of 
the similar to the similar. " 
226 
Similitude "develops a series which have 
neither beginning nor end, that can be followed in one direction as 
easily as in another, that obey no hierarchy, but propagate themselves 
from small differences among small differences ... " 
227 
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Resemblance presupposes an Original, Ideal, True pipe that hierarchises 
and orders its copies. Resemblance only has to repeat once for 
affirmation to capture it in its nets ensuring a 'this' is always 
securely attached to a 'that. ' Similitude, released from the anchor of 
an original, a first and last, a beginning and end, an authenticating 
model that organises its derivatives, forges and multiplies itself 
through serial vectors in a reversible movement between copy and copy, 
repeating itself infinitely in a multiplicity of affirmatives. The 
space of similitude is the difference and repetition within and across 
the enunciable and the visible. 
Enonces can no longer be determined by a single affirmation. The strict 
separation between the enunciable and the visible, legitimated/regulated 
through resemblance, has been irreversibly transformed by the double 
articulation of their non-relation. Deleuze captures the formula thus: 
"to speak and to show in a simultaneous motion ... a prodigious 
interweaving. " Speaking and seeing at the same time, although it is 
not the same thing, although we do not speak of what we see, or see 
that of which we speak. But the two comprise the stratum, and from 
one stratum to the next are transf2ged at the same time (although 
not according to the same rules). 
Once opened to similitude the affirmations of speaking and seeing 
proliferate indeterminately in all directions continually reconstructing 
the possibilities of knowledge; through their very incommensurability 
they produce the multiple terms that regulate possible knowledges across 
varying thresholds and limits. The space of enonces has entered into a 
becoming with the age of the rhizome: 
A day will come when, by means of similitude relayed indefinitely 
along the length of a series, the image itself, along with the name 
it bears, 
22ý11 
lose its identity. Campbell, Campbell, Campbell, 
Campbell. 
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If the potential of the knowledge-rhizome lies in its capacity to 
destroy spaces of identity by opening them to difference and repetition, 
to an outside that conditions their formation, this potential can be 
reassimilated and invested elsewhere. (The relentless plundering of 
Magritte's images by a collusive Art/Capital circuit that deploys them as 
a marketing strategy. The thought of similitude as the rhizomic 
circulation of global capital. Warhol- the first 'seer' of the capital- 
rhizome). The spaces of enonces constitute a battlefield, a zone of 
turbulence and chaos, a 'perpetual war' carried on through the 
mutability and contingency of its political instruments. The spaces of 
knowledge undergo constant interference, division, reconstitution and 
transformation. The struggle over knowledge can no longer be "couched in 
terms of the symbolic field or the domain of signifying structures" but 
must be thought in terms of "relations of force, strategic developments, 
and tactics". 
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The history that bears and determines us has the form of a war 
rather th ithat of 
language: relations of power, not relations of 
meaning. 
Similitude accelerates and exacerbates this dynamic struggle between the 
enunciable and visible forms of history to the threshold of a new 
dimension, a new event of space and relation that runs through the forms 
of knowledge, conditioning them and making them possible and giving one 
form determinable primacy over another. It is the event of Power, an 
"event of an entirely different nature, one that hides outside the 
image, takes place outside" 
232. 
As Foucault says of that other painter- 
thinker of force, Paul Reybeyrolle, when confronted with the limit-event 
of the space of enonces: "nothing from the interior hints at it; no 
longer does anything venture to penetrate. Rather than an exterior, 
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there is a pure outside, neutral, inacessible, without form. " 
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3. THOUGHT OF THE OUTSIDE 
There are Events of Thought 
Thought about thought, an entire tradition wider than philosophy, 
has taught us that thought leads us to the deepest interiority. 
Speech about speech leads us, by way of literature as well as 
perhaps by other paths, to the outside in which the speaking subject 
disappears. No doubt that is why Western thought took so long to 
think the being of language: as if it had a premonition of the 
danger that the naked experience of language poses for the self- 
evidence of the 'I think. 
A thought that stands outside subjectivity, setting its limits as 
though from without, articulating its end, making its dispersion 
shine forth, taking in only its invincible absence; and that at the 
same time stands at the threshold of all positivity, not in order to 
grasp its foundation or justification but in order to regain the 
space of its unfolding, the void serving as its site, the distance 
in which it is constituted and into which its immediate certainties 
slip the moment they are glimpsed -a thought that, in relation to 
the interiority of our philosophical reflection and the positivity 
of our knowledge, constituies what in a word we might call "the 
thought from the outside. 
Every word becomes a concept as soon as it is supposed to serve not 
merely as a reminder of the unique, absolutely individualised 
original experience ... but at the same time to fit countless, more 
or less singular cases, which, strictly speaking, are never 
identical, and hence absolutely dissimilar. 
Thought has a historicity which is proper to it. That it should have 
this historicity does not mean that it is deprived of all universal 
form, but instead that the putting into play of these universal 
forms is itself historical. And that this historicity should be 
proper to it does not mean that it is independent of all the other 
historical determinations (of an economic, social or political 
order), but that it has complex relations with them which always 
leave their specificity to the forms, transformations and events of 
thought. This is what could be called the principle of singularity 
of the history of thought: there are events of thought. 
Through the effects of the exteriorities of knowledge, the event of the 
outside appears. The thought of the outside*is concerned with the 
emergence of discursive and non-discursive topologies and their 
assumption of a position within the 'real'. The name given to this 
emergence is event, evenement. The thought of the outside is precisely 
the 'event' of 'there is language' and 'there is light' conceived as 
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relations of force, becoming and chance productively and positively 
folded into material strata in space and time. It is that space ('non- 
place') and time (the 'actual') in which relations of force('non- 
relations') seep into the formations of knowledge creating the events of 
Power/Knowledge. If, in Western thought, this 'event' has appeared in 
its relations to the real (in language, desire, the unconscious, etc) 
through a structurally constitutive mechanism of 'lack' ( best summed up 
in the Heideggarian inspired Lacanian drivel: the 'lack-of-being that 
life is'), or simply as the unthinkable, in Foucault it functions 
through the complex interrelations, connections and bifurcations between 
power/knowledge that actively produce the real. It produces the real 
through the interrelations of the articulable and the visible and the 
cutting, reshaping and folding of space and time. The relations between 
the event and thought presuppose a 'non-place' and a 'non-relation', an 
'extimacy' of intimate exteriority, an outside in which thought once 
again becomes possible. 
1. THE IMMANENCE OF THEORY. 
1.1. Singularities/multiplicities: the singularity of events, the 
multiplicity of the universal. 
The event is the differential composition of the being of light and the 
being of language, a dispersive series of 'impossible' or unclassifiable 
conditions (singularities, multiplicities) that have made this event, 
and no other, into the kind of actuality that it is. The individuated 
event is conditioned by the historical aprioris of light and language 
and the force relations that run through them thus ensuring that the 
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event is a very specific form of positivity that is historical and 
epistemological rather than phenomenological. The positive 
eventalisation of light and of language are not revealed through a 
'clearing' or a shared background of practices. Each event is produced 
and functions as a coalescence of exterior strata which are derived from 
a set of conditions or aprioris unique to each stratum. Lines of force 
run through different levels of each stratum triggering different 
effects. Displacing talk about rules, codes and laws (which only ever 
had minor importance) Foucault endorses the thought of 'eventalisation' 
5 
as the name for a spatialized and spatializing strategy of thought, a 
new way of continuing to make maps of difference, a strategy for making 
and intensifying connections with the outside. 
Its not a matter of locating everything on one level, that of the 
event, but of realising that there is actually a whole order of 
levels of different types of events, differing in amplitude, 
chronological breadth, and capacity to produce effects. The problem 
is at once to distinguish among events, to differentiate the 
networks and levels to which they belong, and to reconstitute týe 
lines along which they are connected and engender one another. 
The strategy of eventalisation breaks down the units of explanation 
which all too often rely on a "historical constant, an immediate 
anthropological trait, or an obviousness which imposes itself uniformly 
on all" 
7 by "making visible a singularity. " 
8 
Making the singular visible 
involves a "breach of self-evidence" 
9, 
a counter-actualisation of the 
event that unfolds and individuates the metastability and 'polymorphism' 
10 
of the outside. Events are constructed through multiple processes, a 
plurality of causes that offer a "polyhedron" 
11 
or multiplicity of 
intelligibility through "a progressive, necessarily incomplete 
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saturation. " 
12 The virtual differences of the outside folded into the 
event are unfolded and individuated by decomposing the process under 
analysis into micro-physical units which are then expanded into the 
external relations of intelligibility through a 'multiplication of 
analytical 'salients "' 
13. 
Thus the singular, actual, individuated event 
subsists or insists in the polymorphism of its virtual differences. 
Foucault inserts the strategy of eventalization into a broader practice 
of history: 
History as it is practiced today.... is continually enlarging the 
field of events, constantly discovering new layers.. . in order to 
establish those diverse, converging, and sometimes divergent, but 
never autonomous series that enable us to describe the 'locus' of an 
event, the limits of its fluidity and the conditions of its 
emergence. 
In practicing the eventalization of history Foucault will reject any 
transcendent, structural, psychoanalytic or phenomenological appeal and 
any reference to intentionality, ideology, or significance is refused as 
a reduction of the concreteness of the event, an effacement and 
deeventalization of its specificity and singularity and its immanent 
relation to the outside in the name of understanding, explanation or 
theory. For example: 
It seems to me that we must insist on the specificity of the Gulag 
question against all theoretical reductionisms (which make the Gulag 
an error already to be read in the texts), against all historicist 
reductionisms (which make the Gulag a conjectural effect which can be 
isolated in terms of its causes), against all Utopian dissociations 
(which would set it, with 'pseudo-socialism', in opposition to 
socialism 'itself'), against all universalising dissolutions into the 
general form of internment. These operations all serve the samelEole 
... to preserve the currency among us of a leftist discourse... 
Archaeological space determined "the law of existence of the statement, 
that which has rendered them possible - them and none other in their 
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place: the conditions of their singular emergence: their correlation 
with other previous or simultaneous events, discursive or not. " 
16 The 
'meaning', 'truth' and 'objectivity' of discourse is displaced by the 
conditions of its emergence, insertion and functioning through what 
Foucault refers to as its mode of existence or effectivity 
17 
The 
eventalization of discourse becomes a description of concrete 
techniques, effects and conditionings. Foucauldian eventalization 
denies any transcendent or molar term in order to analyse the 
individuation of practices or events, an individuation defined by the 
effectivity of the event within and across enonces and by its conditions 
of existence. 
Effectivities are combinations or mixes of heterogeneous yet adjacent 
strata and (the task of) eventalization is to make their mode of 
existence and their conditions of existence visible as a product of the 
a polyvalent yet univocal space or dimension (the outside) which it 
neither represents, resembles or is analogous. Elements connect and fold 
through this space (i. e. they assemble and re-assemble their own 
heterogeneous conditions) each time reconfiguring and modifying the 
space of effectuation. Depending upon the particular line, point or 
surface at which the strategy of eventalisation intervenes, the 
effectivity of events are mapped out as sets of relations which have 
been produced and function in continuous variation across their 
differences. The plane of immanence (in Deleuze's idiom: the plane of 
consistency) is a space of difference-in-itself and Foucault's 
eventalization of the effectivity of this plane of thought is nothing 
but its affirmation. Foucault's strategy of eventalization: the 
historical actualisation of events as effectivities through the immanent 
126 
(aconceptual) difference of the outside. Conditioned and condition 
assemble or machine their parts and matter, connecting and reconnecting 
them together, squeezing, flattening and redistributing their space of 
articulation whilst simultaneously increasing their 'dimensionality' or 
'valency' through multiplication and proliferation of connection: events 
of thought are affirmations of differential multiplicities. 
The complex 'flattened', immanent, yet multi-dimensional spatiality of 
eventmental thought requires establishing a whole series of topological 
connections between the inside and the outside, space and time, 
knowledge and power across its plane of expression which will disturb, 
problematise and displace the metaphysical spaces that 'ground' the 
meaning, unity, creation, and originality of de-eventalised thought. It 
will open a new 'spacing' of events and a new 'timing' of history and a 
new way of mapping their relations in order to show not only the extent 
to which singular events are a "transformable group", but to eventalize 
a thinking-otherwise in relation to the events of thought. 
The strategy of drawing lines of multiplicity or connections between 
points or singularities in a field and measuring their immanent 
intensity, the 'distance' and 'difference' between them, necessarily 
involves studying how the effects themselves ramify in all directions 
cutting across a particular regime or domain. A discursive 'object' 
subsists relative to other discursive objects only in its multifarious 
effects at other points and their effects at the point of its apparent 
locus which resonate through "the said as much as the unsaid. " 
18 
This 
strategy of placing events in relation to a constitutive and immanent 
outside undermines the desire to produce abstract first principles with 
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their hierarchical dualisms, progressivist schemas or teleologies which 
would regulate and control the 'play' of events, reduce and capture 
their 'meaning' through origin and totality, cause and effect, and 
locate centres for particular regimes. These centres or structures can 
then establish striated boundaries between particular regimes of 
effects, install transcendental and hierarchical conditioning mechanisms 
that would restore depth, negativity and interiority and exclude and 
efface the outside as they produce identity within difference. 
Events, then, exist within and between lines, points or surfaces which 
are situated within multidirectional and multidimensional fields of 
force. The productive relations between these singularities and 
multiplicities is synonymous with effect and a particular dynamic point 
or moving line -a partial object - is defined by its relation to the 
outside, its connections with other points in a field of effects. The 
'event' of the outside is the folded, differential articulation of the 
enunciable and the visible. The events of the outside name so many 
impersonal and pre-individual singularities and the outside 'itself' is 
the 'aleatory point' that triggers and traverses these singularities. 
The event of the outside, for Foucault, is a "swarm of singularities' 
19 
that cannot be captured in the unity of the Same: an "eventalisation of 
thought" is the carving out of a space in which the hierarchy of the 
Same is irrevocably perverted. 
Foucault's eventalization of thought problematises a methodological 
schema that makes a 'deventalised' thought of the Same a principle of 
historical / philosophical intelligibility. 
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The way they work is by ascribing the object they analyse to the 
most unitary, necessary, inevitable and (ultimately) extra- 
historical mechanism or structure available. An economic mechanism, 
an anthropological structure or a demographic process, which figure 
as the climactic stage ij0the investigation - these are the goals of 
de-eventalised history. 
De-eventalised thought locks material strata into an explanatory pattern 
or grid-form ensuring that any surplus or excess is assimilated and 
appropriately distributed through its categorial schema. For Foucault 
this involves a reduction of the event into a 'unitary necessity, ' 
always captured by a law, principle, structure or mechanism that 
hierachises, gradates, dehistoricises and depoliticises into a 
comfortable and reassuring image of thought. Foucault's eventalization of 
the thought of the outside functions as the site of the displacement or 
dislocation of models of the Same (e. g. Platonic, Kantian, structural 
or dialectical paradigms) and the elevation of analyses "in terms of the 
genealogy of relations of force, strategic developments and tactics. " 
Here I believe ones point of reference should not be to the great 
model of language (langue) and signs, but to that of war and battle. 
The history that bears and determines us has the form of war rather 
than that of language: relations of power, not relations of meaning. 
History has no 'meaning', though this is not to say that it is 
absurd or incoherent. On the contrary, it is intelligible and should 
be susceptible to analysis down to the smallest detail-but this in 
accordance with the intelligibility of struggles, of strategies and 
tactics. Neither the dialectic, as logic of contradictions, nor 
semiotics, as the structure of communication, can account for the 
intrinsic intelligibility of conflicts. 'Dialectic' is a way of 
evaiding the always open and hazardous reality of conflict by 
reducing it to a Hegelian skeleton and 'semiology' is a way of 
avoiding its violent, bloody and lethal character 2ýy reducing 
it to 
the calm Platonic form of language and dialogue. 
For Foucault structuralism 'evacuated' the event 
22, drained off its 
singular content into universal, necessary, ahistorical, binary 
structures: 'Kantianism without the subject. ' Dialectics evades the 
event by assimilating difference into a unity and totality of the same. 
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It effaces the open, indefinite and redundant space of the outside by 
putting it to work: the dialectical labour of law, lack and the negative 
expressed as the resolution of contradiction in a synthesis of the same 
beyond difference. Dialectics: 
does not liberate the different, on the contrary it guarantees that 
it is always recuperated. The dialectical supremacy of the same 
allows it to exist, but only according to the law of negation, as 
the moment of non-being. You think that you are seeing the 
subversion of the other declaring itself, but in secret, 
53ntradiction is working for the salvation of the identical. 
Deeventalised thought mobilises the 'unitary necessities' of the Same in 
the name of a 'will to truth' that day by day 'grows implacably. ' 
24 
The 
arrest of the event and the elision of anything in it that might be 
querelous or discontinuous operates through categorical thinking and its 
instruments of repetition, gradation and representation (the identity of 
concepts). The 'boundless diversity' or 'mad flux' 
25 
of difference is 
entrapped within the Same where it is policed, monitored and 
disciplined. To think against Platonic similarity is to think in the 
absence of hierarchy and gradation, not to reinstate the rights of 
appearances "ascribing to them solidity and meaning, and bringing them 
closer to essential forms by lending them a conceptual backbone" 
26 but to 
think the simulacrum as simulacrum, to think difference differentially: 
"and what will enter, submerging appearance and breaking its engagement 
27 
to essence, will be the event. " 
Thinking the event differentially is to break with the repetition of the 
same profoundly disturbing the interlocking spaces of 'common sense' 
with its mutual and reciprocal functioning of the faculties enabling the 
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introduction of 'ill will, into the 'good will' that forces differences 
to serve as markers of classification. 
What if we gave free rein to ill will? What if thought freed itself 
from common sense and decided to function only in its extreme 
singularity? What if it adopted the disreptuable bias of the 
paradox, instead of complacently accepting its citizenship in the 
doxa? What if it conceived of difference differentially, instead of 
searching out the common elements underlying difference? Then 
difference would disappear as a general feature that leads to the 
generality of the concept, and it would become -a fifferent 
thought, the thought of difference -a pure event. 
The 'pure event' thought differentially is the vibration and intensity 
of the 'being of the sensible' beyond representation, a repetition of 
repetition itself. It is a non-conceptual, singular difference 
displaced on each occasion through its repetition in thought as a 
phantasm: "it makes the event indefinite so that it repeats itself as a 
29 
singular universal.,, 
1.2. The materiality of events 
A. The incorporeal space of thought: phantasms and events 
As we have seen in The Order of Things and The Archaeology of Knowledge, 
Foucault framed the material space of discourse and the non-discursive 
by appeal to the notions of episteme, enonces and archive. The former 
indicated an open network of relations and successive displacements, a 
space of multiplicity and dispersion. The latter referred to an 
anonymous apriori or system of rules accounting for the appearance, 
formation, and transformation of discursive and non-discursive strata as 
an (historical) audio-visual regime. The enonces themselves create, 
produce and stratify this regime. These terms together articulated the 
exterior spaces of an 'archaeology' of knowledge. In The order of 
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Discourse the discursive and non-discursive field is seen as the 
difference between what could be said correctly and observed 
appropriately and what is actually stated and seen and thus opens up an 
outside in which power and force relations are operative, an outside 
which is drawn out, mapped and remapped in Foucault's eventalisation of 
thought. 
In the Archaeology Foucault had already recognized the evental character 
of the enonces but they were tied to the exterior dimensions of the 
forms of knowledge encoded as 'rule' and 'regularity'. The Order of 
Discourse and Theatrum Philosophicum will develop and elaborate the 
thought of the event in terms of an incorporeal materiality of force 
relations or a 'phantasmaphysics' 
30 
of the outside that will break the 
primary controlling forms of discourse (summed as the 'world, self, and 
god' 
31) 
and dissolve them in the force, chance and becoming of a thought 
of difference, a thinking-otherwise about the events of thought. 
In thinking the event as a 'singular universal'32, Foucault will elaborate 
the event in its relations with a phantasmatic and incorporeal space 
which does not converge in a common space of origin or similitude but 
functions in a disjunctive space of affirmation, a series of colliding, 
mingling and folded surfaces that positively produce a meaning-effect in 
its singularity. Each singularity is always folded within a fold as an 
element in another series, a component of a multiplicitous serial space. 
The actualisation of the singular event from the virtual series is 
activated and reactivated by the phantasmatic incorporeal space that 
simultaneously folds the series together and holds them apart across one 
surface: 
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It (the phantasm) transcends inside and outside, since its 
topological property is to bring its, internal and external sites 
into contact, in order for them to unfold onto a single side. 
The incorporeal materiality of the phantasm functions as a simulacrum 
that articulates the discursive and the non-discursive together at the 
moment when the surfaces of 'language' and event coincide. This 
coincidence that "arises between surfaces" is articulated in "the reversal 
that causes every interior to pass to the outside and every exterior to 
the inside... " 
34 
In constructing events as folded singularities, points 
or intensities on a virtual surface, a plane of multiplicity and immanence 
ready to be actualised in any form or modality, Foucault eventalizes the 
limits and conditions of historical thought in order to open that thought 
to the exteriority of genealogical series, to the thought of the outside. 
Such series function by the repetition of a (non) event, as an event in 
thought, by retroactively aligning the series with the disruptive and 
discontinuous folds of the (non-spaced, non-original) event. The 
'original' event is always already a fold or folded space-time, a 
"temporal oscillation that always makes it precede and follow itself. " 
35 
The repetition of the disruptive event disturbs and displaces the 
reassuring forms and identities, similarities and chronologies of history 
so that the past is riven with fissures, bifurcations and folds that open 
political spaces for radical thought, a thinking-otherwise about the 
events of thought in the present. 
The materiality of the event, then, is problematized. Neither substance 
nor accident, quality nor process, the event occurs neither at the level 
of bodies, nor in some immaterial realm. It is a material effect that 
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"consists in the relation, the co-existence, the dispersion, the 
overlapping, the accumulation, and the selection of material 
elements. It is not the act or the property of a body; it is 
produced as an effect of, and within a dispersion of matter. Let us 
say that the philosophy of the event should move in the at Jýrst 
paradoxical direction of a materialism of the incorporal. " 
Incorporal materiality is not a primary infrastructural domain upon 
which discursive events would be an expressive emanation but a 
topological dimension which runs throughout the surfaces of the event, 
conditioning it and conditioned by it. It is not an inert positivity but 
an effect of bodies mingling, colliding and separating 
37. 
Incorporeal 
materiality insists or subsists on the surface of bodies and the surface 
of words, it is not a thing or a cause but a space of virtuality, a 
topological relation and a verbal infinitive capable of a multiplicity 
of actualisations. It is simultaneously the 'meaning' of the event and 
the 'event' of meaning, the displacement of the present and the 
repetition of the infinitive. Foucault's favoured example is, of course, 
death: 
Death supplies the best example, being both the event of events and 
meaning in its purest state. Its domain is the anonymous flow of 
speech; it is that of which we speak as always past or about to 
happen and yet it occurs at the extreme point of singularity. 
'To die' is never localized in the density of a given moment, but 
from its flux it infinitely dibides the shortest 3Woment....: the (multiple) eternity of the (displaced) present. 
Foucault's eventalization of thought attempts to think the space of 
enonces or the relation of the articulable and the visible as the 
disjunctive and double affirmation of the event and the concept, or 
rather, the event and the phantasm as the singular, universal, 
incorporeal and univocal space of thought. Thought is the universal 
repetition of the phantasm in the singularity of the event: "What is 
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thought itself if not the event that befalls the phantasm and the 
phantasmatic repetition of the absent event. " 
39 
The phantasm and the 
event folded together and apart are the disjunctive synthesis of thought, 
they are 
the object of thought and thought itself; they situate extra-being 
at the surface of bodies where it can be approached by thought 4$d 
trace the topological event in which thought itself is formed. 
b. The subject in space-time 
There is no equivalence, isomorphism or identity between the object of 
thought and thought itself since the formative processes of thought 
reside in the "uncrossable fissure" 
41 
of the outside. This implies a 
double dissociation: "that of a central and founding subject to which 
events occur while it deploys meaning around itself; and of an object 
that is a threshold and a point of convergence for recognizable forms 
and the attributes we affirm. " 
42 
The eventalization of thought will 
require a practice of history that will break the relation between 
thought and its object (conceived as a relation between continuous 
history and consciousness as the centre of its development and action) 
by opening that relation to a radical practice of space: 
For all those who confuse history with the old schemas of evolution, 
living continuity, organic development, the progress of 
consciousness or the project of existence the use of spatial terms 
seems to have the air of an anti-history. If one started to talk in 
terms of space that meant one was hostile to time,... that one 
'denied history'... They didn't understand that to trace the forms of 
implantation, demarcation and delimitation of objects, the modes of 
tabulation, the organization of domains meant the throwing into 
relief of processes - historical ones, needless to say - of power. 
The spatialising descripti2i of discursive realities gives on to the 
related effects of power. 
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Equally, in The Order of Discourse Foucault will eventalize the outside 
(power) of historical thought through its description in terms of 
discontinuity and exteriority and its problematization of the subject 
and of time: "It is a question of caesurae which break up the instant 
and disperse the subject into a plurality of possible positions and 
functions. " 
44 
Throughout the range of his texts Foucault continued to 
think the (linear, unitary, chronological and totalizing) concept of 
time as necessarily bound to a (metaphysical) model of consciousness 
("two sides of the same system of thought" 
45) that could only offer a 
weak, naive and limiting understanding of historical transformation ("in 
this system, time is conceived in terms of totalization and revolutions 
are never more than moments of consciousness" 
46) 
that conceals and 
effaces the operation of the outside. It thus renders the 'effects of 
power' invisible and can only be prised apart and opened to a thinking 
otherwise through a stategic practice of space: 
metaphorising the transformations of discourse in a vocabulary of 
time necessarily leads to the utilisation of the model of individual 
consciousness with its intrinsic temporality. Endeavouring on the 
other hand to decipher discourse through the use of spatial, 
strategic metaphors enables one to grasp precisely the points at 
which discourses are4ýransformed in, through and on the basis of 
relations of power. 
The discontinuous event-series of the outside function independently of 
these units ( the subject and the instant') through relations which are 
neither successive, simultaneous or of the order of consciousness but 
must be thought as a complex topology of differential and material 
relations of force, chance and becoming (in space-time) through which the 
events of thought are formed. In The Order of Discourse Foucault will lay 
out a number of 'principles' through which the event and the series may be 
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mapped to the ouside which will show the extent to which the 
eventalization of thought, the process which forms and transforms it and 
from which it forms and transforms itself is subject to chance, error 
and relations of power. 
Through a principle of reversal: the "swarming abundance" of events are 
always tied to a continuity expressed through positive sources - author, 
discipline, 'will to truth'. Evental thought will reverse this: only 
recognize the cutting up, dispersal and rarefaction of events. And this 
rarefaction does not function on some vast hidden surface or underside 
since a principle of discontinuity does not assume a "great unsaid or 
unthought which runs throughout the world and intertwines with all its 
forms and all its events. " 
48 
Events are constituted through the 
discontinuous practices of the articulable and the visible which cross 
each other, pass through one another, presuppose and exclude one another 
yet, equally, might remain unaware of one another. A principle of 
specificity ensures that the legibility of events has nothing to do with 
any 'pre-discursive' domain, so that events can be interpreted or 
explained though and already existing set of significations. Discursive 
events are a product of the specific practices of the articulable and 
the visible and the force relations that run through them, they are "a 
violence which we do to things.. a practice we impose on them" 
49 
Our own 
practice must account for the 'regularity' of discursive events, it is 
not inherent in the world. Finally, the perspective from the outside 
construes the event field as inhabited by a twisting and folding of 
regulation, chance and accident. Events of thought occur in a folded 
and involuted outside that has nothing to do with intentionality nor is 
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it the effect of any kind of mechanical causality. Events are 
irreducible and 'autonomous', independent of the direction, meaning or 
temporality of consciousness. No order of events is fully organised but 
establishes itself in relation to a certain disorder. Similarly, there 
is no primordial randomness of 'language' upon which orders from the 
outside are projected. These terms are unintellible in isolation and 
highly variable. The principle of the external conditions of 
possiblity, then, determines the aleatory series of events out of which 
it appears and which fix its limits. Foucault's thought of the outside 
yýý which have been introduces "chance, the discontinuous and materialit 
50 
effaced through the founding subject (phenomenology), originating 
experience (hermeneutics) and a mediating totality (dialectics), into 
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the "very roots of thought" 
Foucault opposes his own terms to the notions of creation, unity, 
originality and signification which have rendered events invisible. 
Foucault's texts have no use for consciousness or continuity with their 
metaphysical understanding of freedom and causality and no use for 
structure and sign. Foucault's texts rigourously militate against any 
notions that could provide a framework of intellibility for a subject. 
(especially those (Kant) that 'subjectivize' or 'interiorize' space and 
time rendering them passive and receptive). Evenements are active and 
productive singularities, connected as lines of multiplicity, grouped as 
colliding surfaces and articulated/made visible as an indefinite and 
reversible series of phantasm/events of variable functions and 
incorporeal matters. Foucault's eventalization of thought installs a 
"small (and perhaps) odious piece of machinery" 
52 in the gap that the 
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history of ideas sought to keep free. Displacing the great adventure of 
reason, this machinery locates the difference of events, and the 
difference of the forces that run through them in "a space of multiple 
dissensions", a space that neither the "language or the meaning can 
quite exhaust" , the space of the outside. 
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1.3 The effective history of thought. 
The Foucauldian strategy of eventalization thus performs a particular 
operation on the 'body' of thought, opening up a consistent (immanent) 
space in which events can appear and be conjoined with other events. Each 
series of events are connected and connectable to each other, mapped along 
their lines of composition and borne along by (what we might variously 
name) their incline, resistance or 'line of flight' 
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that opens out on 
to the outside. Deeventalized thought tends to striate this space and 
immobilize its movement through hierarchical schematisms that represent 
and reproduce the Same whereas eventalized thought tends to a smooth 
space of the outside through the repetition of a 'free' syntheses of 
Difference. The cartographer will measure the extent to which event- 
assemblages maximize their potential of difference (and minimize the 
constraints of the same) by mapping their immanent and differential 
conditions of existence and affirming their reality. There are no 
constants only forces in continuous variation, there is nothing to 
recognize or rediscover only connections and differences to be made. 
Realigning and folding the modes of existence or effectivities of the 
phantasm/event series in a properly genealogical space, Foucault's 
eventalization of outside thought becomes what Nietzsche, Genealogy, 
History will call "effective history". 
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An entire historical tradition (theological and rationalistic) aims 
at dissolving the singular event into an ideal continuity - as a 
teleological movement or a natural process. 'Effective' history, 
however, deals with events in terms of their most unique 
characteristics, their most acute manifestations. An event, 
consequently, is not a decision, a treaty, a reign, a battle, but 
the reversal of a relationship of forces, the usurpation of power, 
the appropriation of a vocabulary turned against those who had once 
used it, a feeble domination that poisons itself as it grows lax, 
the entry of a masked 'other. ' The forces operating in history are 
not controlled by destiny or regulative mechanisms, but respond to 
haphazard conflicts. They do not manifest the successive forms of a 
primoridal intention and their attraction is not that of a 
conclusion, jgr they always appear through the singular randomness 
of events. 
Foucault's eventalisation of thought in the folds of history activates 
another unthought series, another emergent series of the outside, "an 
unstable assemblage of faults, fissures and heterogeneous layers" that 
"disturbs what was considered immobile, (it) fragments what was thought 
unified, it shows the heterogeneity of what was imagined consistent with 
itself. " 
56 
The events of thought are reinscribed in the formation of 
another series: a Nietzschean series structured by Herkunft and 
Enstehung, descent and emergence. This reinscription of the displaced 
origin and telos systematically dismantles the continuity, immutability, 
identity, objectivity, meaning and truth of traditional 'momumental' 
history: 
a history given to reestablishing the high points of historical 
development and their maintenance in a perpetual presence, given to 
the recovery of works, ag ions and creations through the monogram of 
their personal essence. 
This is a further unfolding and refolding (a topological shift) of the 
"space of dispersion" (plane of immanence)in which the archaeologist had 
teased out the complex relations between the articulable and the visible 
as forms of exteriority. Now they are redeployed as the productive site 
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of phantasmatic, incorporeal yet singular events of thought and their 
articulation through the Herkunft/Enstehung series as a confrontation 
between force, body and history - the nobility or baseness inscribed on 
bodies and their forced and forceful emergence into the spectacular 
space of history. The space of dispersion is now "precisely this scene 
where they are displayed superimposed or face to face. " 
58 
The space of 
the outside is "nothing but the space that divides them, the void 
through which they exchange their threatening gestures and speeches. " 
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Foucault's texts begins to eventalize a properly genealogical space, an 
incorporeal, virtual, phantasmatic space of force relations outside the 
body/substance, form/history matrix within which forces mutate yet 
topologically connected through the event of their articulation. 
Emergence. The genealogical space opened up by evental thought is a war- 
zone through which the outside enables history to appear as an 
irreducible 'object' in itself, as an event, a power-full event 
constituted by force, struggle and conflict. Events are constituted 
through a struggle of forces distributed in a complex spatial 
scenography: "What Nietzsche calls the Entstehungsherd of the concept of 
goodness is not specifically the energy of the strong or the reaction of 
the weak, but precisely this scene where they are displayed superimposed 
or face to face. It is nothing but the space that divides them, the 
void through which they exchange their threatening gestures and 
speeches. " 
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The emergence of the event: 
"designates a place of confrontation, but not as a closed field 
offering the spectacle of a struggle among equals ... it is a 'non- 
place,, a pure distance, which indicates that the adversaries do not 
belong to a common space. Consequently, no one is responsible for 
an emergence; no one can glory in it, since it always occurs in the 61 
interstice. " 
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The 'non-place' of the outside is composed of formless forces, 
topologically in contact with form/strata compositions through an 
interstitial void that determines their emergence: Foucault's 
eventalisation of thought is precisely a problem of space (the outside) 
and relation (non-relation). A great drama of "endlessly repeated ... 
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dominations. " 
This relationship of domination is R3 more a 'relationship' than the 
place where it occurs is a place;. 
The 'evental' site of domination is a 'non-relation' between a complex 
series of immanent forms (discursive/non-discursive multiplicities) and 
the composing forces of the outside. The entstehung or emergence of 
forces cannot be conceived as a point or segment on a line but must be 
thought as a matrix of qualitatively hetergeneous dimensions or spaces, 
a series of relational discontinuities which are not structural or 
dialectical but topological. 
Herkunft. The event cannot be isolated from the conjunctural or 
operational spaces that produce it, and from the figures of descent 
(accident, error and randomness) that function through them. The 
disruptive force of the Herkunft disarticulates or undermines 
determinate notions of history by making its formative processes visible 
as a product and an instrument of discontinuity, chance and the 
'exteriority of accidents': 
to follow the complex course of descent is to maintain passing 
events in their proper dispersion; it is to identify the accidents, 
the minute deviations - or conversely, the complete reversals - the 
errors, the false appraisals, and the faulty calculations that gave 
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birth to those things that continue to exist and have value for us; 
it is to discover that truth or being does not lie at the root of64 
what we know and what we are, but the exteriority of accidents. 
Herkunft differentiates singularities outside of any categorial 
framework and locates them in an "intersecting network" of accidents 
that permits "the dissociation of the self, its recognition and 
displacement as an empty synthesis, in liberating a profusion of lost 
events". 
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Herkunft attaches itself to the body, inscribing its surfaces, 
energies, forces and movements in the events of history: "it is molded 
by a great many distinct regimes; it is broken down by the rhythmns of 
work, rest and holidays; it is poisoned by food or values, through 
eating habits or moral laws; it constructs resistances". 
66 
The "singularity of events" are inscribed on the body through 
'reversal, ' 'usurpation' and 'appropriation', through 'accident', 
'error' and 'chance' in "a scene where forces are risked in the chance 
of confrontation. " 
67 
Foucault's text dramatises the eventalisation of 
thought ("only a single drama is ever staged in this 'non- place", 
68 
through the repetition of struggle and domination, the agonism of forces. 
If the herkunft traces the back-stage directions "that give birth to those 
things that continue to exist and have value for us" 
69 
then enstehung is 
the violence of the double, a redoubling of the outside and its composing 
forces as they "leap from the wings to center stage, each in its youthful 
'° 
strength" , the 'cruel theatre' of the body's obliteration by history 
and its resignification through force "made to appear as events on the 
stage of historical process.,, 
71 
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Foucault eventalizes the thought of the outside, then, as an open 
struggle or spectacular engagement of forces in the 'non-place', 'pure 
distance', 'interstice' or 'void' through which the organizing terms of 
the articulable and the visible (the exchange of threatening speeches 
and gestures) are forced to pass, displacing any transcendental or 
metaphysical 'interiority' (I, cogito, synthesizing subject, etc, ) that 
could then re-centre thought, and any continuity, teleology or totality 
that would give history direction, meaning, end or purpose ensuring that 
the events of thought are articulated in the constitutive exteriority of 
the (Nietzschean) play of force, chance and chaos. "It is at once the 
chance within the game and the game itself as chance; in the same 
stroke, both the dice and the rules are thrown" 
72. 
All the predicates 
and perspectives of Foucault's eventalization of thought must be related to 
this game of chance and the chance of the game- ( "the iron hand of 
necessity shaking ther dice-box of chance" 
73)- 
to the hazardous space of 
the outside. 
Ever since the Sophists' tricks and influences were excluded and 
since their paradoxes have been more or less safely muzzled, it seems 
that Western thought has taken care to ensure that discourse should 
occupy the smallest possible space between thought and speech. 
Western thought seems to have made sure that the act of discoursing 
should appear to be no more than a certain bridging (apport) between 
thinking and speaking, a thought dressed in its signs and made 
visible by means of words, or conversely the st4uctures of language 
put into action and producing a meaning effect. 
Deeventalized thought dehistoricises (and depoliticises) the evental 
character of its realisations effacing the hazards of the outside in its 
exclusive movement between thinking and speaking. The 'reality' of the 
event, the univocal and polyvalent 'Being' of its differential 
expression is elided by reducing it to either autonomous thought or 
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autonomous speech. The descent/emergence series opens and disperses the 
space between 'thought and words', aligning them with an outside teeming 
with force, chance, accident and error in order to refocus 'historical 
mutation' as a problem of genealogical conditions open to becoming and 
transformation. Descent /emergence reinscribe the events of the outside 
in terms of a critical ontology of history, a Nietzschean ontology of 
difference where there is no 'Being' behind the effecting and becoming 
of history but a vast immanence of interconnected and enfolded force- 
fields which are not anchored in the same but unfolded through 
difference, which are not regulated through any unitary principle but 
constituted through will to power. 
Foucault's dramatisation of the events of thought on the stage of history 
enable the construction of an historical ontology of difference through 
"clothed or masked repetition, " a 'dress rehearsal' for 'thinking 
otherwise' in a new theartre of thought. Beyond the repetition of 
identities and resemblances, Foucault connects events to the real by 
dismantling their conditions (as possibility of representation or 
totality of the same) and reassembles them (as actual existence in the 
outside) in the theartre of Force and Difference. This dress rehearsal 
conditions the 'fabric' of thought for new folds, new creations, a new 
'fabrication' of thought. "Knowledge is not made for understanding; it 
is made for cutting". And genealogical cutting operates on itself by 
cutting the eventalization of thought into a folded ontology of history, 
a historical-genealogical ontology of difference. (This will later 
become the historical or critical ontology of ourselves). Through the 
events of effective history 'Being' is said and seen, effected and 
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effective as the difference of the outside. The genealogical events of 
outside thought are the mechanisms that affirm Being as that which is 
said, seen and felt to be unfolded in one world through an infinite 
difference and variation in space-time. The immanence of theory is 
folded into a pragmatic or practical ontology of thought, a political 
ontology of difference thought through (as we will see) in terms of a 
politics of truth, the specific practice of intellectuals and the 
critical events of thought in order to open spaces of resistance in the 
'present' to the powers that run through the events of thought. 
2. THE FOLD OF PRACTICE. 
The 'something else' that we had earlier seen as the doubling of 
distributed points on a discursive surface or as that limit which 
discourse and the non-discursive confront as their difference is now 
formulated through the event/phantasm, body/history, enstehung/herkunft, 
series as the singularity of the Event of the outside itself: it 
envelopes and folds, through the relation of its outer and inner 
surfaces, the entire series of events into an infinity making the inside 
pass to the outside and visa versa through discontinuous finite events. 
From the moment discourse ceases to follow the slope of self- 
interiorising thought and, addressing the very being of language, 
returns thought to the outside - from that moment, in a single 
stroke, it becomes a meticulous narration of experiences, encounters 
and improbable signs - language about the outside of all language, 
speech about the invisible side of words. And it becomes 
attentiveness to what in language already exists, has already been 
said, imprinted, manifested -a listening less to what is 
articulated in language than to the void circulating between its 
words, to the murmur that is forever taking it apart, a discourse on 
the non-discourse of all lanage; the fiction of the invisible 
space in which it appears. 
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The 'void' that circulates between the series is not of the series but 
that point of difference between them, the point where they converge 
communicate and are articulated onto each other. The 'murmur' that 'is 
forever taking them apart' is an equally original feature or singularity 
of the outside that disjoins the series, displaces them, making them 
begin again, redistributing the series into other sets. These figures 
are empty places, absent 'differentiators' or singularities that trigger 
the venting of particular series all of which "communicate in one and 
the same event which endlessly redistributes them, while their 
transformations form a history" 
76. 
The Event of the Outside 
redistributes them from the "fiction of the invisible space in which it 
appears" and gives them a history or genealogy "of experiences, encounters 
and improbable signs. " 
77 Events of the outside take place in an 'ideal' 
space, a phantasmic, fictional (in)vented and invisible space which is 
never the space which realises them or makes them exist. Rather events 
of the outside insist or subsist as an infinitive before they exist. 
Events of the outside insist or subsist as the aleatory point, the 
mobile empty question of thought in its relation with the singular 
points of problematic space: thought of outside - there are practical 
events of thought. 
78 
2.1 Eventing Blanchot. 
It is with the singular series of Blanchot's fictions, the 'events' of 
Blanchot, that Foucault explicitly encounters and practices the "thought 
from outside. " It is precisely in the relation between 'fiction' and 
visible 'space' that Foucault pursues and develops the singular 
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'objectives' of the question of thought and the practice of space. 
Foucault demonstrates with Blanchot's 'fiction' how the thought of the 
outside is given to be seen: 
Blanchot's fictions are, rather than the images themselves, their 
transformation, displacement and neutral interstices. They are 
precise; the only figures they outline are in the gray tones of 
everyday life and the anonymous. And when wonder overtakes them, it 
is never in themselves but in the void surrounding them, in the 
space in which they are set, rootless and without foundation. The 
fictitious is never in things or in people, but in the impossible 
verisimilitude of what lies between them: encounters, the proximity 
of what is most distant, the absolute dissimulation in our very 
midst. Therefore, fiction consists not in showing the invisible, 
but in showing ýýe extent to which the invisibility of the visible 
is invisible. 
Through the impossible space of fiction, a topological space in between 
events converting near and far into irreducible pure distances, the 
emission of singularities/events are 'shown' or made visible in relation 
to the invisible outside. Foucault/Blanchot's 'fiction' shows the 
extent to which the invisibility of the visible outside is 'invisible 
but not hidden. ' The outside is invisible to the extent that it is the 
unseen light that makes visible, it is the "sparkle of the outside. " 
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The forms or events of luminosity that the outside in fiction makes 
visible (Blanchot's texts, Foucault's genealogies), are bound up with a 
material space that doubles, multiplies, cuts into and contests the 
materiality of events. 
(Fiction) bears a profound relation to space; understood in this 
way, space is to fiction what the negative is to reflection (whereas 
dialectical negation is tied to the fable of time). No doubt this 
is the role that houses, hallways, doors, and rooms play in almost 
all of Blanchot's narratives: placeless places, beckoning 
thresholds, closed, forbidden spaces that are nevertheless exposed 
to the winds, hallways fanned by doors that open rooms for 
unbearable encounters and create gulfs between them81cross which 
voices cannot carry and that even muffle cries... 
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Voices cannot carry in this space because the conditions for their 
existence are absent or rather the battle begins, the forms contest each 
others space and the Event of the Outside eternally returns, each time 
displaced, as a thought of difference, multiplicity, 'an opening on to 
the future. ' The doubled space of Blanchot's fiction is cleaved by an 
outside that gives these spaces a different history, form, materiality 
and function. The event of fiction makes these differences visible, it 
opens thought to the outside, the unseen spaces of thought. 
2.2 The events of truth 
A. Fictioning the outside. Foucault's genealogical fictions practice 
this effort of making visible a historical unthought from which history 
constantly tries to free itself. The Events of history are not inside 
it, but in the absent opening outside. Foucault's genealogical fictions 
take historical forms/events outside of what they have been in order to 
open them to transformation. Transformation can come about through 
thinking the absent or impossible spaces of history as limits, 
conditions and constraints on what is no longer or not yet possible for 
thought, "that is by making the past active and present to the outside 
so that something new will finally come about, so that thinking, always, 
may reach thought. Thought thinks its own history (the past), but in 
order to free itself from what it thinks (the present) and be able 
finally to 'think otherwise' (the future). " 
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Foucault's fictions unwork historical thought and make it possible to 
think otherwise by eventing other possibilities 'within the true': 
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I am well aware that I have never written anything but fictions. I 
do not mean to say, however, that truth is therefore absent. It 
seems to me that the possibility exists for fiction to function in 
truth, for a fictional discourse to induce effects of truth, and for 
bringing it about that a true discourse engenders or 'manufactures' 
something that does not as yet exist, that is, 'fictions' it. One 
'fictions' history on the basis of a political reality that makes it 
true, one 'fictions '81 politics not yet in existence on the basis of 
a historical truth. 
B. Distance. One fictions the events of truth on the basis of a thought 
that makes it true, one fictions thought not yet in existence on the 
basis of events of truth. Foucault's fictions do not plug up the gap or 
distance between events, or between saying and seeing, but connect and 
reconnect with the "pure distance" of the outside itself. 
A distance which belongs neither to the world, nor to the 
unconscious, nor to perception, nor to inwardness, a distance which, 
in its barest form, offers a crisscrossing of lines of ink as well 
as an entanglement of thoroughfares ... And if at last anyone were 
to ask me to define the fictive, I should say, albeit rather 
tactlessly, that it was the verb 91 nerve structure of that which 
does not exist, such as it is. 
Foucault eventalizes the outside as the invisible nerve structure of 
that which does not yet exist- but must be fictioned through the 
irreducible distances of an 'impossible' relation with the outside. 
Fiction inhabits those distances "which cannot be broken down" of the 
thought from outside. It does not yet exist but subsists in the 
distancing of the relation between 'a crisscrossing of lines of ink' and 
'an entanglement of thoroughfares. ' The outside resides in thought as 
the unthought distancing of that which is no longer or not yet. 
Thought: 
cannot discover the unthought without immediately bringing the 
unthought nearer to itself - or even, perhaps, without pushing it 
further away, and in any case without causing man's own being to 
undergo a change by thah5very fact, since it is deployed in the 
distance between them. 
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C. Truth of the outside. Fiction and distance are elements or 
instruments of outside thought that eventalise truth, "'I have never 
written anything but fictions... ' but never has fiction produced such 
truth and reality. " 
86 
Foucault's fictioning of the 
outside is concerned with the existence or non-existence of the 
composite event within the 'true, ' that is with the fact that events 
produce 'truth effects. ' This production itself is conditioned and 
therefore the particular effects of such events cannot be accounted for 
purely within 'discursive' or 'non-discursive' terms. Truth effects 
describe the inclusion and exclusion of concrete historical 'facts' from 
exerting particular effects. Thus the importance of the question of 
power , but not just the power of certain 'discourses' or 'language' but 
also the whole field of non-discursive visible practices and the powers 
that circulate through them as, for example, in a 'regime of truth' 
which organises bodies and materials as well as discourse in order to 
produce truth 
87. 
Foucault's 'political history of the production of 
truth' establishes that truth is no longer a property attached to 
discourse but the concrete effect of particular practices that traverse 
the non-discursive as well as the discursive, the visible as well as the 
articulable. Truth is evented and produced as a problem space through 
the disjunctive practices and programmes of saying and seeing each with 
its own 'regime' and a specific set of techniques and procedures for 
producing truth - whose procedures and methods, techniques and 
strategies can be opened to an outside that would constitute a 'history 
of truth. ' 
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Outside thought would constitute a 'history of truth' not by uncovering 
"'the ensemble of truths which are to be discovered and accepted, ' but 
rather "the ensemble of rules according to which the true and the false 
are separated and specific effects of power attached to the 'true', it 
being understood also that its not a matter of a battle 'on behalf' of 
the truth, but of a battle about the status of truth and the economic 
and political role it plays. " 
88 
Truth is inseparable from the procedures of its production, inseparable 
from a "regime of practices" and the conditions which make them 
acceptable. The eventalisation of thought has nothing to do with 
'theories, ' 'institutions' or 'ideology' but with practices of seeing 
and saying and the problematic space of truth they make possible. 
Practices are to be "understood here as places where what is said and 
what is done, rules imposed and reasons given, the planned and the taken 
for granted meet and interconnect. " 
89 
D. Jurisdiction and veridiction. This construction of practical series 
('jurisdiction, ' 'veridiction' 
90) is both a 'coding' of behaviours, (a 
system of regulating, ordering, grading, examining, classifying, 
training etc, in short, 'governing') interwoven with the production of 
true discourses "which serve to found, justify and provide reasons and 
principles for these ways of doing things. " 
91 Jurisdiction and 
veridiction are interlocking and overlapping zones of events, events of 
the articulable and the visible with effects which are "mutually 
opposed, composed and superposed. " 
92 
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Eventalising singular ensembles of practices, so as to make them 
graspable as different regimes of 'jurdiction' and 'veridiction. ' 
That ... is what I would like to do. 
Eventalisation directly takes up the problematic of strategy in enabling 
the articulation of truth and power together. This "monism of 
practices" enables the two regimes to develop together and mutually 
condition one another, the former prescribing a set of procedures and 
strategies the latter providing reasons and principles for the 
procedures and strategies through a production of 'true' discourses. 
94 
Within the space of these two axes the problem of how particular 
practices emerged and were accepted within a particular historical 
moment can be addressed along with their relation to the whole field of 
practices. The 'dispositif' or 'apparatus' describes such a field of 
practices as an ensemble of "discourses, institutions, architectural 
forms, regulatory decisions, laws, administrative measures, scientific 
statements, philosophical, moral and philanthropic propositions - in 
short the said as much as the unsaid. " 
95 A regimes of practices which 
define particular technologies or "programmings of behaviour" 
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coexist 
and interact with all these other regimes. Eventalisation brings 
together the discursive as well as non-discursive events all of which 
modify each others functions and effects. 
2.3. Polymorphism (singularity/multiplicity) of the Outside. 
Jurisdiction and veridiction as lines or parcels of the enunciable and 
the visible are splintered and multiplied in Foucault's eventalisation 
of thought into an 'increasing polymorphism as the analysis progresses' 
so that each line or series becomes a heterogeneous multiplicity -a 
machinic arrangement or compositive space made up of molecular particles 
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or points functioning together and apart as a dynamic 'structure. ' Thus 
the event of 'carceralisation' is mapped as an expanding, capillary 
network, a fractal scaling of 'elements, ' 'relations' and 'domains of 
reference' proliferating rhizomatically across polymorphic surfaces 
97. 
-A polymorphism of the elements which are brought into relation: 
starting from the prison, one introduces the history of pedagogical 
practices, the formation of professional armies, British empirical 
philosophy, techniques of use of firearms, new methods of division 
of labour. 
-A polymorphism of relations described: these may concern the 
transposition of technical models (such as architectures of 
surveillance), tactics calculated in response to a particular 
situation (such as the growth of banditry, the disorder provoked by 
public tortures and executions, the defects of the practice of penal 
banishment), or the application of theoretical schemas (such as 
those representing the genesis of ideas and the formation of signs, 
the Utilitarian conception of behaviour, etc). 
-A polymorphism of domains of reference (varying in their nature, 
generality, etc. ), ranging from technical mutations in matters of 
detail to the attempted emplacement in a capitalist economy of new 
techniques9? f power designed in response to the exigencies of that 
economy). 
The events of 'carceralisation', are mapped as heterotopic spaces, 
"heterotopias of deviation" 
99 
that collide, overlap, and intermingle. 
"They are explicit programmes: we are dealing with sets of calculated, 
reasoned prescriptions in terms of which institutions are meant to be 
reorganised, spaces arranged, behaviours regulated. " 
100 
Foucault's 
analysis of the spaces of jurisdiction and veridiction demonstrates that 
the programmes of seeing and saying "don't take effect in the 
institutions in an integral manner; they are simplified, or some are 
chosen and not others; and things never work out as planned. " 
101 
Particular techniques and apparatuses emerge in response to a particular 
need and are therefore always strategic. The existence of these 
techniques is never completely conditioned by this 'origin' since they 
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continue to exist through "functional overdetermination" and "strategic 
elaboration. " Techniques enter into relations with other techniques in 
which they condition and are conditioned by each other, the effects of 
these relations enforce the modification and adjustment of the apparatus 
itself. A particular technique may have effects that demand the 
elaboration of that technique itself extending it well beyond the 
original need whilst completing its effectiveness. Zn other words, the 
effectivity of techniques, because of the complexity and mutual 
conditioning of the relations they enter into, extend beyond their 
intended or imagined possibilities: they become engulfed into larger 
apparatuses operating with different strategies which are, in turn, 
conditioned by other techniques with different aims and objectives. 
Particular techniques, then, are connected with nothing necessary, 
natural or arbitrary but with a "multiplicity of historical forces. " 
Eventalisation begins with a "breach of self-evidence" 
102 
through which 
the singularity, concreteness and positivity of the event are made 
visible. Through a process of 'causal multiplication' the archeologist 
/cartographer constructs a new space of intelligibility which is shaped 
like a 'polyhedron' or 'polygon' the number of faces of which are never 
given in advance. With no constants, essences or universals Foucault's 
nominalism of the outside enables the construction or invention of a 
series of surfaces that are 'rhizomatic', connecting events with events, 
drawing maps of lines of effectivity. Given the singular event, one 
must "rediscover the connections, encounters, supports, blockages, plays 
of force, strategies, and so on which at a given moment establish what 
subsequently counts as being self-evident, universal and necessary. " 
103 
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This reconstruction, rewriting and reassembling of the historical record 
finds that thought is the inscription of lines of power upon its 
surfaces, but the lines do not correspond to pre-established categories 
and relations but redefine them each time according to the shape and 
contours of the relations of force that are operative. 
Horkheimer and Adorno only adduce part of the problem when they 
demonstrate the link between Kantian Schematism and 'what Hollywood 
consciously put into practice. ' 
104 Concepts of the understanding 
programme appearances through a schematizing power 
(jurisdiction/veridiction) conditioned by historically contingent 
strategies which regulate their production. The conditions for the 
possiblity of an event are the conditions for its existence. The Duality 
of Kantian reason is sustained in Horkheimer and Adorno's account but in 
Foucault it is broken and disseminated through an Outside. If 
jurisdiction and veridiction are effects of fragments of what is possible, 
taken together as co-mingling series of groupings of strategic events they 
actively produce the real. 
They are fragments of reality which induce such particular effects 
in the real as the distinction between true and false implicit in 
the ways men 'direct, ' 'govern' and 'conduct' themselves and others. 
To grasp these effects as historical events - with what this implies 
for the question of truth (which is the qujohion of philosophy 
itself) - this is more or less my theme. 
2.4. Practising the Outside. 
Foucault's eventalisation of thought is produced through an outside (the 
gap/void or difference between strategies), the non-correspondence or 
anisormorphism between practices and programmes of seeing and saying. 
Programmatic knowledges attempt to elide or efface the disjunction between 
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practices, erasing the function of the outside, in order to make their 
object/event programmable. This programming of events schematises their 
difference and heterogeneity by deploying an 'internal' mechanism that 
regulates their construction and production. Eventalisation de-programs 
events from any Kantian schema or neo Kantian history of ideas which 
utlize the idea as a regulative 'focus imaginarius', the unconditioned 
which conditions every structure through its form of unity (totality) and 
necessity (universal objectivity). 
For me this is precisely the point at issue, both in historical 
analysis and in political critique. We aren't, nor di0ge have to 
put ourselves under the sign of a unitary necessity. 
The 'idea' in its 'undoubted reality' is precisely the kind of 'self- 
evidence' which 'imposes itself uniformly on all, that Foucault's 
eventalisation is attempting to 'breach' and 'counter-program': 
A breach of self-evidence, of those self-evidences on which our 
knowledge, acquiescences and practices rest. This ij0ýhe first 
theoretico-political function of 'eventalisation'. 
And this function is bound up with a second which would demonstrate how 
any internal mechanism is the fold of an exterior or outside. It means 
"rediscovering the connections, encounters, supports, blockages, plays 
of force, strategies and so on which at a given moment establish what 
subsequently counts as being self-evident, universal and necessary. " 
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Foucault eventalises any 'idea in the Kantian sense' and its transposition 
in historical schemas through a 'breach' space that is then mapped to its 
outside. Thus, eventalisation asks how such 'evidences' arose (herkunft) 
and took form (enstehung). The (evental) question of evidence is bound up 
with the form of its acceptability and the functions it serves. It is 
therefore a component in a 'strategy of power. ' 
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2.5. Diagnosing the Outside. 
History is continually reborn in Foucault's eventalisation of thought as a 
'breach birth' aided by genealogical 'midwifery'. Eventalisation makes 
history 'effective' to the extent that it can practically turn it against 
itself. 
Effective history studies what is closest, but in an abrupt 
dispossession, so as to seize it at a distance (an approach similar 
to that of a doctor who looks closely, who plunges to make a 
diagnosis and to state its difference). Historical sense has more 
in common with mediyAge than philosophy ... its task is to become a 
curative science. 
The eventalisation of thought would take certain features of 
'physiological' thought (techniques and practices of effective history 
which are "similar to that of a doctor who looks closely, who plunges to 
make a diagnosis and to state its difference, " 
110) 
to open up a body of 
evidence to those invisible and unseen events from outside. As a 
'curative science' 
111 it would constitute a 'seeing' outside as well as a 
'saying' ('to state its difference'); it would be a 'diagnosis, ' a 
critical diagnosis made on the basis of a certain self-evidence (what is 
closest) abruptly dispossessed and ruptured, rendered unacceptable 
through the 'distance' of a seeing/saying outside. 
Diagnosis is a primary strategy of eventalised/eventalizing thought. It 
deprives us of our continuity; it dissipates that temporal 
identity in which we are pleased to look at ourselves when we wish 
to exercise the ruptures of history ... It causes the other and the 
outside to burst forth. Understood in this manner the diagnostic 
does not establish the fact of our identity by the plaY19f 
distinctions, it establishes that we are difference. 
Foucault practices this art of diagnostic eventalisation throughout his 
work but it is most prevalent in the 'birth' books. In the 'event' of 
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the clinic "the exact superposition of the 'body' of disease and the 
body of the sick man ... is self-evident only for us. " 
113 In 'eventing' 
the 'practice of imprisonment' 
114 
Foucault refers to 'the self-evident 
character that the prison form assumed. ' 
115 
In both cases Foucault's 
analyses/diagnosis insert themselves within the differential or ruptured 
space of self-evidence and open it to an outside within thought. In this 
opening practices and programmes of seeing and saying are mapped to 
strategies of power and their relations to forms of knowledge and modes of 
living; a critical opening in thought that would enable a 
'thinking-otherwise' about the events of thought. 
Foucault eventalises thought in the difference between what we are no 
longer (the archive) and what we are becoming (diagnosis) what we are 
not yet. It is the difference between history and actuality, past and 
present, a diagnosis of the 'history of the present: ' 
To diagnose the present is to say what the present is, and how our 
present is absolutely different from all that it is not, that is tT16 
say, from our past. Perhaps this is the task of philosophy now. 
Foucault's thought functions in that constructed outside between an 
'analytic' and a 'diagnostic, ' it folds these spaces together and bursts 
any continuity or identity between them. Diagnosis would trace and 
agitate along the line of their fold 'lines of fragility' of 'breakage' 
and 'fracture' that would open a new space within the fold: 
I want to say about the task of diagnosis today that it does not 
consist only of a description of who we are, rather a line of 
fragility of today to follow and understand, if and how what is, can 
no longer be what it is. In this sense, the description must be 
formulated as a kind of virtual break, which opens room, understo117 
as a room of concrete freedom, that is possible transformation. 
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The thought from outside, in diagnostic mode, is formulated as a 
virtual/actual circuit through which points of 'break' and 'caesurae' 
are diagnosed and eventalised in the present. The analytic consists in 
reattaching the virtual to actualised events in order to make visible 
those weak points around which diagnosis would construct 'lines of 
flight' in the present. From what practices of knowledge, strategies of 
power and forms of subjectivsation are we departing? In short, from 
what events of thought are we becoming other? These questions feed back 
into the event of Foucault's thought through specific zones, spaces and 
events of archaeological/genealogical enquiry: madness, sex, punishment 
etc. Each zone requires a separate analytic/diagnostic which 
nevertheless connects with and resonates with the others. 
Diagnostic space opens up a "space of concrete freedom" of 'becoming- 
other' such that resistance to what we have been saying and doing to 
ourselves and one another is both possible and necessary. The 
eventalisation of thought is an analysis and diagnosis of the 
"contemporary limits of the necessary, a critique of what we are saying, 
thinking and doing" conceived as events that expose the outside in 
self-evidence and open it to other possibilities. 
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2.6. Eventing the intellectual 
It is the function of the 'intellectual' to invent and pursue these spaces 
and Foucault eventalises the function of the specific intellectual: 
What the intellectual can do is provide instruments of analysis, and 
at present this is the historians essential role. What's 
effectively needed is a ramified, penetrative perception of the 
present, one that makes it possible to locate lines of weakness, 
strong points, positions where the instances of power have secured 
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and implanted themselves by a system of organisation dating back 
over 150 years. In other words, a topological and geographic1j9 
survey of the battlefield - that is the intellectual's role. 
The 'court of reason' with its 'jurists' and 'notables' no longer 
adjudicates events and has become a 'battlefield' that must be 
'surveyed', a contested battlefield directed by disciplinary armies each 
with a specific agenda. Has Foucault simply taken the metapanoptical 
function away from the Kantian philosopher and arrogated it to the 
genealogist? In fact, Foucault's texts militate against any 
metapanoptical structure by eventalising it as a set of distinct, 
singular and specific 'small scale, regional, dispersed 'Panoptisms'120 
that intersect and overlap operating as auxiliaries or supports in a 
kind of 'viral spread' or generalised abstract function. Each micro- 
panoptism, with its veridicative and juridicative machinery produces its 
own objects and 'strains' of truth "linked in a circular relation with 
systems of power which produce and sustain it, and to effects of power 
which it induces and which extend it.,, 
121 
A. Resistance of the outside. Foucault's 'dream' intellectual would be a 
mobile and constantly mutating line of flight that the system of power 
itself produces but can never quite contain: 
I dream of the intellectual destroyer of evidence and 
universalities, the one who, in the inertias and constraints of the 
present, locates and marks the weak points, the openings, the lines 
of power, who incessantly displaces himself, doesn't know exactly 
where he is heading nor wh1ý2he'll think tomorrow because he is too 
attentive to the present. 
The "specific intellectual" can provide instruments of analysis, little 
'tool kits' to locate lines of weakness in the present, exacerbate and 
amplify them. This is not to suggest the appropriate tool be utilized in 
solving the correct problem so much as a tool/concept be used to create 
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a problem, to invent a problem and to make a difference, to "pack a 
potential in the way a crowbar in a willing hand envelops an energy of 
prying". 
123 
Foucault's texts begin to eventalize a new relation between 
theory and practice, between intellectuals and struggle/resistance; a 
relation of 'transversality' between points in a network of strategies / 
stratificatons enabling specific intellectuals to function as 
'exchangers' through the overlapping "points of intersection" 
124 
within this network. Thus local and regional struggles can develop 
lateral connections "across different forms of knowledge and from one 
focus of politicisation to another. " 
125 
What prevents these struggles 
from becoming too localised or sectoral, what enables these resistances to 
remain in touch with the forces that enable them to grow is that they 
"attack not so much such or such' an institution of power, or group, or 
elite, or class, but rather a technique, a form of power. " 
126 
And 
here Foucault would situate his own specific contribution by "using this 
resistance as a chemical catalyst so as to bring to light power relations, 
locate their position, find out their point of application and the methods 
used. Rather than analysing power from the point of view of its internal 
rationality, it consists of analysing power relations through the 
antagonism of strategies". 
127 
Resistances directly express an outside distributed through an 
'antagonism of strategies. ' Applying the 'chemical catalyst' of 
eventalisation to the forces of resistance that 'always already' exist 
"means that a social field offers more resistance than strategies, and the 
thought of the outside is a thought of resistance. " 
128 
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The eventalised thought of the outside as a thought of resistance in 
Foucault no longer concerns any 'universality' of 'man' or 'revolution' 
but the transversality of forces that pass through man, making change 
possible; there is a 'plenitude of the possible. ' Foucault's 
eventalisation of the outside is an effort within that plenitude: 
To give some assistance in wearing away certain self-evidentnesses 
and commonplaces about madness, normality, illness, crime and 
punishment; to bring it about, together with many others, that 
certain phrases can no longer be spoken so lightly, certain acts no 
longer, or at least no longer so unhesitatingly performed, to 
contribute to changin72gertain things in people's way of perceiving 
and doing things... 
Foucault's eventalisation of thought opens up a space of resistance and 
change by connecting together maps of events and making visible their 
relation to the outside and thus allowing us to 'see' power differently, 
by making, for example, the practices of imprisonment 'difficult', 
'problematic' and 'dangerous' 
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through a presentation of their 
invisible conditions of possibility. "My project is precisely to bring it 
about that they no longer know what to do'g'. 
131 
The moment of pause or 
space of difficulty in the evidence of self-experience can be used to 
construct a line of flight, a passage to the outside. When Foucault says 
that his work of eventalisation "takes place between unfinished abutments 
and anticipatory strings of dots" 
132 
he is referring to this 
problematised space of self-experience that we are leaving behind and a 
new space, not yet sketched out, of unforeseen possibilities for being 
other than we are, a space of 'thinking-otherwise' in relation to the 
events of thought. This 'thinking-otherwise' is "seeking to give new 
impetus, as far and wide as possible, to the undefined work of freedom. " 
133 
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2.7. Critical events 
The eventalisation of thought activates a new spatial relation to 
critique, criticism and the critical as a thought from the outside. It 
is "genealogical in its design and archaelogical in its method.,, 
134 
When Deleuze remarks, in relation to Foucauldian power, it is as if 
something new were emerging in the wake of Marx, we would add, in relation 
to critique, it is as if something new were emerging in the wake of Kant - 
an eventalisation of critique. The entire juridical edifice of 
transcendental critique sited in the universal, ahistorical, 'common' 
space of the court of reason gives way to a mobile, strategic space of 
immanent 'critique' eventalised in an outside always already adjacent and 
conjoined to a space of difference. The juridical space of critique 
elides the extent to which its judgements and their conditions of 
possibility, are penetrated and traversed by exogenous and extra- 
territorial mechanisms that actively produce the conditions for the 
existence of juridical space with its borders, frontiers, territories, 
limits etc. These mechanisms remain invisible not just because juridical 
space cannot provide a deduction of itself (which would be an infinite 
regress or spiralling of the quid juris upon itself 
135) but because this 
space is produced and made to function as a reterritorialised instrument 
that masks its own conditions of existence. This is not a problem of 
ideology or repression but of a power whose "success is proportional to 
its ability to hide its own mechanisms". 
136 
The stakes of Foucault's eventalisation of critique consist in 
inhabiting the outside to 'produce, ' 'actualise, ' 'fiction, ' and 
'invent' a critique not yet in existence, a space of critical thought 
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that insists or subsists within the juridical space of critique. The 
point is to 'rupture' the juridical because it continues to occlude the 
extra-juridical forces that condition it. Transcendental critique is 
juridical because it legitimates its judgements on the basis of apriori 
conditions of possibility which have been deduced in terms of our 'legal 
entitlement. ' That reason is inherently juridical is a basic premise of 
transcendental critique. Foucault continually returns to transcendental 
thought as that axial point of difference or disengagement for 
eventalising thought. "In all of my work I strive ... to avoid any 
reference to this transcendental as condition for the possibility for 
any knowledge ... I try to historicise to the utmost to leave as little 
space as possible to the transcendental. " 
137 
the space of eventalised 
critique is a singularly unclassifiable or 'heterotopic' space of the 
outside that squeezes out the transcendental in its movement, to event the 
transcendental is to invent spaces of possibility within the impossible. 
A. The impossible within. The eventalisation of critique produces the 
impossible within or invents a possibility for which we have no legal 
entitlement. It actualises an impossible multiplicity, lines of 
difference from the outside which we cannot yet see or say, an 
impossible thought that cannot yet be thought. And this is not a 
juridical negation, a (formal) apriori, an obstacle, censor, repression 
or prohibition so much as an historically productive impossibility of 
what is not yet or no longer possible. The eventalisation of critique 
uproots juridical space, separates it out, and disperses it in the 
invention of an impossible outside. This critique: 
will seek to treat the instances of discourse that articulate what 
we think, say, and do as so many historical events ... that will not 
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deduce from the form of what we know what is impossible for us to do 
and to know, but ... will separate out, from the contingency that 
has made us what we are, the possibilit? 3gf no 
longer being, doing 
or thinking what we are, do or think. 
Eventalised critique opens a 'plenitude of the possible' in the events 
of thought, new spaces for the invention of saying, being, doing and 
seeing otherwise. It is an experience of thought that is "indissociable 
from a desperate eagerness to imagine it, to imagine it otherwise than 
it is, and to transform it, not by destroying it but by grasping it in 
what it is. " 
139 
B. The possible without. To imagine a thinking otherwise than it is, a 
critical thought of the events of thought is not a desire to 'smash' the 
juridical or step outside 'of the law' it is a "long work of comings and 
goings, of exchanges, reflections, trials, different analyses. " 
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It is an experimentation in connecting and reconnecting with the real. It 
is not a desire to replace law with a 'new legality' disguised as beyond 
politics' 
141 
so much as a displacement of legal negativity, ('penser ... 
le pouvoir sans le roi 
142) 
a fold into the with-out of evental critique 
that poses problems to politics. ' 
The point, in brief, is to transform the critique conducted in the 
form of a necessary limitation into a Rjjctical critique that takes 
the form of a possible transgression 
The possible without of evental critique is not the invention of a 
possible form to be realised but surprise of what is no longer or not 
yet possible in the invented spaces of critique: eternal return of the 
outside or virtual multiplicity without law and concept. This is 
critique that will not be realised in the utopic space of historical 
possibility but a critique actualised through the hetertopic space of 
'lines of differentiation' flowing from outside 'actualised by 
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inventing. ' Critical actualisation does not programme thought but frees 
it for invention. It cannot project a new order but imagines the 
present one differently: 
Critique doesn't have to be the premise of a deduction which 
concludes: this then is what needs to be done. It should be an 
instrument for those who fight, those who resist and refuse what it. 
Its use should be in processes of conflict and confrontation, essays 
in refusal. It doesn't have to lay down the law for law. It isn1ý4 
a stage in programming. It is a challenge directed to what is. 
The resistance or refusal of what is is a resistance or refusal of what 
we are no longer in order to initiate that step into the space of a 
becoming other, the transformative actualisation of the not yet. 
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transformation, "ideal" criticism and "real" transformation. 
Criticism and transformation are bound together in the space of a 
becoming other of thought eventalising those 'monumental' spaces of 
critique (pure, practical, aesthetic) that are kept separate. The 
problematic holding together of criticism and transformation modifies 
the structure of the very context of thought and its relation to the 
'real. ' 
We've got to avoid the sacralisation of the social as the sole 
instance of the real, and stop treating thought - this essential 
thing in human life and human relations - lightly. Thought exists, 
well beyond and well within system and edifices of discourse. It is 
something which often hides itself, but it always animates everyday 
behaviour. There is always a little bit of thought even in the 
silliest institutions, always some thought even in mute habits. 
Criticism consists in driving this thought out of hiding and trying 
to change it: showing that things are not as obvious as we might 
believe, doing it in such a way that what we accept as going without 
saying no longer goes without saying. To criticize is to render the 
too easy gestures difficult. In these conditions, criticism (and 
radical criticism) is absolutely indispensable for all 
transformation. Because a transformation which would remain within 
the same mode of thought, which would only be a certain manner of 
better adjusting the same thought to the reality of things, would 
only be a superficial transformation. 
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On the other hand, from the moment one begins to be unable, any 
longer, to think things as one usually thinks them, transformation 
becomes siq taneously very urgent, very difficult, and altogether 
possible. 
The eventalisation of critique is simultaneously the eventalisation of 
the outside: the invisible visibility of power. 
2.8. The Event of Power. 
The outside is the placeless space through which every relation of power 
and resistance, thought and criticism is inscribed. "Rootless and without 
foundation" 147, the outside can be eventalised as a specific logic of 
power and resistance that presupposes the anarchic proliferation of forces 
that undermine them. The double movement or double conditioning of the 
outside is such that power arises out of resistance and not the reverse. 
The embodiment of power in institutions or technologies functions to 
regulate and control those forces that invest them, but there will always 
remain an irreducible outside, an inaccessible pocket or zone at the 
centre of the cyclone. The zone of the events of the outside at once 
generates, limits, and subverts relations of power. "Power is everywhere" 
not because it embraces everything but precisely because it is neither 
here nor there, because it is continually eventalising: "it is produced 
from one moment to the next, at every point, or rather in every relation 
from one point to another" 
148. 
If power is diffuse, multiple and 
continually proliferating it is never totalising or completely all 
encompassing since it cannot thoroughly saturate, immobilise, regulate, 
invest or parasitise its own arbitrary and chaotic movement, its own 
evental structure. Power seeks and fails to subdue the event of its own 
self organisation and production. The alea of its evental character is 
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completely inscribed within it. The event of power is that fold of 
infinitely extended space (outside) through which power fails to 
accomplish itself and through which thought may think-otherwise. To fold 
the event of power into the immanent plane of Foucault's thought it will 
be necessary to map the theory/practice of events as topological co- 
functions of a diagrammaticism of thought. 
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4. THE SPACES OF POWER : DIAGRAMMATIC THOUGHT 
A whole history remains to be writtey of spaces - which would at the 
same time be the history of powers. 
People have often reproached me for these spatial obsessions, which 
have indeed been obsessions for me. But I think that through them I 
did come to what I had basically been looking far: the relations 
that are possible between power and knowledge. 
The spatial systems of knowledge established in the order of Things/ 
Archaeology as the relation between discursive and non-discursive 
formations and later broken down and reconstituted as 'events' or 
singularities of the Outside are opened to a properly serial, 'micro- 
physical', machinic and strategic space-time in Discipline and Punish 
and The History of Sexuality. The micro-series of the books are ordered 
by a historical space-time image of power that links strata together as 
multiplicities in a relation of immanence to strategic lines of force. 
The 'conduction' of strata by lines of force together compose 
strategies: "strategies of relations of force supporting, and supported 
by, types of knowledge". 
3 
This 'analytic' of power "takes whatever is 
still pyramidal in the Marxist image and replaces it with a strict 
immanence where centres of power and disciplinary techniques form 
multiple segments". 
4 
Multiple segments or 'human multiplicities' are 
constantly mutating and being transformed through the effects of 
strategies of power and the diagram is a map, replete with the precise 
spatial logic, of the everchanging formations within this network that 
control human collectivities in space and time. Thus Foucault's 
'diagrammaticism' demonstrates that it is through the 'schemata' of 
power that the exteriorities of knowledge are articulated and the events 
of thought are conditioned. 
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The abstract or 'incompossible' diagram expresses a space-time image of 
thought for each formation, a dimension of thought irreducible to the 
exteriorities of knowledge yet relayed through particular points as 
events of the outside. Genealogical diagrams are archaeological archives 
teeming with force and chaos, or rather, diagrams are relations of force 
in action. Foucault only speaks of power/knowledge relations and power 
relations and the definitions correlate with these terms. ("There is no 
Power, but power relationships which are being born incessantly, as both 
effect and condition of other processes. " 
5 
The diagram, which "must 
be detached from any specific use" 
6, 
offers a blueprint or virtual map of 
how these relations of force are actualised and how they condition the 
practices of knowledge, the events of power and the possibilities of 
thought in a given epoch. The diagram does not 'represent' anything - it 
makes and unmakes the real; and in this it is like a specific fold or rift 
of the outside itself; it is a precise, abstract, historical figure of the 
plane of consistency, an imageless, anonymous, spatial image of the 
possibilities of power, resistance and thought in a given formation. The 
diagram is 'expressed' through a mobile, metastable space of 'becoming' 
that cuts into the audio-visual archive, conditions it, and is in turn 
conditioned by it. It is the unfolding of a pure space of chaos and order, 
a 'local' and unstable map of the 'not yet' and the 'no longer' wrought 
into "confrontation at the limit of the living present". 
7 
1. The spaces of Power/knowledge. 
For diagrammatic thought power and knowledge inhabit each other, 
parasitise each other. Each is the others 'inside', a double inside 
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stretched and folded across each others surfaces without any 'exterior' 
in-between, such is "the question of their relation. " 
8 
This multiply 
folded (and multiply tensed) relation expresses the 'complicated' 
spatiality or space-time of power-knowledge, enables their co-incidence 
into "local centers" and strategic blocks, and tightly links them in their 
"incessant comings and goings. " 
9 
"Relations of power (with the struggles that traverse them and the 
institutions that maintain them) do not merely facilitate or 
obstruct knowledge; they are content neither to favour or stimulate 
it, nor to falsify or limit it ... the problem is thus not solely to 
determine how power subordinates knowledge and makes it serve its 
ends nor to determine how it superimposes itself on it and imposes 
on it ideological contents and limitations. No knowledge can be 
formed without a system of communication, of recording, of 
accumulation, of displacement - which is itself a form of power ... 
No power, on the other hand, can be exercised without the 
extraction, appropriate distribution, or retention of knowledge. At 
this level, there is not learning on one side and society on the 
other, or science $d the state, but rather the fundamental forms of 
"pouvoir-savoir. I' 
The familiar schemas of subordination, superimposition, essence or 
attribution are already problematised in this formulation and when, in 
Discipline and Punish, Foucault treats the relation in terms of 'micro- 
physics', Foucault writes, "to analyse.. the micro-physics of power 
presupposes.. that one abandons.. the violence-ideology opposition, the 
metaphor of property, the model of the contract or of conquest; that - 
where knowledge is concerned - one abandons the opposition between what 
is 'interested' and what is 'disinterested', the model of knowledge and 
the primacy of the subject. " 
11 
Moreover, diagrammatics reveals power as 
positive and productive: "We must cease once and for all to describe 
the effects of power in negative terms: it "excludes, " it "represses, " 
it "censors, " it "abstracts, " it "masks, " it "conceals. " In fact, power 
produces; it produces reality; it produces domains of objects and 
rituals of truth. " 
12 
, These qualifications are gathered together in a 
hesitant but imperative mode: 
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"Perhaps ... we should abandon a whole tradition that allows us to 
imagine that knowledge can exist only where the power relations are 
suspended and that knowledge can develop only outside its 
injunctions, its demands and its interests ... We should admit 
rather that power produces knowledge ... that power and knowledge 
directly imply one another; that there is no power relation without 
the correlative constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any 
knowledge that does not presuppose and constitute at the sire time 
power relations. These are "power-knowledge" relations. " 
Power and knowlege are articulated onto heterogeneous spaces so 
different that we cannot fail to tell them apart and yet so entangled, 
entwined and topologically interlaced that we cannot take for granted 
the possibility of telling them apart. Foucault's text insists 
absolutely on maintaining both versions of the relation simultaneously. 
It is a "relation of non-relation". 
14 
They are heterogeneous to the 
extent that, on the one hand, the enunciable and visible that constitute 
the forms of knowledge have their own irreducible spaces, rhythmns, 
history, functions and materiality and, yet, on the other hand, these are 
affects of actualisation and capture which already presuppose the 
transference or transmission and redistribution of force relations. The 
relation of incommensurability that regulates the forms of knowledge is 
doubled and conditioned by relations of power that determine what is made 
visible by technologies of observation and eloquent by processes of 
expression. Foucault's texts on power produce this double relation 
simultaneously erasing the space of difference insisted upon and erasing 
that insistence in reiterating the difference. The power/knowledge 
relation remains indefinite and reversible as the folded and double space 
that holds them together and apart divides and then closes up the division 
across the asymmetrical surfaces of their 'articulation'. 
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This thing called power is characterised by immanence of field 
without transcendent unification, continuity of line without global 
centralisation, and contiguity of pays without distinct 
totalisation: it is a social space. 
2. Panopticism. 
It is in Discipline and Punish that Foucault diagrams the 
panoptic features of this social space and is bound up with disciplinary 
technologies. Indeed the mechanism of panopticism expresses and 
embodies the diagram of this social space through its relations between 
articulable and visible forces in disciplinary technologies: 
This enclosed, segmented space, observed at every point, in which 
the individuals are inserted in a fixed place, in which the 
slightest moments are supervised, in which all events are recorded, 
in which an uninterrupted work of writing links the centre and the 
periphery, in which power is exercised without division, according 
to a continuous hierarchical figure, in which each individual is 
constantly located, examined and distributed among the living 
beings, the sick and the dead -1 ll this constitutes a compact model 
of the disciplinary mechanism. 
Panopticism is the abstract mechanism of the disciplinary formation. It 
is the exposition of a heterogeneous convergence through which relations 
of force, compacted into strategies, are actualised in the 
differentiation between articulable and visible series, between 
technologies of observation and procedures of expression. Its 
articulable elements (penal law discourse and its reformisms) condition 
the emergence of new figures (e. g. delinquency), across a plane of 
immanence, traversed by visible elements (e. g prison) that control and 
regulate these figures. The Panoptic mechanism expressed as a function 
of diagrammatic space: 
is not simply a hinge, a point of exchange between a mechanism of 
power and a function; it is a way of making power relations 
functions in a fuj5tion, and of making a function through these 
power relations. 
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The mechanism is fractured or split along the fold or cleft of the power 
relation that binds and seperates visible and articulable functions. 
There is no totality, unity, "conformity or bi-univocal correspondance" 
18 
between the diagram of panoptic spaces, only "a relation of forces which 
acts transversally and finds in the duality of forms the conditions for 
its own action and realisation". 
19 
Panopticism is not only an 
architecture of space that distributes visibilities throughout the prison 
(or schools or hospitals or factories etc) but is equally a distribution 
of articulable functions linking them up through their 'encounter' and is 
coextensive with the whole force-field. The panoptic function tranverses 
all the forms (care, education, punishment) and all those formed and 
fabricated (prisoners, sick, madmen etc) within a specific enclosure. If 
the formula for panopticism considered as a machine or technology of 
visibility is to see without being seen' as an articulable-visible 
diagram or abstact machine of power it is to control and govern 
the'life' and conduct of human multiplicities in space and time. 
3. Bodies and Discipline 
The diagram of the panoptic mechanism articulates discipline as that 
relation of power that automatically extracts, increases, combines, 
composes and reconstitutes the forces at its disposal, "in every relation 
from one point to another". 
20 
Discipline is a flexible and indefinitely 
transferable technology that effects an increase in the relations of utile 
force at its disposal, simultaneously increasing its domination and 
diminishing resistance at minimum cost. Discipline augments force over and 
above the summed parts of its 'object', "it was a question of constituting 
a productive force whose effect had to be superior to the sum of 
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elementary forces that composed it". 
21 
Discipline divides forces in 
space, orders them in time and recomposes them in space-time; it 
transposes them into 'fixed' forms ("discipline is anti-nomadic") and 
organises visible matter and enunciable functions into a continuous 
hierarchical network. The primary object and target of disciplinary 
technology - in terms of an 'anatomo-politics' - is the body: machinic 
processes construct and integrate through their 'mechanisms' a group of 
formed 'substances' (soldier, prisoner, schoolboy, etc, ) whose forces of 
utility are increased at the expense of a strict subjection: "an art of 
the human body was born ... at the formation of a relation that in the 
mechanism itself makes it more obedient as it becomes more useful, and 
conversely". 
22 
Foucault reveals his indebtedness to a Nietzschean 
'materialism' by stressing that it is upon the body's surfaces that the 
forces of power and history are inscribed. Body names that surface or set 
of surfaces traced by lines of multidirectional force destroyed and 
preserved by entstehung creating a "volume in perpetual disintegration. " 
23 
This 'emergence' is always a "particular stage of forces" 
24 
and, as we 
have seen, these events of power are therefore to be analysed according to 
a diagrammatic and genealogical logic of strategy, contest and struggle, 
and not that of contradiction. 
It was Nietzsche who emphasised the enculteration of subjects through 
"blood and cruelty" 
25 
and Deleuze and Guattari who conceptualised the 
body as a set of undifferentiated surfaces teeming with particles and 
affects, marked by patterns of intensity in a relation of immanence to a 
'body without organs', 
26 
continually reinserted, organized and overcoded 
in an oedipal/capital circuit. Similarly, body in Foucault is a pure 
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materiality, a multiplicity of forces and sensations "directly involved 
in a political field; power relations have an immediate hold upon it, 
they invest it, mark it, train it, torture it, force it to carry out 
tasks, to perform ceremonies, to emit signs. " 
27 
Disciplinary punishments 
construct an entire "political technology of the body. " 
28 
Foucault's texts refuse the unitary coherence and intentionality of any 
phenomenological 'lived body' linked to the world through a "network of 
primal significations, which arise from the perception of things... " 
29 
Joining up with a Deleuzo-Guattarian 'schizo-analysis' with their bodies 
without organs, Foucault's cartography of the body shows how its forces, 
desires and materiality are topologised (the striation of the smooth 
space of the body) into a series of multiple surfaces, broken into 
sections and regions, layers and strata, lines and points, breaking open 
bodies, cutting into them and the functionings between them "according 
to the laws of proximity, torsion and variable distance - laws of which 
30 
they remain ignorant. " 
These measurements are carried out according to the degree of capture, 
with all its mixtures that the diagram presents between the discursive 
and non-discursive variables, between the articulable and the visible 
and the force relations that traverse them. The diagram or abstract 
machine of disciplinary power is swallowed up and distributed in a 
mechanism of coeffecience, geared through the ratios of particular 
machines - the school, hospital or prison-machine - governing the degree 
of integration, effectuation and control "for that multiplicity of 
bodies and forces that constitutes a population. " 
31 
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The disciplines with their refinement, development and elaboration of a 
whole family of techniques for the control of individuals virtually 
discover and certainly 'create' the body as an object and target of 
power. Of course, the body has always been caught in a web of power 
relations which impose regulations and constraints upon it, but the 
scale of control of disciplines is unique, treating the body not as an 
undifferentiated unit but breaking it down into smaller zones, analysing 
in detail its movements and gestures, slowness and rapidity, like a 
military drill where complex movements are reduced to their simple 
component acts. Discipline seeks an "infinitesimal power over the 
active body. " 
32 
The object of control is no longer the body as 
'signifier': power no longer concerns itself with signs imposed upon or 
extracted from bodies, but with the efficiency of the bodily movements 
themselves, the precise distribution and composition of forces 
considered in their internal organisation and with respect to the 
functional processes into which they are inserted. This modality of 
control develops a constant, uninterrupted coercion applied during the 
functional activity itself. 
The human body was entering a machliery of power that exposes it 
breaks it down and rearranges it. 
Space 
This political investment of the body, a "political anatomy", 
34 
operates 
within a set of spaces and spacial techniques that mark out the body and 
its forces and the functional social institutions in which it operates 
and is operated upon, Disciplinary power constructs these spaces and 
techniques but is irreducible to them; discipline is: 
A type of power, a modality for its exercise, comprising a whole set 
of instruments, techniques, procedures, levels of application, 35 
targets; it is a 'physics' or an anatomy of power, a technology. 
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The 'physics' of disciplinary power distribute and divide the forces of 
the body through the construction of a set of spaces that still 
function through enclosure but in terms of the developing 'machinery' of 
disciplinary technology this principle is "neither constant, nor 
indispensable, nor sufficient.. " 
36 
Discipline divides space into compact 
segments through partitioning in order to isolate bodies, extract and 
'train' their forces, making them more effecient at least expense. There 
is a whole 'physics' of space through which the forces of the body are 
circulated, that power machines into 'images' and 'discourses' and 
through which bodies are recognised or excluded, positioned and 
displaced. Disciplinary power effects on bodies a decomposition and 
redistribution of their forces so that they "may be subjected, used, 
transformed and improved". 
37 
Disciplinary space is that set of techniques par excellence for 
dismantling body/multiplicities, reassembling them and redirecting 
their forces, effectively dissolving 'communities' of resistance of all 
kinds (the mad, the sad and the bad etc, ). Disciplinary space must 
"avoid distributions in groups; break up collective dispositions; 
analyse confused, massive or transient pluralities". 
38 
Discipline breaks 
down complex multiplicities into smaller simple units; it breaks down 
populations and crowds in hospitals, workshops, schools, placing 'docile 
bodies' and 'fabricated' individuals into units carefully divided into a 
basically cellular space. "Each individual has a place, and each place 
has its individual". 39 Disciplinary space is cellular, isolatable, 
hierarchical, emplaced and relatively immobile, moving only from point 
to point in closed intervals and assigned breaks. 
180 
In discipline the elementary units of space are relational "since each 
is defined by the space it occupies in a series, and by the gap that 
separates it from the others". 
40 
The units of space do not so much 
arrange, distribute and relate territory or precise location as rank: 
the place one occupies in a classification, the point at which a 
line and a column intersect, the interval in a series of intervals 
that one may traverse one after the other. Discipline is an art of 
rank, a technique for the transformation of arrangements. It 
individualises bodies by a location that does not give them a fixed 
position, býi distributes them and circulates them in a network of 
relations. 
The 'serialisation' of disciplinary space through the relations of 
'cell', 'place' and 'rank' marks it as "real without being actual, ideal 
without being abstract"; these mixed spaces are "real because they 
govern the disposition of buildings, rooms, furniture, but also ideal, 
because they are projected over this arrangement of characterizations, 
assessments, hierarchies. " 
42 
The great space of the table, as "both a 
technique of power and a procedure of knowledge" 
43, 
aligns these spacial 
relations across the disciplinary register in order to treat 
"multiplicity itself, distributing it and deriving as many effects as 
possible. " Disciplinary power distributes relations of space in the form 
of the table to achieve "ordered multiplicities". 
44 
Disciplinary power controls and increases the forces of body- 
multiplicities through a precise spatial tabulation of their energies, 
movements and relations; it codes its institutional spaces as 
multifunctional control sites that fix, monitor and regulate the flows 
that pass through it. For example, Foucault's analysis of the naval 
hospital shows its development as a "filter" mechanism that "pins down 
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and partitions" 
45 
and controls the circulation not just of contagions and 
diseases but, through an adaptation, extension and overlaying of its 
control mechanisms, also the circulation of goods and commodities, 
effecting control over "remedies, rations, disappearances, cures, 
deaths, simulations. " 
46 
In the factories and workshops of the eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries these functional sites and multiple control 
circuits driven by the need to continually increase productive force 
through its tabulation of flow ( the flow of bodies, movements, 
processes, relations) in space would be indispensable for articulating 
the distribution of individuals in space onto the machinery of 
production. The tabulation of flows in space is doubled and complimented 
by the tabulation of flows in time. 
The disciplines, which analyse space, break up and rearrange 
activities, must alp be understood as a machinery for adding up and 
capitalising time. 
Time. 
It was the function of the time-table to ensure that activities and 
actions of the body are broken down into simple, measured, components so 
that their multiplicity of forces can be ordered and arranged in 
duration and their movement and gesture can be subdivided, decomposed 
and programmed through regulated repetition, imposed routine and "a 
collective and obligatory rhythmn". 
48 
Discipline fashions the time-table 
into a positive and productive instrument: "it is a question of 
extracting, from time, ever more available moments and, from each 
moment, ever more useful forces.,, 
49 
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Discipline 'machines' time, intensifies it to its ideal limit, 
accelerates the functional processes into which it is inserted and 
designates maximum speed as a virtue in the order of morality. 
Disciplinary time functions as an accumulating resource, is turned into 
'credit-time', by organizing duration into clearly delineated parallel 
or successive segments, by seperating and adjusting the activity-threads 
of each segment according to a continuum of increasing complexity and by 
finalising each segment by a clearly defined sequence of temporality 
that must terminate at precise points in the sequential series. The 
'serialisation' of activity through time laid out in tight, hierarchical 
nets according to rank, level of attainment, seniority. 
And at the heart of this machinery for the capitalisation and seriation 
of time one finds the exercise. Exercise is a means of training and 
organising the production of useful subjects through a "linear, 
continuously progressive organisation". 
50 
It is "that technique by which 
one imposes on the body tasks that are both repetitive and different but 
always graduated. " 
51 
Through exercise power positively constitutes and 
saturates duration offering the possibility of detailed control and 
regular intervention at every moment. "It thus assures, in the form of 
continuity and constraint, a growth, an observation, a qualification". 
52 
In the disciplinary time of exercise the individual progresses not to any 
apex but to a "subjection that has never reached its limit.,, 
53 
Space-time 
The disciplines are a technology for the construction of a machine that 
positively produces surplus force from body-multiplicities through a 
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strict striation of space and time, a machine "whose effect will be 
maximised by the concerted articulation of the elementary parts of which 
it is composed", 
54 
a machine "whose principle would no longer be the 
mobile or immobile mass, but a geometry of divisible segments. " 
55 
increasing its power through the composition and reinvestment of surplus 
force in space-time. Thus the disciplines install the body as an active, 
yet automatic and signalized (not signified) component in a mega-machine 
of power, or, as Foucault says, "as part of a multi-segmentary machine. " 
56 
Thus the disciplines install space and time and combine them as the 
indispensable transmission device of the machine itself: the 
multiplication of controllable and useful forces through their 
recomposition in space-time - the apex of disciplinary power as an 
arrangement of 'tactics'. 
Tactics, the art of constructing, with located bodies, coded 
activities and trained aptitudes, mechanisms in which the product of 
the various forces is increased by their calculated g9mbination are 
no doubt the highest form of disciplinary practice. 
Discipline constructs a calculating machine of power that seeks pure 
exponential increase to the nth degree, a will to power that organizes 
the tactical extraction of force in space-time. Foucault's cartography of 
discipline is "a profound Nietzscheanism" 
58 
and, as a diagrammatics of 
pure reason (and not a Kantian critique), is also a twisted and 
provocative 'Kantianism' since Foucault completely rewrites, through a 
radical 'Transcendental empiricism', the whole of the 'Transcendental 
Aesthetic': space and time as the machined parts of the body, a 
diagrammatics of power schematized and then actualised through its 
composition in space-time. 
184 
Functions-relations 
The techniques and functions of disciplinary power, then, insert bodies 
into discursive and non-discursive formations and are assigned roles, 
statuses and positions which carry out objectives governed by the rules 
of the formation and the composition of the statements in question. 
This articulation and combination of forces is 'canalised' or 
channelled through the particular primary function - production, care, 
education etc. through molar integrators (state, family, etc) occupied 
by variable "Personages": doctor, teacher, guard etc. which act as 
supports for techniques like surveillance and hierarchical disposition 
deployed within the stategic nets of power. The integrators with their 
Personages are interchangable on each occasion and are merely conduits 
for a set of functions that ensure the almost imperceptible 'delivery' 
of force relations through each function so that "prisons resemble 
factories, schools, barracks, hospitals, which all resemble prisons. " 
59 
Although individual techniques of discipline had of course existed 
earlier in the armies and monasteries their function remained negative 
but when integrated into their central social function they became their 
condition of existence: "as a unity that derives from this very unity 
an increase in its forces. " 
60 
In the history of disciplines Taylorism 
merely refined a set of already known techniques and extended them to 
new processes. 
The historical moment of the disciplines was a moment when an art of 
the human body was born, which was directed not only at the growth 
of its skills, nor at the intensification of its subjection, but at 
the formation of a relation that in the mechanism itself makes it 
more obedient as it becomes more useful, .... it gjoduces an 
increased aptitude and an increased domination. 
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The techniques of discipline impose the relation: "utility-docility. " 
Foucault's diagrammatic cartography exposes the body and its materiality 
as that relay or junction point within the carceral machine where the 
primary decomposition and division of active forces from themselves 
takes place; body names the topological site of the becoming-reactive of 
force traced through the incorporeal relation: utility-docility. 
62 
At this level, and in terms of the relationship between judicial 
punishment and the body of the condemned, Foucault is able to describe 
the transformation in penal style through the mechanism which 
transcribes the sentence onto the body. In this case, the mechanism 
that operates on and through the bodies surfaces the 'machine-prison' 
penalty-machine, is a combination of elements or segments derived from 
the visible and articulable which remains heteromorphous. "The carceral 
system combines in a single figure discourses and architectures. " 
63 
By 
tracing the transformation of this mechanism on the body Foucault makes 
visible a new technology of power whose mode of punishment passes from 
"an art of insupportable sensation to an economy of suspended rights. " 
64 
The body is no longer the 'object' of the new dispensation, but it 
remains an instrument, caught up in intermediary movements: 
"punishment, if I may so put it, should strike the soul rather than the 
body.,, 65 The soul is an invisible element, region or point produced 
"around, on, within the body. " The law is not internalised but 
incorporated on the soul-surface of the body. The 'interiority' of the 
soul is constructed and produced on the surfaces of the body enabling 
the illusion of an ineffable depth. As a surface signification that 
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contests and displaces inside/outside, the soul is a figure of projected 
'interior' psychic space inscribed on the body as a signification that 
perpetually conceals itself. The soul is a 'phantasm' constructed by 
force relations transversally cutting across the surfaces of body, it is 
a real investment by-passing any imaginary or symbolic. "It would be 
wrong, " Foucault writes, "to say that the soul is an illusion, or an 
ideological effect. On the contrary, it exists, it has a reality ... 11 
66 
In Foucault's text the soul is not imprisoned by or within the body but 
undergoes an inversion: "the soul is the prison of the body. " 
67 
The 
genealogy of this body-soul would be a primary element in the history of 
micro-physics and would be correlative of a certain "technology of power 
over the body. " 
What distinguishes this technology and links it up with the contiguous 
and topological space-time of the diagram of disciplinary power is that 
the 'soul' which the prison/law/knowledge system first constructs, and 
then operates upon, is the same as that which is educated, drilled, 
corrected and controlled in the schools, barracks, asylums and 
factories: 
"this real, non-corporeal soul is not a substance; it is the element 
in which are articulated the effects of a certaýq type of power and 
the reference of a certain type of knowledge. " 
These typologies constitute a technology of discipline which operates 
like a generalised abstract function and cannot be identified with any 
one institution or apparatus. Foucault's diagrammaticism shows that this 
technology of power traverses every institution or apparatus, positively 
producing and reconfiguring their spaces, linking them up, "prolonging 
them, and making them converge and function in a new way. " 
69 
Even 
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seemingly obvious segments of the state such as the prison or police are 
so conditioned: 
Although the police as an institution were certainly organised in 
the form of a state-apparatus, and although this was certainly 
linked directly to the centre of political sovereignty, the type of 
power it exercises, the mechanisms iý0operates and the elements to 
which it applies them are specific. 
The diagram of disciplinary technology is coextensive with the entire 
social body not just according to the limits it embraces but to the 
extent in which it penetrates right down to every minute detail thereby 
revealing its relative independence from juridical and political 
apparati. Diagrammatic thought reconfigures the body/soul complex 
within the workshop, prison, factory, etc, as the realisation of 
mechanisms of power that are already presupposed by these forms. 
Foucault's analysis of bodies and discipline diagrams a technology of 
power that is simultaneously an economy, an economy of power that is 
characterised by the mixed and distended space of the norm 
With this new economy of power, the carceral system, which is its 
basic instrument, permitted the emergence of a new form of 'law': a 
mixturilof legality and nature, prescription and constitution, the 
norm. 
4. Normalisation and individualization. 
Through the disciplines appears the power of the norm. Is this the 
new law of society? Let us rather say that it is added to to other 
powers constraining them to new delimitatio95: the powers of law, 
of the word, of text, those of traditions. 
Disciplinary mechanisms redefine and expand the boundaries of the space 
of the 'political', constraining them to new delimitations, in a way 
that undermines "a certain image of power-law, of power-sovereignity, 
which was traced out by the theoreticians of right and the monarchic 
institution. " 
73 
Disciplinary mechanisms develop forms of control which do 
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not operate through threat, deduction, prohibition, levying or death. 
In fact "our historical gradient carries us further and further away 
from a reign of law. "74 Foucault explains, "I do not mean to say that the 
law fades into the background or that the institutions of justice tend to 
disappear, but rather that the law operates more and more as a norm, and 
that the judicial institution is increasingly incorporated into a 
continuum of apparatuses (medical, administrative, and so on) whose 
functions are for the most part regulatory. " 
75 
Disciplinary power/ 
knowledge "has to qualify, measure, appraise, and hierarchise. ° 
76 
It 
"does not have to draw the line that separates the enemies of the 
sovereign from his obedient subjects; it effects distributions around the 
77 
norm. " 
The norm functions - through a whole series of feedback processes - as a 
generalised and abstract control of space-time that enables the 
recognition and correction of tendencies and dispositions that may 
affect the willingness or capability of 'individuals' to adhere to that 
norm. 
"The perpetual penality that traverses all points and supervises 
every instant in the disciplinary institution, compares, 
differentiatea$ hierarchizes, homogenizes, excludes. In short, it 
normalizes. " 
The old 'inquisitional' system of investigation based on the reparation 
of power gives way to an 'examinatorial' system of infra and micro- 
penalties designed not only to prevent the occurrence of an infraction 
from happening in the first place but to produce a "penality of the 
norm" 
79 
whose power resides in the homogenization and precise 
classification of space and time: "by making it possible to measure 
gaps, to determine levels, to fix specialities and to render the 
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differences useful by fitting them one to the other. " 
80 Through the 
great Classical lists and tables, with their systems of notating and 
registering individuals at 'all points' and in 'every instant' the 
disciplines derive normative scales which had a decisive importance in 
"the "epistemological 'thaw'' of the sciences of the individual". 
81 
Normalization is that mechanism of adjustment which makes possible the 
transformation from discipline as 'blockade' to discipline as machine or 
mechanism and which in turn facilitates, as a result of this 
transformation, its generalisation and abstraction through the sciences 
and knowledges of the individual. 
82 
Disciplinary society, in this sense, 
is not a society of confinement or exclusion but a machine of uniform or 
homogenous space-time which links up all of its component parts 
producing, in an indefinite translation, a whole whose forces are more 
than the sum of its parts. This 'surplus value' is then reinvested or 
reintegrated since the norm integrates anything that might be external 
to it. 
If disciplines normalise rather than prohibit or permit, and observe, 
surveil and control the anonymous and abnormal, rather than glorify the 
privileged, it is because they transport a new form and objective of 
power which increasingly subordinates older ones. Thus Foucault 
distinguishes the manufacture and fabrication of individuals from the 
insertion of subjects into language, ideology, culture or tradition and 
subordinates the latter to the former. 
From a law of exclusion through confinement to a norm of indefinitely 
expanding inclusion through continuous surveillance, the space or axis 
of 'individualisation' is transformed. Foucault's diagram of sovereignity 
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maps an 'ascending individualisation' 
83. 
the more one held power or 
prestige the more likely one was to be historically recorded through 
rituals, discourses, commemorations, paintings etc. The disciplines 
reverse this. They introduce a 'descending individualisation': the more 
anonymous and functional the level of power, the greater the likelihood of 
individualisation of those to whom it is applied. An 'historical-ritual' 
form of domination is subordinated to a 'disciplinary-scientific' one. 
The commemoration of proper name and glorification of heroic exploits and 
familial or aristocratic genealogy were subordinated to surveillance and 
observation (not ceremony), measure and calculation (not privilege and 
status). The objective is no longer to punish those who violate laws, but 
to insert individuals into hierarchical groups according to a normative 
scale. A juridical objective domination was no longer valid, but 
subordinated to a normative one; the knowledge of jurists, chroniclers and 
painters was subordinated to the rise of a new form of knowledge and 
associated techniques of intervention: the sciences, analyses, and 
practices we call 'psychological: ' 
All the sciences, analyses or practices employing the root 'psycho' - 
have their origin 1i this historical reversal of the procedures of 
individualization. 
The strategies deployed through normalisation always develop according 
to the logic of descending individualisation, a strategy of power that 
constructs individuals in space-time. Foucault continually returns to 
this point: discipline 'manufactures' individuals; it is a specific 
technique of a power which takes individuals at one and the same time as 
objects and as the instruments by means of which it is exercised. The norm 
links up individualities as object and instrument, becomes that space of 
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reference through which disciplines construct individuals and operate 
through them. 
The individual is not to be conceived as a sort of elementary 
nucleus, a primitive atom, a multiple and inert material on which 
powers comes to fasten or against which it strikes ... in fact, it 
is already one of the prime effects of power that certain bodies, 
certain gestures, certain discourses, certain desires come to be 
identified and constituted as individuals. The individual, that is, 
is not thg5vis-a-vis of power; it is, I believe, one of its prime 
effects. 
If the individual is an effect, this effect is a measure of the extent 
to which normalisation is a function of the spatio-temporal logic of 
power that traverses the articulable and the visible. Each individual 
becomes a 'case', a 'status', a 'role' and a 'type', "a differentiation 
that is not one of acts, but of individuals themselves, of their nature, 
their potentialities, their level of value. " 
86 
Each carrying around a 
little dossier of judgements, an identity established "in-truth" and 
fixed in a network of writing. The statements contained in these files 
and dossiers, which form part of any 'examination' and constitute an 
'archive' of "normalising judgement", are established through techniques 
of comparison and forms of categorization in a space of differentiation 
in which a quantification and hierarchization of 'nature', level and 
ability can be assessed in relation to an 'average', 'standard', 
'optimum' and increasingly 'normal' value. Normalising judgements are 
relayed through, and combined with a system of visibility, an apparatus 
of observation, "in which the techniques that make it possible to see 
induce effects of power, and in which, conversely, the means of coercion 
make those on whom they are applied clearly visible". 
87 
The examination is 
composed of a system of light and a system of language, procedures of 
expression and technologies of observation: it combines "the technique 
of an observing hierarchy and those of a normalising 
88 
gY judgement, " 
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brought together in a 'single mechanism. ' This single mechanism or 
'examining machine' is at the "centre of the procedures that constitute 
the individual as effect and object of power, as effect and object of 
knowledge". 89 
Foucault brings together the space-time machinery of docile bodies and 
the articulable-visible examining machines of individuals as the 
'schema' of the actualisation or realisation of power/knowledge: 
It is the examination which, by combining hierarchical surveillance 
and normalizing judgement, assures the great disciplinary functions 
of distribution and classification, maximum extraction of forces and 
time, continuous genetic accumulation, optimum combination of 
attitudes and, thereby, the fabrication98f cellular, organic, 
genetic and combinatory individuality. 
Normalisation is articulated upon or presupposes a precise and extensive 
knowledge of the individuals upon which it is resourced, it is a power 
which knows the individuals upon which it is exercised, in order to make 
them calculable and programmable, to make them known. This knowledge is 
derived from articulable procedures and techniques of the visible 
deployed through a controlled space-time. If, in this, the normalising, 
synthesizing and combinatory power of the examination bears similarities 
to the function that Kant attributes to the concept of the Schema it is 
because "it does not answer the question, how are phenomena made subject 
to the understanding, but the question, how does the understanding apply 
itself to the phenomena which are subject to it. " 
91 
Foucault rethinks 
Kantian schematism as the problematic relation between what can be 
judged (the articulable) and what can be observed (the visible) through 
the space-time diagrammaticism of normalising power. 
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In Discipline and Punish, as in all of Foucault's previous books, the 
Kantian topography of reason is radically disturbed and displaced. If in 
the space of archaeological thought the 'historical apriori' was "not a 
condition of validity for judgements, but a condition of reality for 
statements", 
92 in diagrammatic thought the conditions for the reality of 
statements are given by power and statements are always already 
functions of the articulable before they are judgements. In effect, The 
Archaeology of Knowledge had discovered a new type of 'judgement' 
function that Transcendental philosophy could not recognize and 
certainly not account for and Discipline and Punish gives this judgement 
a certain genealogical 'deduction'. (Obviously not in the sense of 
'legal entitlement' but in terms of powers productivity). Foucault 
displaces the fact/right axis upon which judgements can be given and 
legitimated onto a power/norm axis upon which statements exist. 
Judgement is a mechanism for normalizing and controlling bodies in space 
and time. In The History of Sexuality Foucault will demonstrate the 
techniques through which the body is trained to judge itself. it is no 
longer a question of removing any 'metaphysical impediments' to freedom 
in an act of self-legislation since the heteronomy of the body has 
nothing to do with laws of nature or causation so much as the 
microphysical and political impediments of a power that conditions and 
prepares the body for its own use without recourse to law. 
Normalising power does not operate like law excluding, prohibiting, 
objectifying, coercing and punishing but seeks to enhance the life of 
bodies, individuals and populations intensifying the penetration of the 
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entire social body through the production of anomalies which it then 
attempts to reassimilate. Docile bodies and normalized individuals are 
created by a power whose forces and aptitudes are continually expanding 
exponentially, justified by a more economical and efficient power with 
no other goal than the ever greater welfare of all. The practices and 
technologies associated with this process Foucault will go on to call 
biopower. It is a power: 
working to incite, reinforce, control, monitor, optimise, and 
organise the forces under it: a power bent on generating forces, 
making them grow, and ordering them, rather than one ded1gated to 
impending them, making them submit, or destroying them. 
S. The juridical. Law and illegalisms. 
The norm is not in 'opposition' to law, although bio-power develops within 
the space of the norm "at the expense of the juridical system of law", 
94 
and law is not in decline as a result of the development of bio-power 
since normalisation tends to be accompanied by a massive proliferation of 
legislation. The norm in fact is opposed to what Foucault calls the 
'juridical': the institution of law as the expression of a sovereigns 
power. (Philosophically: the 'architectonic' of critical reason expressed 
through the Kantian court as the medium for legitimating and justifying 
claims to knowledge). 
Disciplinary power is opposed.. term by term, to a judicial penalty 
whose essential function is to refer, not to a set of observable 
phenomena, but to a corpus of laws and texts that must be 
remembered; that operates not by differentiating individuals, 9ýut 
by 
specifying acts according to a number of general categories. 
If, as Foucault puts it "the law cannot help but be armed, " 
96 
and, if its 
weapon par excellence is death, this equation of law and death does not 
derive from the essential character of law. Law, in fact, is traduced 
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and made to function by the formulation of norms, thus becoming part of 
a different sort of power that "has to qualify, measure, appraise, and 
hierarchise rather than display itself in its murderous splendour. " 
97 
In the age of bio-power, then, the juridical, which characterised 
monarchical law, can readily be opposed to the normative, which comes to 
the foremost typically in constitutions, legal codes, and "the constant 
and clamourous activity of the legislature. " 
98 
Thus we must distinguish 
law and its formal expression from the juridical. The juridical 
functions as that code that enabled monarchical power (and critical 
reason) to constitute itself. The code may also have been constituted 
in other ways. Neither the "regression of the juridical", 
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which 
accompanies the rise of bio-power nor the fact that the most typical 
mechanisms of juridical power can no longer be represented in legal 
form, necessarily signals the disappearance of the law. 
Law, in fact, functions in Foucault's diagrammaticism as a system of 
differentials which formalise articulable and visible regimes. The 
relations between these forms is organised by the 'juridical' in the 
case of 'sovereign' society and by 'norm, ' 'normality' and 
'normalisation'in the case of disciplinary society and Foucault's text 
gives us fragments toward a genealogy of law. Law founded on the 
'juridical mode' Foucault shows to be tethered to a concept of power 
shaped by theories of repression. Law appears as an external reaction 
to desire whereas repression appears as a condition internal to desire. 
100 
The formal differentiation of law in sovereign societies operated 
through binary mechanisms that permitted or forbade certain expressions 
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or contents. In the societies of discipline lines of enunciation and 
lines of visibility tend to be administered, appraised, hierachized and 
adjusted through the integral space of norms, producing them through a 
seamless, contiguous mechanism. Here law becomes the integration and 
introjection of 'illegalisms', a collection of integrations which are 
initially local but then tend to become global, aligning and 
homogenisisng the relations between forces. 
The disciplinary model of power also demonstrates the extent to which 
penal justice manages illegalities producing positive effects to the 
benefit of a certain class and doesn't eliminate illegalities but 
administers them 'differentially. ' Thus penal reform of the 18th 
century creates a new system for the distribution of illegalisms not 
just because offences focused increasingly on property rather than 
people but because disciplinary mechanisms categorised and formalised 
infractions in a new way, creating new forms like 'delinquency' which in 
turn set up new classifications and a different control of illegalisms: 
illegalism is not an accident, or a more or less inevitable 
imperfection ... At a pinch, I'd say that a law is not made in order 
to forbid any behaviour, but in order to distingh between the 
different ways of getting round the law itself. 
Penal law doesn't refer to prison but to its own differential 
articulations. It is a system of statements that classifies, translates 
and calculates. It is a machine that relentlessly produces statements 
and sentences. Prison, on the other hand, comes from somewhere else, 
has an entirely different 'becoming', since its form is irreducible to 
penal law. "Prison, that concentrated and austere figure of all the 
disciplines, is not an endogenous element in the penal system as defined 
at the turn of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. " 
102 Prison is 
197 
that system of optics whose structuring invisible principle is defined by 
panopticism: a machine that makes the visible. The optical machine, or 
as Foucault calls it an 'observation machine', makes lines of light 
which form variable shapes inseparable from the apparatus in question. 
It structures light, disperses it, distributing the visible and the 
invisible, makes possible a seeing without beeing seen. 
Its principle ... is in a certain concerted 
distribution of bodies, 
surfaces, lights, gazes; in an arrangement whose internally chanisms 
produce the relation in which individuals are caught up. 
Equally, prison (Benthams panopticon) is also a site for la voix 
acousmatique, a system of 'conversation' tubes through which law is 
expressed as "commands.. that are barked from on high and from below" 
104 
to prisoners who can hear but cannot see the source of the voice, to 
prisoners who may be spoken to individually without others knowing who 
is being addressed so that no one is certain that they are not under 
surveillance. 
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Two formations: A system of language, sentences, 
commands and order-words and a system of light, gazes and observations 
that do not refer to each other but come into contact. Penal law still 
fills the prisons and prison continues to produce 'delinquents. ' But this 
is so only when we consider the integration or actualisation of power- 
relations within the variable layers of strata. The strategic element 
finds "a whole extra-legal functioning of power... " that was "partly 
assured by the mass of reserve labour constituted by the delinquents. " 
106 
The gap or fissure that opens up between the stratified forms of law and 
prison is filled by a "strategic reinvestment" which articulates their 
difference. 
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The figure of law, then, is above all the form under which sovereign 
power since the Middle Ages has presented itself. Its continued 
domination is evidenced by the extent to which power is still conceived 
as negation, prohibition, and repression. Such power limits freedom by 
imposing a will, issuing commands and exacting obedience with threats. 
As a 'political' architecture it is preoccupied with questions of 
sovereignity and justifiable coercion setting up its answers in terms of 
rights, obligations, procedures and juridical persons. The diagram of 
sovereignity still plays this role in liberal, state or Marxist 
political theory where the ruling class plays the same uniforming 
function as princes, sovereigns, legislators, etc played in classical 
political theory. 
Despite the differences in epochs and objectives the representation 
of power has remained under the spell of monarchy. In political 
thought and analysis we still have not cut off the head of the king. 
Hence the importance that the theory of power gives to the problem 
of right and violence, law and illegalitY67 freedom and will, and 
especially the state and sovereignity. 
The price of a continuing juridical representation of power is the gap 
or discrepancy that opens up between the 'political' and the extension 
of control through new functions and new forms delivered through new 
mechanisms, instruments and relations of power that remain occluded or 
invisible to the political. "We have been engaged for centuries in a 
type of society in which the juridical is increasingly incapable of 
coding power, of serving as its system of representation. " 
108 
Foucault's 
diagram of disciplinary power provides the means of problematizing this 
juridico-discursive conception; in so far as disciplinary techniques 
fabricate useful individuals, turning bodies into labour-power, soldier- 
power or delinquents, "power produces; it produces reality; it produces 
domains of objects and rituals of truth. " 
109 Foucault does not ignore 
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repression or ideology but they are seen as the dust thrown up by a more 
fundamental struggle between forces. The expression of a power 
relation, the relation between forces Foucault describes as "an action 
upon an action. " 
110 
The power-relation "incites, provokes, combines. "lll 
In disciplinary societies these functions "allocate, classify, compose and 
normalise. " 
112 
Modern politics is a dispersed and indefinite struggle of 
forces that the juridical model congeals and totalises. Diagrammatic 
thought would "cut off the kings head"; it would attempt "apart from any 
totalisation - which would be at once abstract and limiting - to open up 
problems that are as concrete and general as possible, problems that 
approach politics from behind and cut across societies on the diagonal". 
113 
6. The state and its apparatuses. 
Foucault does not diminish the importance of the state but demonstrates 
how the state depends on discipline for its effective domination. "One 
impoverishes the question of power when one poses it uniquely in terms 
of legislation or of the constitution, or only in terms of the state or 
state apparatus. Power is much more complicated, more dense and 
diffused than a set of laws or an apparatus of the state. " 
114 
Disciplinary power is diffused not just through 'legitimate' forms but 
through local forms at the extremities of its existence where power has a 
"capillary form of existence, " 
115 
where it "reaches into the very grain 
of individuals, " 
116 
whose analysis in ascent would aim to discover the 
'colonisation' of these local forms, their transformation and 
utilisation in the central apparati and more global forms of domination. 
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The Marxist pyramid is displaced by points or nodes of power immanent to 
disciplinary techniques which form great segments of strata linked to 
one another traversed by human multiplicities. Refusing the principle 
of subordination through which power relations are reduced to the status 
of effects of some more global principle, such as the mode of 
production, power relations in the form of disciplinarity provided the 
conditions of existence for modes of production. 
"At the emergence of large-scale industry, one finds beneath the 
division of the production process the individualising fragmentation 
of labour powerilýhe distribution of the disciplinary space often 
assured both. " 
Disciplinarity is that kind of 'production' that conditions and is 
conditioned by military, pedagogic and other spaces of production. The 
two processes - the accumulation of capital and the development of the 
techniques for the control of increasingly larger and more numerous 
human multiplicites - cannot be separated. 
To the extent that disciplinarity is a precondition for capitalist 
production and to the extent that disciplinary mechanisms are bound up 
with techniques across the production apparatus, Foucault points out the 
economistic illusion in thinking that capital defines the specificity of 
the forms of material production and reproduction. Moreover, Foucault's 
analysis refuses to see the forms or the exercise of power as 
instruments of a class. If the transformation in the exercise of power 
also coincides with the establishment of a "new class power" this is 
only a distant "guarantee of intelligibility" of those transformations 
themselves. 
118 
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Foucault stresses that power could not be a 'property' won by a class. 
In History of Sexuality (Vol 1) Foucault begins to draw out the 
strategic and absract conception of diagrammatic power that multiplies, 
folds and conditions the technico-economic, mechanistic conception of 
power in Discipline and Punish. In The History of Sexuality power is a 
strategy whose effects cannot be attributed to an appropriation "but to 
dispositions, manoeuvers, tactics, techniques, functionings. " 
119 
Class 
or class struggle is not denied but embedded in a broader, more global and 
simultaneously micro topology where power is "exercised rather than 
possessed; it is not the 'privilege' acquired or preserved, of the 
dominant class, but the overall effect of its strategic positions. " 
120 
Without their inscription and codification through relations of strategy 
power relations remain unknown: "Power in the substantive sense, le 
pouvoir, doesn't exist ... power means relations or more-or-less 
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organised, hierarchical coordinated cluster of relations. " 
The state or state-control is one institution along with family, 
religion, Production even art which are not the sources of power but 
already presuppose strategic power-relations. If the state has captured 
so many power relations and arrogated to itself so many diverse 
functions this is because it has assumed the status of 'global 
integrator' enabling state-control of so many domains (economic, 
juridical, familial, sexual etc). The molecular or micro relations of 
power are organised by a molar function in each of these domains 
constituting forms of knowledge divided and multiplied across the 
articulable and the visible. 
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The molar/molecular 'structure' of power facilitates the emergence not 
of increased state power but, as we will see, of the "governmental- 
isation' of the state. " 
122 
Disciplinary techniques and mechanisms 
saturate and infiltrate the old machinery of state which was incapable of 
effectively ordering and distributing new multiplicities. The old 
systems of deducing and levying, of bestowing life and death (tied to 
the space of exclusion and death inhabited by the leper) were 
insufficiently equipped to deal with the developing disciplinary diagram 
(tied to the model of the plague and administering life). 
The establishment of the mechanisms of discipline as means of state- 
control is for Foucault the outcome of a process that gathered momentum 
in the societies of the Seventeen and Eighteenth Centuries. Their 
original function was to "neutralise dangers, to fix useless or disturbed 
populations to avoid the inconveniences of over-large assemblies; now they 
were being asked to play a positive role, for they were becoming able to 
do so, to increase the possible utility of individuals. " 
123 
The negative functions of discipline give way to a positive mechanism 
which tends toward 'deinstitutionalisation', stepping outside enclosures 
and confined spaces. The mechanisms circulate in a 'free' state 
offering opportunities for 'investment' and 'exchange, ' transferral and 
adaption: "massive and compact disciplines are broken down into flexible 
methods of control which may be transferred and adapted. " 
124 
Disciplinary 
power, no longer tied to sovereign institutions which were "closed, 
established within boundaries", became a generalised mechanism at the 
service of all production: The great "swarming of disciplinary 
mechanisms.,, 
125 
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Discipline and Punish maps the spread and generalisation of these 
mechanisms of molar and molecular control and the abstract or strategic 
machine that gives them their direction is properly located and 
elaborated in The History of Sexuality (Vol 1). Here Foucault 
demonstrates that this new topology of power evolved through two pure 
functions linked together through a whole cluster of relations in order 
to produce, saturate, infiltrate and invest 'life. ' An 'anatomo- 
politics' organised through the mechanisms of panopticism, disciplinary 
space-time and the techniques of normalization facilitates the 
development of the body/individual as a machine ensuring "the 
optimisation of its capabilities, the extortion of its forces, the 
parallel increase of its usefulness and its docility, its integration 
into systems of efficient and economic controls"; 
126 
and a 
'bio-politics' ordered through the regulations of a population, its 
biological processes: propagation, birth, mortality, health and longevity 
with all of their variable conditions. The co-ordination, 
super-imposition and articulation of these two functions and their 
actualisation through a network of interacting strategies together refocus 
the topology, dynamics and intelligibility of Foucault's diagrammaticism. 
7. Diagrammaticism 
Diagrammaticisms rule of immanence: each diagram articulates a bundle of 
potential force relations which function as a plane of immanence: 
"between techniques of knowledge and strategies of power, there is no 
exteriority". 
127 
No knowledge without power, no power without knowledge. 
Power-knowledge relations: immanence without exterior in reciprocal 
presupposition . Yet no identity or isomorphism since they are 
"articulated with each other on the basis of their difference. " 
128 
Power- 
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exclusion. In their coming together they fall away from each other since 
the point, fold or cut that joins them up also inscribes their 
difference, prevents them from collapsing into each other. Non- 
identical, non-oppositional- a non-relation. 
Diagrammaticisms rule of continual variations: power-knowledge relations 
exhibit "a pattern of modifications" 
129 in continuous variation as force 
relations are continually churned up through realignments, 
reinforcements and reversals. "The 'distributions of power' and the 
'appropriations of knowledge' never represent only instantaneous slices 
taken from processes involving, for example, a cumalative reinforcement 
of the strongest factor, or a reversal of relationship, or again, a 
simultaneous increase of two terms. " 
130 
Thus diagrams of power-knowledge 
are several maps superimposed onto each other, folded, stitched and sewn 
together. Diagrams "are not static forms of distribution, they are 
'matrices of transformation''. 
131 History is continually unmade and 
remade as diagrams are drawn from the pool of virtual/potential force, 
realised in stategies and transformed in the real. 
Foucault's texts offer a cartography of this process as a series of 
'open' and connective maps to the Outside, a series of double 
reciprocal and reversible movements, of the articulable and the visible, 
of forces and forms of positivity broken up by various lines and 
trajectories traced out over strategic segments which are integrated and 
differentiated into diagrams of power/knowledge: "power as exercise, 
knowledge as regulation. " 
132 
Foucault's 'pragmatism' is also a profound 
pluralism at the heart of which operates a distribution of 
multiplicities in continuous variation, multiplicities of the seen and 
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the said and the "manifold relationships of force,, 
133 
that activate them. 
These relations of multiplicity raise the possibility of an infinity of 
diagrams, of all kinds of intermediary diagrams such as the Napoleonic 
diagram that Foucault writes of "at the point of junction of the 
monarchical, ritual exercise of sovereignity and the hierarchical 
permanent exercise of indefinite discipline. " 
134 
As we will see, Foucault 
thinks modern power as a specific 'triangulation' and 'tesselation' of 
diagrams and it is precisely their functioning together that breaks 
forces of resistance, isolating them, dividing them in space, ordering 
them in time and composing them in space-time - an individualizing and 
totalizing power administering and controlling the life of populations. 
Diagrams can thus connect up, overlap, or wrap around each other and the 
topology (of power and resistance) will be different on each occasion. 
This connection and reconnection of points or superimposition of maps 
means that all diagrams include points with continuously variable 
'degrees of freedom, ' determined by the number of dimensions with their 
"points, knots, and focuses" 
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that remain relatively unbound: diagrams 
contain "a multiplicity of points of resistance. " 
136 The diagrams subsist 
in the very 'warp and woof' of concrete institutions actualising the 
relations between forces, rendering their own virtual potential into a 
power relation that passes through every point differentiating 
statements from visibilities, discourses and architectures, penal law 
and prison etc. These systems are continually opened by "mobile and 
transitory points of resistance", 
137 
producing fractures and cleavages 
which break up unities and effect regroupings but which also move across 
individuals themselves "cutting them up and remolding them, marking off 
irreducible regions in them ... " 
138 
These bifurcations and fractures, of 
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power and resistance, these continual variations create the 
"heterogeneous ensemble" that constitutes a diagram. 
Diagrammaticisms rule of double conditioning: power-knowledge relations 
are not actualised or realised unless they pursue their tendency to 
progressively integrate from "local centers" of tactics to global, 
massive and heteromorphous strategies that react or fold back on these 
tactics as anchor and support. These are not different or discontinuous 
levels (micro/macro), nor are they homogenous forms acting through 
scalar difference (projected enlargement or miniaturization) but a 
complex, multiply folded space (and time) that iterates its own 
conditions each time through slightly modified coordinates. Thus "one 
must conceive of the double conditioning of a strategy by the 
specificity of possible tactics, and of tactics by the strategic 
envelope that makes them work. " 
139 
Strategic forces pass as much through 
the dominated as the dominant invading the stable forms of the visible 
and articulable that make up the archive. 
one needs to be nominalistic: power is not an institution, a 
structure, or a certain strength with which people are endowed; it is 
the name that one atl, Fýbutes to a complex strategical situation in a 
particular society. 
It is the anonymity and instability of this 'complex strategic 
situation' that Foucault will define as "intentional and non- 
subjective,,, 
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a programme without a programmer. Strategy exploits the 
spaces within programmes, between programmes, programmes of 
'observation' and 'expression' that the strategy itself creates and 
conditions. The non-correspondence, anisomorphism or 'non-relation' 
between programmes is the 'virtual' space for strategy to operate 
enabling the 'transduction' of force relations into a more or less 
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concerted effort of synthesis which would remain 'unknown' within the 
programmes themselves. Thus strategy appears in "the arena of the 
cynical, promiscuous, the tacit. " The double conditioning of the diagram 
and the archive, strategy and strata. 
Diagrammaticisms rule of tactical polyvalence: power-relations can not 
be differentiated or actualised in their movement "from one point to 
another" except through the vehicle of 'discourse'. Discourse functions 
here as a complex switch/relay/connection device in which "a 
multiplicity of discursive elements... come into play in various 
strategies. " 
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Within these strategies discourses function as both "an 
instrument and an effect of power, but also a hindrance, a stumbling- 
block, a point of resistance and a starting point for an opposing 
strategy". 
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The diagam is thus continually modifying and realigning its 
elements in relation to the everchanging combinations and displacements 
of the discursive field which, in turn, feed back into the strategic 
process. There are no 'epicenters' or originating points for this 
process and neither (or very rarely) are there simple oppositions or 
dualisms. "There is not, on one side, a discourse of power, and opposite 
it, another discourse that runs counter to it. Discourses are tactical 
elements or blocks operating in a field of force relations; there can 
exist different and even contradictory discourses within the same 
strategy; they can, on the contrary, circulate without changing their 
form from one strategy to another, opposing strategy. " 
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This applies as 
much for the 'non-discursive' as the discursive and the problem ( the 
problem of 'truth') will be to map the polyvalence of tactics, as both 
'mutually exclusive' and in 'reciprocal presuppositions', as they 
circulate through enunciable an visible blocks. 
208 
Diagrams of power issue from a 'non-place', 'outside' of the forms of 
exteriority. The Stratosphere. Or rather, the diagram, in so far as it 
reveals a set of relations between forces, is not a place but a cauldron 
of mutation that affects those composing forces: 
In a sense, only a single drama is ever stag1j, in this 'non-place, ' 
the endlessly repeated play of dominations. 
The endless repetition of forces incorporating and assimilating other 
forces which in turn ... a continuous restaging of the theatricality of 
force. Why one set of relations of force achieves relative stablization 
over another becomes a throw of the historical dice, but why one 
production or diagram takes the forms that it possesses (what it makes 
see or say) is a function of those topological and diagrammatic spaces 
left 'vacant' by its predecessor. If life, labour and language are 
dispersed and distributed throughout the spaces left vacant in 
representation, it is because representation is displaced at the point 
of its "greatest inadequacy", an inadequacy made visible by a new 
combinatorics of force that makes possible new 'subject' positions, 
conceptual architectures and object domains; a new modality of seeing 
and saying, a new set of relations between power, space and the image of 
thought that conditions and is conditioned by them. The 'force' of 
diagrammatic reading lies precisely in accessing this zone which is 
"neither visible nor hidden" 
This power/knowledge complex, then, brings together the diagram and the 
archive, folds and splices strategy and strata together "on the basis of 
their difference. " The diagram, as it were, 'selects' a particular 
'embodiment', instantiation or incarnation according to its own design 
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thus enabling, for example, the predominance of the prison in 19th 
Century judicial punishment even though the prison existed long before. 
Equally, penal law undergoes a development that obliges it to speak of 
crime and punishment in terms of the defence and security of society 
rather than in terms of vengeance and the restoration of sovereign 
power. The diagram divides itself across this fracture between forms, 
between architectures and discourses, gives them conditions and makes 
them function whilst remaining virtually outside. 
Foucault's diagrammaticism finds that this virtuality or outside is 
composed of the immanent strategies, sets of force relations that makes 
the forms and functions possible. Such programmes or strategies are 
determined by the diagram under analysis and we move from the unstable 
and transitory domination of one diagram to another. Reasons for such 
movement cannot be given in advance and it becomes impossible to say why 
a particular global strategy of power should have arisen when it did. 
"It is difficult to give reasons, since all the reasons, including 
economic ones, presuppose the presence of the diagram. " In any case, 
"we give up nothing in abandoning reasons. " 
146 
The diagram is driven by 
relations of force, chance, mutation, and contingency which does not 
make it inexplicable, but its intelligibility should not be confused 
with necessity. If diagrams of power are intelligible "this is not 
because they are the effect of another instance that 'explains' them, 
but rather because they are imbued, through and through, with 
calculation.. " 
147 
The 'calculation' of diagrammatic surfaces renders 
their 'logic' "perfectly clear, their aims decipherable and yet .. no one 
is there to have invented them, and few who can be said to have formulated 
them. " The "great anonymous, almost unspoken" 
148 diagrams are unstable, 
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fluid, constantly in states of change. Foucault called this dynamic, 
internal to the diagram and in relation with the 'outside', a 
'becoming'. If the diagram is always in a state of becoming it is 
because it 'subsists' in the 'not yet' and 'no longer' of the 'present'. 
And Foucault's 'history of the present' is a series of diagrams of the 
becoming of power in relation to the forms which it creates and 
destroys. This becoming and subsistence of diagrams of power Foucault 
would concur is "real without being actual, ideal without being 
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abstract. " 
Diagrammatic thought traces and tracks a line of general force "in any 
relationship between one point and another" 
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cutting across lines of 
visibility and lines of enunciation. These are the coordinates of 
knowledge which, in each case, issue from and condition the diagram: 
"strategies of relations of forces supporting, and supported by, types 
of knowledge.,, 
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It thus appears that the multiplicities of the 
episteme, as a specific apparatus of knowledge, are opened up by other 
multiplicities from the outside, multiplicities of force that contest 
it, force it to do battle and subject it to a drifting outside of what 
may or may not be characterised as 'knowledge' or 'science'. The 
episteme and the 'audio-visual archive' are doubled, multiplied and 
folded in all directions and across all levels and the diagram becomes 
the skin or membrane attached to a 'moving substrate of force 
relations". 
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The moving substrate perpetually engenders states of power 
by virtue of a permanent system of asymmetrical and unequal relations in 
which they are engaged. 
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There are, then, diagrams of power that are irreducible to knowledge 
which will not preclude their 'mutual immanence' but will actively offer 
its conditions. 
153 
These conditions are always strategic (and therefore 
double) and are actualised through colliding and interacting spaces that 
are polyvalent and in continuous variation. These spaces express a (non) 
relation between forces: "a set of actions upon other actions. " 
154 
In 
fact, power is not essentially repressive because it "incites, it 
induces, it seduces. " 
155 
Power is not a form, an attribute or a property 
that can be held or dispersed, withheld, frustrated or transferred. 
These are reactive affects presupposing a power that is first of all 
productive, that is practiced and exercised, and which circulates 
through a 'non-place' passing through all related points. Power 
understood in this way is formless, purely operational and functional. 
Abstracted from the forms it assumes, or the aims and objectives given 
to it, the space of power is thought as immanent force (non-place) or 
condition rather than transcendental form, diagrammatic relation (non- 
relation) rather than structure or code and problematic, differential 
actualisation (event, emergence) rather than dialectical resolution. 
Foucault's diagrammaticism inverts, displaces and problematizes all the 
old theoretical frameworks of power making possible a new cartography of 
the 'political' : 
"It is a question of of orienting ourselves to a conception of power 
which replaces the privilege of the law with the viewpoint of the 
objective, the privilege of prohibition with the viewpoint of 
tactical efficacy, the privilege of sovereignty with the analysis of 
a multiple and mobile field of force relations, wherein far- 
reaching, but never completely stable, effects of domination are 
produced. The strategical model, rather than the model based on 
law. And this, not out of a speculative choice or theoretical 
preference, but because in fact it is one of the essential traits of 
Western societies that the force relationships which for a long time 
had found expression in war, in every form of warf M, gradually 
became invested in the order of political power. " 
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8. The apparatus of sexuality. 
The experience of 'war' and 'politics' as both irreducible strategies and 
interchangeable mechanisms partially code and integrate the forces of the 
diagram as a disciplinary power and a 'bio-power', and Foucault begins to 
draw the diagrammatic map of a 'bio-politics' that administers, monitors, 
regulates and controls the life and forces of the body and populations 
through a strategic "deployment of sexuality". If panopticism articulates 
the diagram of disciplinary power then the apparatus (dispositif) 
expresses the diagram of forces that traverse sex and control the life of 
human multiplicities. Power over life runs through sex because it is that 
point of articulation and intersection between the body and populations 
and the apparatus is a map of these processes and relations, a map of 
lines of dispositional force and their variation through division and 
displacement into the positif curves of the articulable and the visible. 
The exercise of biopower on body/populations involves "the entry of 
phenomena peculiar to the life of the human species into the order of 
power and knowledge, into the sphere of political techniques. " 
157 Sex 
allows "access to the life of the body and the life of the species" 
158 
and Foucault's apparatus of sexuality will articulate the management, 
policing and ultimately the goverment of life through those procedures 
of power-knowledge that emplace sex within the articulable ('the 
incitement to discourse') through the generalisation of techniques of 
confession, and that distribute sex through the visible as the 
accomplishment of techniques of observation. A 'scientia sexualis'. The 
deployment of sexuality through the articulable and the visible effects 
a power over life that tightly couples together truth and pleasure in 
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space-time, or rather, truth is given to be seen and told through a 
fascination ("we have at least invented a different kind of pleasure 
pleasure in the truth of pleasure, the pleasure of knowing that truth, of 
discovering and exposing it, the fascination of seeing it and telling it" 
159) 
that is dependent upon the way in which what can be seen and what can 
be said is derived from the construction and invention of a sexuality 
through 'incitement' in space and time: 
Let Charcots Salpetriere serve as an example in this regard: it was 
an enormous apparatus for observation, with its examinations, 
interrogations, and experiments, but it was also a machinery for 
incitement, with its public presentations, its theater of ritual 
crises, carefully staged with the help of ether and amyl nitrate, 
its interplay of dialogues, palpations, laying on of hands, postures 
which the doctors elicited or obliterated with a gesture or a word, 
its hierarchy of personnel who kept watch, organized, provoked, 
monitored and reported, andlW accumulated an immense pyramid of 
observations and dossiers. 
If Freud establishes from this another space (and time) through which 
the 'hystericisation' of sex can be connected to a visible and 
articulable element (what the hysteric shows and says) then Foucault's 
great diagram of the apparatus of sexuality can also serve "as an 
archaeology of psychoanalysis" 
161 
The apparatus of sexuality is that system of deployment that constructs 
or fictions sex as a 'speculative' element in its functioning. It is a 
"sexuality without sex", a "unique signifier and a universal signified" 
162 
that normalizes desire through its hysterical incitement to be seen 
and said. It is, then, an "especially dense transfer point for relations 
of power" 
163 
that breaks up the scientia sexualis (the ars erotica is 
dependent upon another diagram of forces involving the relation between 
master and slave or disciple, a quite different cluster of relations 
between power and knowledge and the transmission of truth and pleasure) 
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into a great shimmering network of surfaces conditioned by forces that 
incite and induce a specific mode of seeing as well as saying: a sex 
that speaks and a sex that reveals, surfaces teeming with words and 
surfaces traversed by gazes, a sexual body constructed and enfolded by 
power. 
The power that thus took charge of sexuality set about contacting 
bodies, caressing them with its eyes, intensifying areas, 
electrifying surfaces, dramaýýjing troubled moments. It wrapped the 
sexual body in its embrace. 
Scientia sexualis produces the sexual body through the techiques of 
confession and incitement as a specific site for the inscription of 
desire and truth. 'Law' is eroticized as that mechanism (distributed 
across medicine, criminology, psychiatry, etc, ) that constitutes and 
produces, multiplies and proliferates the desire and truth (the desire 
for truth and the truth of desire) of the sexual body. 
One should not think that desire is repressed, for the simple reason 
that the law is what constitutes desire and the lack on which it is 
predicated. Where there is desire, the power-relation is already 
present: an illusion, then, to denounce this relation for a 
repression exerted after the event; but vanity as well, to US 
questing after a desire that is beyond the reach of power. 
And desire is produced around the body through the confession of its 
truth: "The confession is a ritual of discourse in which the 
speaking subject is also the subject of the statement. " 
166 
It is "a 
technique for producing truth" that "unfolds within a power 
relationship. " 
167 
Truth is inseparable from the procedures that establish 
it and Foucault grafts confessional procedures onto the history that he 
established in Discipline and Punish that moved from 'inquisitional 
enquiry' to the 'disciplinary examination' model. In all cases the 
procedure is made up of statements and visibilities and the forces that 
run through them and a different 'desire' is extracted and made to 
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function as true through variable techniques. Foucault historicizes the 
apparatus for the production of desire as an invention of recent date 
Uwe have had sexuality since the 18th Century, and sex since the 19th. 
What we had before that was no doubt the flesh. " 
168 
But from one 
formation to the next the apparatus produces a different set of relations 
between power and knowledge, truth and pleasure, bodies and desires and 
each case involves different variables and subject positions, different 
methods and processes, techniques and practices. 
Foucault concentrates on the specific practices and technologies of sex 
that produce truth as 'problematic', a 'problematisation' of truth: the 
'non-relation' between truths of light and language. Foucault's diagram 
of the apparatus of sexuality with its demolition of the 'repressive 
hypothesis' and its mapping of the deployment of scientia sexualis 
reveals the teeming discourses of sex, the technologies for its 
observation and "an entire machinery for producing true discourses 
. concerning it" 
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Between each of us and our sex the west has placed a never ending 
demand for truth: it is up to us t178xtract the truth of sex ... it 
is up to sex to tell us our truth. 
The truth of sex became something fundamental, useful or dangerous, 
precious or formidjýje: in short ... sex was constituted as the 
problem of truth. 
The 'question' of sex is constituted within a fold of truth: sex must 
speak and show the truth as we demand that it say and make us see the 
truth. The truth of ourselves, of others, and of the other within the 
self, "all this found an opportunity to deploy itself in the discourse 
of sex. " 
172 
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9. The apparatus of government. 
The truth of sexual reason is one element in the functioning of a 
government of truth that traverses every segment of the social apparatus 
as a government of affective life. If power redirects its energies to 
the prolongation, administration and management of life, takes life as 
its aim and object, resistance turns life against power: "life as a 
political object was in a sense taken at face value and turned back 
against the system that was bent on controlling it. " 
173 The task of 
Foucault's diagrammaticism lies in locating, activating and amplifying 
these lines of resistance, lines that can be connected in what we might 
risk calling a discipline of resistance or bio-resistance, the 
multiplication and intensification of lines of flight, endogenous to 
regimes of power, by connecting them to an Outside. For diagrammatic 
thought life resists power through a direct 'feed' to the outside and 
'reverse' resistance can only be a temporary and incomplete stage in 
this process. There is always a moment of disengagement in power 
relations, a multiplicity of resistant points that are always unstable 
and reversible. Foucault's diagrams always search out and 'make' these 
'lines of fracture. ' It is no longer suffecient to 'diagnose' or 
'release' resistances of the Outside, it has to be made from the Outside 
The lines can be opened up to other forces, reactive forces twisted into 
active forces, agitated to the extent of making change possible and 
necessary. Powers' counterstroke uses the resources that power formerly 
deployed against oppositions: 
what was understood and what seemed as an objective was life ... 
which became the issue of political struggles, even if the latter 
were formulated through affirmations concerning rights. The 'right' 
to life, to ones body, to health and happiness, to the satifaction 
of needs ... this 'right' which the classical juridical system was 
utterly incapable of comprehending... 
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Life rather than the law, productive power rather than juridical power 
characterises "political struggle" and in the struggle of government 
life itself is the issue. 
"Since the last century, the great struggles that have challenged 
the general system of power were not guided by the belief in a 
return to former rights, or by the age-old dream of a cycle of time 
or a Golden Age. One no longer aspired toward the coming of the 
emperor of the poor, or the kingdom of the latter days, or even the 
restoration of our imagined ancestral rights; what was demanded and 
what served as an objective was life, understood as the basic needs, 
man's concrete essence, the realization of his potential, a 
plenitude of the possible. Whether or not it was Utopia that was 
wanted is of little importance; what we have seen has been a very 
real process of struggle; life as a political object was in a sense 
taken at face value and turned back against the system that was bent 
on controlling it. It was life moli5than the law that became the 
issue of political struggles ... " 
Power over life involves maintaining the forces of life, "making them 
grow and ordering them" 
176 
to the point where their relation either 
fosters life or disallows it to the point of death, the moment that 
escapes it. Forces must be cultivated, optimized, managed, administered 
and sustained in life, normalizing their differences, increasing their 
potential and governing their actualisation. The difference between 
points of force in a relation amounts to a quantitative inequality which 
is not prior to any sequence or modality of action nor prior even to the 
body for, as we have seen, the body is already a complex arrangement of 
forces distributed throughout its surfaces. The forces of government in 
question here have nothing to do with violence or ideology which are 
merely forces at their extremities. The differential relations of force 
refer to a capacity to act or be acted upon, a capacity to affect or be 
affected; as Foucault says "an action upon an action: " 
In effect, what defines a relationship of power is that it is a mode 
of action that does not act directly or immediately upon others. 
Instead it acts upon their actions: an action upon an action, or 
existing actions or on those which may arise in the present or the 
future ... The exercise of power ... is a total structure of actions 
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brought to bear upon possible actions; it incites, it induces, it 
seduces, it makes easier or more difficult; in the extreme it 
constrains or forbids absolutely; it is nevertheless always a way of 
acting upon an acting subject or acting subjects by virtue of their 
acting orlýjing capable of action. A set of actions upon other 
actions. 
Here Foucault demonstrates the extent to which "the exercise of power 
consists in guiding the possibilities of conduct and putting in order 
the possible outcomes" 
178 
which means that power is less a confrontation 
between two adversaries or the linking of one to the other than a 
question of government. The governmental motor generates and controls 
the flow of space-time through which forces can act. 'Government' is 
the power to affect, whether it is children, families, souls, the sick 
or the mad. 
This word must be allowed the very broad meaning which it had in the 
sixteenth century. "Government" did not refer only to political 
structures or the management of states rather it designated the way 
in which the conduct of individuals of states might be directed: 
the government of children, of souls, of communities, of families, 
of the sick. It did not cover only the legitimately constituted 
forms of political or economic subjection, but also modes of action, 
more or less considered and calculated, which were designed to act 
upon the possibilities of action, more or less considered and 
calculated, which were designed to act upon the possibilities of 
action of other people. To govern, in this sense, is to structure 
the possible field of action of others. The relationship proper to 
power would not therefore by sought on the side of violence, or of 
struggle, nor on that of voluntary linking (all of which can, at 
best, be the instruments of power), but rather in the area of the 
singular mod17? f action, neither warlike nor juridical, which is 
government. 
This power to affect is obviously not an appearance or an illusion. It 
is a factored product that distends itself over the multiple surfaces of 
the social to which it is co-extensive. An 'immanent cause', a machine 
that produces its own cause which is inseparable from its effects even 
though it is 'outside' the effects themselves not the outside of the 
effect. The governmental 'effect' traverses all of those institutions of 
molarity which seek to capture or organise its 'microphysical relations'; 
the state is only one example of this. 
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'Omnes et singulatim' is the great characteristic property of the 
governmental machine whose concerns are simultaneously to 'totalise' and 
to 'individualise. ' 180 It produces this differentation from the reservoir 
of forces to which it is in contact enabling maximum efficiency in the 
control of conduct. Foucault traces this governmentalisation of power 
relations to the 'daemonic' folding of 'city-game' onto the 'shepherd- 
game': the Greek game of citizens and laws annexed to the pastoral 
model of a shepherd who cares for each individual in his flock. 
Foucault analyses how the state diagram 'invests' the pastoral-diagram 
through an "individualising 'tactic' which characterised a series of 
powers: those of the family, medicine, psychiatry, education and 
employers. " 
181 
This investment leads to both a 'government of 
individuality' and a form of government by 'individualisation' operating 
as a continuum through all of those agencies which delimit and striate 
space and time, fixing boundaries and determining positions. The 
governmental machine regulates and distributes space-time according to 
the force relations that it 'conducts' through enunciable and visible 
segments. 
Foucault has shown in his diagrams of power that it is less a question 
of a space of sovereignity replaced by discipline in turn replaced by 
government but a 'triangulation' of these three planes of exercising 
power in a network of reciprocal relations, a particularly dense 
interweaving or interpenetration of power relations that constitutes 
governmentality. It is less to do with the imposition of laws than of a 
certain disposition of statements and visibilities, of 'men and things' 
in space and time. This disposition may also employ the law as a tactic 
in order for its ends to be achieved. In any case if the sovereign with 
220 
his laws right through until the liquidation of the themes of 
'mercantilism' were able to frustrate or immobilise the 'art of 
government' its processes emerged full-scale with the demographic 
expansion of the eighteenth century. The notion of 'population' becomes 
the object of government and in doing so utilises and colonises 
sovereignity and disciplines. Government uses the instruments of 
sovereignity (laws) refines and extends them as generalised tactics in 
order to 'legalise' populations. Government simultaneously takes over 
disciplinary techniques, reorients and redistributes them in order to 
gain access and control over bodies and individuals in order to 
'normalize' them. 
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Power is everywhere, it comes from everywhere, in 
every action and passion, "in every relation from one point to another", 
controlling multiplicities in space and time: a government of life. 
The burden of diagrammatic thought is to produce maps of this 
'government of life' which can be connected to the outside and used to 
produce 'other' truths, other 'parrhesiastic' acts in the battle 
'around' truth. 
"If power is constitutive of truth, how can one conceive of a 'power 
of truth' which would no longer be the truth of power, a truth that 
would releaf63 transversal lines of resistance and not integral lines 
of power? " 
How can we 'cross the line? ' One of the 'other' truths- the power of 
truth - that Foucault's maps produce is that we can't 'see' or 'say' the 
truth of power. Power is never 'here and now': power hides in the outside, 
in a 'non-place'; power is never 'present' but hides in the repetition of 
its difference. Power is never a function of logical or syllogistic 
relation but functions through invisible 'non-relations'. "Power is 
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tolerable only on condition that it mask a substantial part of itself. " 
184 
Its success is entirely "proportional to its ability to hide its own 
mechanisms. " 
185 
Power is anonymous and unspoken, blind and mute even as 
it makes us 'see' it and talk about it in ways that ensure its indefinite 
reproduction, as it coordinates "loquacious tactics' and constructs 
great machines of visibility. The guard in the tower of the panopticon 
cannot 'see' power and the speech of the confessing subject is always 
already the 'subject' of power. Power hides its mechanisms by ordering, 
dividing, distributing, composing, inducing, seducing and inciting, in 
short, in relentlessly producing and governing articulable and visible 
functions (through asymmetrical relations of force) by meticulously 
constructing and arranging space-time. Diagrammatic thought releases 
this process from any essence, ground, being, intention, subject, etc, 
that might give it foundations and displaces it onto the outside, makes 
it visible as a process of the outside, a problem of immanent conditions 
of existence, a politics of space and time as a politics of truth. 
Diagrammatic thought can 'see' and articulate power differently or make 
it visible because of its rigorous affinity with space, its ability to 
think the Outside as a map of power and consequently a map of 
resistance; its affinity with time as a way of thinking the no longer' 
against the 'present' in favour of a 'not yet'- an aconceptual 
difference- of seeing and saying othewrwise and in a new way, of 
thinking-otherwise. Diagrammatic thought is a thought of resistance and 
freedom, an indefinitely renewed effort to 'cross the line. ' 
Diagrammatic thought shows the instability of the spaces of power 
relations, the fragility of the apparatus that circulates them and the 
possibility of their 'reversal' through a 'multiplicity of points of 
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resistance", 
186 
"often in the same vocabulary and using the same 
categories". 
187 
And from this we might imagine "another economy of bodies 
and pleasures. " 
188 
It is the agency of sex that we must break away from if we aim - 
through a tactical reversal of the various mechanisms of sexuality - 
to counter the grips of pwoer with the claims of bodies, pleasures and 
knowledges in their multiplicity and their possibility of 
resistance. The rallying point for the counter-attack against the 
deployment T69sexuality ought not to be not sex-desire, but bodies and 
pleasures. 
Foucault will go on to call the internal dynamic of this spiralling 
process between power and resistance a relation of 'freedom' or 
'agonism' in the sense that every exercise of power presupposes a 
subject who is free to act: "power is exercised only over free subjects 
and only insofar as they are free. " 
190 
At the heart of relations of power 
191 
lies "the recalcitrance of the will and the intransigence of freedom", 
an agonistic relation of "reciprocal incitation and struggle", a 
"permanent provocation". 
192 
The relations between the apparatuses of sex, 
subject and government must be thought through a space of constitutive 
freedom, a fold of forces through which power and resistance are 
articulated. And this space involves a whole series of differential 
relations between technologies which aren't just technologies of 
domination but complex interactions upon other interactions "where the 
technologies of domination of individuals over one another have recourse 
to processes by which the individual acts upon himself. " 
193 If Foucault 
had overemphasized the technologies of domination as the only form of 
government, a topological shift was necessary in order to access another 
dimension, dependent upon the others (knowledge, power), yet irreducible 
with its own space and time, history, rhythmn, form, etc. A government 
or technology of the self as Foucault conceives it (care of the self) 
would be the culmination and final flowering of diagrammatic thought as 
a resistance to the government of life, a step into the outside as an 
operation of the art of living. 
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S. THE INTERIORITIES OF THOUGHT: 
SELVES AND SUBJECTIVATION 
Subjectivating the Outside 
It is enough to create new names, new estimations and probabilities 
in order to create in the long run new things. 
the double is never a projection of the interior; on the contrary, 
it is an interiorisation of the Outside. It is not a doubling of the 
One but a redoubling of the Other. It is not a reproduction of the 
Same, but a repetition of the Different. It is not the emanation of 
an 'I', but something that places in immanence and always other or 
Non-self. It is never the other who is double in the doubling 
process, it is a self that lives me as the double of the other: I do 
not encounter myself on the outside, I find the other in me. It 
resembles exactly the invagination of a tissue in embryology, or the 
act of doubling in sewing: twist, fold, stop, and so on. 
The breakdown of philosophical subjectivity and its dispersion in a 
language that disposesses it while multiplying it within the space 
created by its absence is3probably one of the fundamental structures 
of contemporary thought. 
What must be produced is not man himself such as nature designed 
him, or such as his essence prescribes. What must be produced is 
something that absolutely does not exist, about which we know 
nothing... tle creation of something totally different, an 
innovation. 
Oh, those Greeks! They knew how to live. What is required for that 
is to stop courageously at the surface, the fold, the skin, to adore 
appearance, to believe in forms, tones, words, in the whole Olymps of 
appearance. Those Greeks were superficial - out of profundity. 
The events of thought are mapped as actualities through the invention 
/articulation of points or intensities on the immanent surfaces of words 
and things. If these points come from the outside it is only as a 
doubling, a hollowing out of the outside which is "always concerned with 
showing how the Other, the Distant, is also the Near and the Same. " 
6 
The 
Order of Things had already demonstrated the extent to which the 
unthought resides as a double at the heart of thought and we had to wait 
for Discipline and Punish and The History of Sexuality for a conception 
of the immanent strategies that produced these variable configurations. 
The 'abstract machine' produces a synthesis of these configurations and 
a history of the problematics of thought becomes possible. 
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Foucault puts before us, in his last books, a realignment and 
reconnection of these configurations through the possibility of thinking 
the constitution of the self as the unthought subject of desire, the 
unthought inside as an affective, immanent practice of the outside. The 
problematic unthought gives way to a thinking being that problematises 
itself in the immanence of the outside. The "historical ontology of 
ourselves" or "the genealogy of the subject" 
7 
projected through sexual 
experience will "take into account the interaction" of the technologies of 
domination and of the self "where the technologies of domination of 
individuals over one another have recourse to processes by which the 
individual acts upon himself. And conversely, he has to take into account 
the points where the techniques of the self are integrated into structures 
of coercion or domination. " 
8 
It is in this double articulation or fold 
of the outside that Foucault will construct an interiority of thought, "an 
inside deeper than any interior" 
9, 
the mobile and everchanging site for 
the application of the outside to oneself, the wager (dangerous and 
joyful) of 'inventing' oneself through an experience that is 'not yet' or 
'no longer' possible. As the final figure in Foucault's topological being 
of thought it is an attempt to invent an immanent freedom of 
thinking-otherwise in the inside of the outside. 
1. Interior surfaces of the self 
In all cases, and perhaps from the beginning, an inside is created that 
has nothing to do with traditional 'philosophical' interiority, an inside 
that is an infolding of the outside. The aleatory outside, a 'virtuality' 
or immanence adjacent to an inside composition is formed from the 
enunciable and the visible and the powers that traverse them. Equally, the 
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enunciable and the visible and the powers that embody them are informed by 
a virtual outside in a reciprocal relation producing endlessly continuous 
variations; "it resembles exactly the invagination of a tissue in 
embryology. " 
10 
Functions abstracted from form and substance are 
differentiated and actualized through the surfaces of visibilities and 
statements ensuring that the contact between surfaces has properties that 
the surfaces do not contain in essentia. The materials and strata 
constituting the surfaces are differentiated not only from each other but 
also from the Fold of the outside which in turn enables the articulation 
between the surfaces to take place on the basis of their difference. 
The 'self' in Foucault appears as a series of nodes or lines articulated 
across these impersonal or neutral surfaces within the action of the 
fold of the outside, a series of relational vectors of virtual force and 
matter upon which the process of subjectivation inscibes itself. 
I will call subjectivization the procedure by which one obtains the 
constitution of a subject, or more precisely, of a subjectivity 
which is of course only one of the glyen possibilities of 
organization of self-consciousness. 
Subjectivation here names the process or operation of active folding, 
folding the material of the self into new forms of individuation, 
another possible organization of self-consciousness. This technology of 
the self- folding operations of force actually produces thought and 
makes subjectivity possible. Subjectivity and thought are born as a 
heterogeneous and co-functioning matrix produced out its own self- 
iterative processes. The surfaces of the self are composed of immanent, 
moving relational lines, lines of enonces and visibilities, lines of 
force and lines of subjectivation. All these lines are entangled in 
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differential patterns of movement, diverging and pullulating, determined 
by the immanent topological conditions of each historical Diagram. On 
each occasion, the Foucauldian topologist maps the immanent conditioned 
and conditioning effects of these relational lines and the complex 
iterational paths and trajectories they pursue. Each path contains folds 
that create complex anisotopic spaces where orbits become discontinuous 
and unpredictable. Universal and 'apodictic' conditions become displaced 
and 'problematic', bound to specific historical dispositifs and the 
forms of self they make possible. 
Foucault's interiority of thought links up with the archival and 
cartographic research into the repetition and iteration of enonces and 
visibilities and the events of power/knowledge they embody. Unfolding 
the multiplicitous lines of power and subjectivation in order to map 
their 'regulated exchanges' with the apparatuses of knowledge. Foucault's 
analyses of the self elaborate an epistemological and ontological 
interior folded across an immanent dimension of thought; "the 
archaeological dimension of the analysis made it possible to examine the 
forms themselves; its genealogical dimension, enabled me to analyze their 
formation out of the practices and the modifications undergone by the 
latter. " 
12 
These analyses form a series in a line of analyses that places 
the spaces of the epistemological (strata) and the ontological (fold) into 
an immanent topological relation. For Foucault it is "the operation of 
the art of living". 
13 
Lines of power from the outside are placed in 
conjunction with the line of the inside. Techniques of objectification 
are pleated, folded and doubled-up with processes of subjectivation. The 
line of the outside is folded onto itself in order to constitute the 
inside/outside - modes of subjectivation, self. 
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Foucault discovers in the Greeks a problematic moment when "it is not 
sufficient that force is exercised against other forces, or that it takes 
on the effect of other forces, it also has to be exercised on the self, 
itself. " 
14 
The outside is folded against the inside along a series of 
'optional' practices involved in the relation of self to self. 
Subjectivation: "to bend the line so that it comes back upon oneself. " 
15 
The historical analysis of the production of subjectivation allows the 
possibility of envisaging different ways of living, of constructing a 
space to reevaluate ('problematize') the self constructions that are given 
and open new lines to the outside, creating a proliferation and profusion 
of becomings, the actualization of virtual multiplicities of the self. 
For Foucault and Deleuze this is both the practical and theoretical 
question of thought/philosophy: 
up to what point can we unfold the line without falling into an 
unbreakable void, into death, and how to fold it without nonetheless 
losing contact with it, in order to constitute it as anl4nside 
co-present with an outside, applicable to the outside? 
Subjectivation is a process (joyful and dangerous) of moving, bifurcating 
lines maintained in the immanence of the outside, it is a 'tool kit' for 
an encounter with what it is not yet and no longer possible for us to be. 
(It is in the problem of maintenance, ie, care in folding, and the 
efficacy of the tool kit, ie, will it access 'our' problems in a new way, 
that the whole of Foucault's politics of the self resides. ) 
Subjectivation enables a reconfigured relation to self (what can we know? 
What can we be? etc. ) through the endless application of the outside to 
oneself; it is a "refusal of what we are", an effort to "get free from 
oneself" and 'think otherwise. ' 
17 
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The self is "not a substance; it is a form and this form is not above 
all or always identical to itself. " 
18 
The forms of the self are 
continually entering into differing relations, overlapping, folding and 
cutting through one another: "In each case, we play, we establish with 
one's self some different form of relationship". 
19 
The self can be 
stretched, bent, folded, refolded and unfolded. The self is multiply 
layered and multiply levelled, embedded within accumulated 'deposits'of 
strata or 'sedimentary beds'. The historical specificity of the 
formations of the self is derived from how the visible and the 
expressible produce and stratify these sedimentations but also how some 
'particles' (energies, forces, sensations) or lines ("points, knots, 
focuses") repulse or resist singular stratifications, attempt to 
destratify or become attatched to different lines of attraction. The 
self is connective (a line), conjunctive (parallel surfaces) and 
disjunctive (a bundle of trajectories bifurcating in all directions). 
The point is to carefully fold the self in order to move toward the 
outside, in order to better intervene in the processes of 
subjectivation. 
The processes and actions of interweaving and involution, inflection and 
doubling best describe the relations through which the lines and 
surfaces of the self can be reconstituted in another form of 
subjectivation. These processes condition the possibility of escaping 
fixed subject positions constituting a model of individuation without an 
individual: "subjectification as process is personal or collective 
individuation, in relation to one or to many. " 
20 
Subjectivation produces 
individuated subjectivities that do not coalesce into any fixed subject. 
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The folding of lines is an individuated construction of the inside and 
the outside, lines which are also articulated onto other dimensions, 
'political', 'ethical' and epistemological, etc, but which are 
reconfigured in the process. Folding the self absolutely scrambles any 
dichotomy of interior self and exterior social. The practices of the 
self are bound up with and knotted into the political: "being occupied 
with one self and political activities are linked. " 
21 
"Taking care of the 
self" (subjectivation), as opposed to "knowing thyself" (subjection), 
involves practices which construct a relation to oneself by detaching 
forces from their insciption in any collective political network 
(conceived as the just regulation of the state) and turning or folding 
them against themselves, and reinscribing them within a transfigured 
politics. Within this folding lies the possibility of a thousand new 
selves. 
what we have to think are qualities or quantities rather than 
intentions; longitude or latitude rather than depth; rather moments 
of individuation than species and kinds; and thousand masked 
subjects, thousand I's dissolved , thousand passivities and-chaos 
where yesterday there used to rule the sovereign subject. 
2. Greek Foldings 
Foucault's work on the self leaves no privileged space for the 
'ethical. ' The ethics of the self ("The genealogy of the subject as a 
subject of ethnical actions" 
23) 
as a series of moving relational 
lines that are continually displaced in a form of 'problematisation', a 
problematisation of ethical space itself which opens up the space of a 
problem, and gives it a history, a "history of thought. " The self as a 
node or fold of force links up a "historical ontology of ourselves " at 
a profound level, with Foucault's topologies of forms of knowledge and 
relations of power making the production of a history of thought an 
action of resistance to the knowledge, power and selves sedimented in 
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the present. Ethical space is one axis of a problematisation of thought 
within the "history of systems of thought" which emerges with the 
Greeks. 
For the Greeks it is the invention of a "relation to oneself" (rapport a 
soi) as a unique dimension, derived from power and knowledge but 
irreducible to them. There is a 'self-constitution' that is derived from 
codes that give the rule to knowledge and a form of 'enkrateia', a 
relation to oneself that "is a power that one brought to bear on oneself 
in the power that one exercised over others. " 
24 
This principle of 
"internal regulation, " a domination of oneself is a hinge, a fold or a 
doubling of the domination of others. Selves are constituted through a 
differentiatition and folding from the code and are no longer dependent 
upon it. 
This relation of 'enkrateia' between 'free agents' operating through an 
'aestheticised' sexuality places a form of subjectivisation in Greek man. 
For Foucault, the Greeks invert the outside into a new inside space of a 
relation to onself that must be sewn through sexuality. Knowledge/power 
relations continue to bubble away on the surface permanently communicating 
with forms of subjectivity through struggle and composition but 
subjectivisation is continually being redrawn elsewhere even as it unfolds 
and merges with the 'codes and rules' of knowledge/power. 
In Foucault's diagram of the interiority of Greek thought, the Greeks 
were able to bend force, double it back on itself through a set of 
practices or exercises "that enabled one to govern oneself. " These 
231 
exercises become detached from relations of power and the strata of 
knowledge when "free agents" enter into 'agonistic relations'. The 
'agonism' of freedom that Foucault constantly alludes to results in the 
Greek invention of an 'aesthetics of existence' which is always 
determined and composed within a sexuality that folds it and doubles it 
back into an "institutional and social system. " But subjectivation as 
the constantly changing process of the relation to oneself never simply 
becomes a product of systems of power and knowledge. Subjectivation is 
always reborn and takes off elsewhere, always "beneath the codes and 
rules" of knowledge and power. The self is created and recreated on 
each occasion on the basis of the folds that subjectivise knowledge and 
bend power relations. 
Foucault reconstructs a problematic interiority of Greek ethical 
thought, a rapport a soi, that emerges in the breaks, fractures and 
folds of power/knowledge relations. The interiorisation of the outside 
would constitute an "affective and relational virtuality" through the 
"diagonal line" it would trace in "the social fabric. " 
25 
Foucault 
"encloses the outside", envelopes and enfolds it in an interiority of 
thought that is irreducible to knowledge/power relations and yet remains 
historically variable, a constitutive dynamic in continuous variation. 
Subjectivation continually folds and refolds its own topological 
structures, twisting 'somewhere else' through its involvements with 
power/knowledge surfaces. New surfaces continue to sediment, stratify 
and bifurcate according to each level of strata and the 'internal 
organisation' they exhibit. The 'dissipation' of internal structure or 
subjectification continues as if all on its own, or rather according to 
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the roll of the dice, or the set of power/knowledge relations 
reconstructed from chance/necessity. ("The dice-throw does in fact 
express the the simplest possible force relation, the one established 
between particular features arrived at by chance" 
26). 
The forces of 
subjectivation are "concerned less with a form than an energy; less with 
a presence than an intensity, less with a movement and an attitude that 
with an agitation, of a trembling that is contained only with 
difficulty. " 
27 
'Energy, ' 'intensity', 'agitation' and 'trembling' 
"contained only with difficulty" are, first of all, forces of the 
outside that are actualised through a differentiation and 
internalization into the orders of subjectivation; it is "when the 
outside collapses and attracts interiority" 
28 
that the forces of 
subjectivation are shuffled about into new combinations. They are 
doubled and knotted into an interior, an interior whose 'difficulty' 
constantly threatens its own displacement. This displacement begins 
"with an erosion from outside, from that space which is, for thought, on 
the other side. " 
29 
It is the "interior of the exterior and 
inversely" 30 that we had already discovered in the madness book. The 
'difficulty' or 'problematic' as Foucault comes to call it of this space 
is a differentiation or division along a four-fold axis or relation that 
is rapport a soi. 
The fourfold knot 
Foucault's last books pursue the immanent topology or non-linear 
dynamics of the forces of the outside and their actualization through 
the process of subjectivation offering an archaeology/genealogy 
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/problematization of lines and chains with their 'partial linkages' and 
their formation and transformation into knots of the self. For Foucault 
there are four great knots or foldings in the lines of the self. 
The first knot is directly related to the folds of materiality - "it 
topologises the materiality of the body. " 
31 
The variable entanglements of 
the materiality of the self amount for the Greeks to a relation between 
the body and its pleasures: the 'aphrodisia. ' For the Christians it 
will be 'flesh' and 'desire' and their relation, a completely different 
modality of subjectivation. For modernity the 'substance' or materiality 
which is 'problematically' different from flesh and aphrodisia would be 
'sexuality. ' Sexuality is the problematic ethical substance of modern 
societies linked to the liberation of desire, the devaluation of acts 
and the elision of pleasure. For the Greeks it is precisely the 
regulation and management of the forces of desire, acts and pleasure as 
the singular experience of aphrodisia (eating and sex present the same 
problems! ). For Foucault the issue of these material folds or lines of 
substance lies precisely in the extent to which they continue to inform 
and subject "who we are" (Greek, Christian, etc), when our problems are 
no longer the same, closing off new processes of subjectivation and 
restricting different relations to self. 
The second knot in the 'being of the chain' of subjectivation is the 
"mode d'assujettissement", the fold of the relation between forces 
according to a particular rule. The fold of the relation involves 
particular categories of power, depending on the diagram one is dealing 
with, which bend back the forces in question into a relation to oneself. 
The categories of force or power relation will be different on each 
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occassion and the infolded rule (aesthetic, natural, divine, rational, 
etc) will determine how it gets "a hold on our selves. " The mode of 
subjection "provides the linkage between the moral code and self. " 
32 
The 
"linkage", then, is constituted and reconstituted thorugh variable lines 
of force which are folded through variable lines of coding creating a 
'knotted interior- a form of subjection. Foucault indicates that for 
the Greeks the politico-aesthetic mode was an existential choice, not to 
choose to truly be ones true self (Sartrian authenticity) but to choose 
"to build our existence as a beautiful existence", to choose an 
"aesthetics of existence". 
33 
The third knot of the fold concerns "the means by which we can change 
ourselves in order to become ethical subjects. " 
34 
This asceticism or 
self-formation involves the fold of knowledge and truth in that through 
a specific working over of the strings of problematic ethical material a 
relation between truth or knowledge and being is constituted. This is 
the condition for any knowledge, a subjectivation of knowledge and truth 
that is in continuous variation. The practices of self-formation offer 
possibilities of reconstituting the self as a "transformable 
singularity", of freeing ourselves from ourselves through practices that 
challenge (problematize) "the evidence on which our knowledge, our 
consent and our practices are based. " 
35 
The fourth knot concerns the fold of the outside itself "what might be 
called the telos of the ethical subject" 
36 
where the subject hopes for 
death or detachment, salvation or immortality, "which is the kind of 
being to which we aspire when we behave in a moral way. " 
37 
It is here, as 
Blanchot says, that Foucault encloses the outside in an "interiority of 
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expectation. " 
38 
If the Greeks folded the outside into a telos of self 
mastery in order to obtain power over the other Foucault demonstrates 
how this knot is retied through the introjection of a telos of 
rationality (one masters oneself because one is rational) and, later, of 
immortality (no longer tied to mastery but renunciation). A genealogy of 
the interior expectations of thought as a fold of the outside. 
We have to maintain all at once the complex relations between the 
pleats, their circular and looping mechanisms through the immanent space 
of the self that they create on each occasion and a "certain kind of 
independence" 39 that gives each fold its temporality, rhythmn and 
structure. Foucault's last books map the folds of the self through 
their "succession of partial relinkings" and their formation and 
transformation into knots of 'self evidence. ' It is through these 
epistemological knots with their lines of power and resistance that 
"being offers itself to be thought. " 
40 
The Use of Pleasure, then, does not discover or rediscover the subject 
but extends its derivation from an assignable position within the 
statement to an immanent derivation from the outside, which was always 
contemporary and adjacent to it in The Order of Things and The 
Archaeology of Knowledge as the 'something else', something like it but 
not on the level of the statement. This 'something else' that is like 
the statement and enables its articulation are the forces of the 
outside, forces which are captured by relations of power and forms of 
knowledge but equally forces which actualise themselves in a fold of 
subjectivation which differentiates itself from these systems creating a 
relation to oneself as a source of resistance. 
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Foucault's version of the Greek doubling is, then, the development of an 
independent ascetics, a double differentiation "distinct from the ethical 
conduct that was its objective" 
41 
that is a folding and mastery of the 
self in relation to others. And this relation of self-mastery does not 
presuppose that there has to be something originary to be mastered. What 
masters and what is mastered are differential effects of the relation of 
self-mastery. The self relation is produced or constructed on each 
occasion through its folds and positions within the relational field of 
subjectivation. An 'aesthetic' relation to the outside constitutes the 
self through the folds of subjectivation that place the relation of 
self-mastery as the constitutive form of Greek self-invention. 
In the Greek diagram that Foucault invents in The Use of Pleasure the 
forces of attraction and repulsion that constitute the field through which 
subjectivation takes place are aesthetic forces: Beauty and ugliness, 
contemptibility and ignominity in relation to moderation and excess, 
activity and passivity (rather than docility and utility through 
normalisation, the law etc). The line of the self is bent or folded 
through practices which give style to ones existence through an 
aestheticization of the outside rather than a disciplinary model which 
produces the self through the internalisation of a normative and 
prescriptive power that controls individuals in space and time based on 
binary disjunction (good and bad, healthy and pathological, normal and 
abnormal, mad and sane etc). This folding of the lines of the self 
traverse the Greeks use of pleasures and the problem will be to determine 
precisely how sexuality becomes the site for the enactment of the relation 
to oneself that is detached and differentiated from alimentary conditions. 
(This is dealt with as a problem of 'dietetics, ' 'economics' and 
42 'erotics. ') 
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Foucault will articulate the differing relations to the self, their 
continuously variable foldings and the historical possibilities of 
thinking otherwise within these folds through a strategy of 
problematization, an immanent practice of thought that will demonstrate 
the conditions that enable a specific, historical and transformable 
interior fold to develop in relation to the forces of the outside. It is 
through the extension of the problematization of the non-originary and 
historical relation to self constructed through the fold of the outside 
that Foucault will utilize the Greek diagram "not for but in terms of a 
contemporary situation" 
43, 
and it is in the extension of the analysis 
made in terms of problematization that Foucault will link the relation of 
self and sexuality to a history of thought whose task is "to define the 
conditions in which human beings 'problematize' what they are, what they 
do and the world in which they live. " 
44 
3. The space-time of problematic thought. 
Problematization makes a history of thought possible: how did the 
problems of the self become an object of forms of knowledge and 
strategies and techniques of power? and how have these problems been 
transformed and modified in relation to different forms of knowledge and 
different strategies of power? (how has self relation, problematized 
through aesthetic practice become a problem of normalization "subject to 
someone else through control and dependence"? 
45). 
On each occasion the 
outside is folded according to particular practices that gives 
problematization its specific historical form. It is not a question of 
problematizing the given so much as problematizing how it is possible 
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for something to be given. The history of thought as rapport a soi is 
thus a conception of how self-experience enters and exits thought, of how 
the inside is transformed through the fold of the outside, of how certain 
forms of experience (madness, crime, sex, etc, ) are made possible, 
problematized and transformed on the basis of forms of knowledge, 
strategies of power and techniques of self. 
The history of thought as a history of problematizations is an open field 
of becoming that is seeking to give "a new impetus, as far and wide as 
possible, to the still undefined work of freedom" 
46. 
The undefined work 
of freedom is the becoming and thinking otherwise of thought in the 
present, the problematization of "who we are today" since we are no longer 
greek or christian. The history of problematic thought thus serves as a 
way "of thinking the past as it is condensed in the inside, in the 
relation to oneself, .. (and to) .. then think the past against the present, 
and resist the latter, not in favour of a return, but in favour, I hope, 
47 
of a time to come'. (Nietzsche)". 
Problematization is, then, an "affirmative thought whose instrument is 
disjunction". 48 An affirmative thought of the present would be a thought 
of multiple difference, "of the nomadic and dispersed multiplicity that 
is not limited or confined by the constraints of similarity". 
49 Foucault 
opens up the space of different subjectivities, of new and intensive 
subjectivities by operating the disjunctive instrument that separates 
the lines and folds of the self, multiplies their possibilities through 
problematization and then disperses them nomadically along differential 
trajectories; it is thought "as intensive irregularity, disintegration 
of the subject". 
5o 
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The thought of problematisation is a disjunctive practice that addresses a 
"multiplicity of exceptional points, which are displaced as we distinguish 
their conditions, and which insist and subsist in the play of 
repetitions". 
51 
We must not think the possibilities of subjectivization 
in the present by questioning and answerering dialectically; by thinking 
the history of the self problematically the processes of subjectivation 
can be made visible as a specific and diverse practice of the outside, a 
response or set of temporary solutions that do not "assume a unique form 
that is the direct result or the necessary expression of these 
difficulties" 52 but show how a specific set of relations may become a 
singularly transformable object of thought. 
The disentangling of the lines and knots of the apparatus of 
subjectivisation frees up spaces for a new relation to self, a thinking 
otherwise about the processes of subjectivation. Problematisation 
functions as that component part that directly activates the mechanism of 
the fold, constructing a line to the outside that does not yet exist, 
making "something other" enter the real. Problematisation denotes: 
the set of discursive and non-discursive practices that makes 
something enter into the play of the true and the false and 
constitutes it into an object of thought (whether in the forw3of 
moral reflection, scientific knowledge, political analyses. 
Difference. 
Problematic space is traversed by lines of difference that the 
cartographer/specific intellectual maps as they enter into the play of 
the true and the false, constituting a new object for thought. In 
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mapping the lines of difference in processes of subjectivation (greek, 
christian) Foucault produces maps of the self that bifurcate with 
history and relay analysis with other roads. These maps offer the 
possibility of thinking otherwise about modes of subjectivation in the 
present, of problematizing our folds since they are always the temporary 
and variable effect of resistance before they are integrated into 
systems of knowledge and codes of power. Each time the subject is 
produced through differential lines that constitute a matrix of 
relations of power/knowledge. Lines of subectification and lines of 
power/knowledge are non-linear and differentiated, they are not 
originary but function within a field or topology of relations. The 
emergence of lines of subjectification and lines of power/knowlege 
within this space of a relational field is itself a product of those 
relations which are constantly switching connections, investing and 
redeploying elsewhere. 
The differential space of problematization in Foucault's interiority of 
thought is the last form of the 'space of dispersion' that runs through 
all of Foucault's work. It is another device of immanence that opens 
little spaces of freedom to the outside, that connects and reconnects with 
the archaeological and genealogical planes of Foucault's thought. It is an 
imageless thought that makes something enter truth, resist it and change 
it. 
Foucault's texts produce the possibility of new subjectivations, new 
ways of producing the self by intensifying the need for transformation 
in the present through the problematisation of the existing space of 
subjectivisations. Problematisation displaces those practices 
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(confession, discipline, normality) that constitute a given 'rapport a 
soil in the present (what we are ceasing to be) by opening up their 
'self-evidences' (which tie self relation to "identity by conscience or 
self-knowledge) and attaching them to their problematized and differential 
'conditions of emergence. ' The problematic space that Foucault fashions 
for the practices of saying and seeing and the power-strategies that run 
through them that construct the apparatus of subjectivation "makes 
something enter into the play of the true and false, " it makes difference 
by opening a space to think otherwise about the self in the time of the 
not yet, of thinking new possibilities of subjectivation through new games 
of truth. Problematic space is a space of freedom and difference that 
actualises the possibility of thinking otherwise. It is within this space 
of possibility (the not yet of the outside) and within these new games of 
truth that the self may transform itself and attain a different "mode of 
being", a mode of being in which the practices of the self would allow 
"these games of power to be played with a minimum of domination". 
54 
Equally, it makes the "future formation of a 'we' possible" not by placing 
oneself in any "of the 'we's' whose consensus, whose values, whose 
traditions constitute the framework for a thought and define the 
conditions in which it can be validated"55, but by problematizing whether 
"it is actually suitable to place oneself within a 'we' in order to assert 
the principles and the values one accepts... Because it seems to me that 
the 'we' must not be previous to the question; it can only be the result- 
and the necessarily temporary result- of the question as it is posed in 
the new terms in which one formulates it". 
56 
Problematization constructs a 
relation to a 'we' we are no longer in order to open the question of who 
we are today to the actual possibility of what we are becoming, of what we 
are not yet, of what difference we are in the process of becoming. 
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The space of problematisation intensifies the 'need' for displacement, 
difference and transformation within the apparatus of subjectivisation but 
it does not propose solutions. "I am not looking for an alternative, " he 
says, "rather I would like to do a genealogy of problems, of 
problematics. " 
57 
The genealogy of problems would analyse those 
"techniques which permit individuals to affect, by their own means, a 
certain number of operations on their own bodies, their own souls, their 
own thought, their own conduct, and this in a manner so as to transform 
themselves, modify themselves. " 
58 
Distance. 
Problematisation presupposes a 'distancing' from the sedimentation of 
axiomatic practices and procedures that determine who we are by creating 
the conditions for transformations, modifications and displacements in 
who we are becoming. The problematization of the self then, finds that 
it is traversed by lines of difference (singularities, multiplicities, 
active forces, the fold, segments etc) that are subjected to unifying 
principles and transcendent structures. The activity of problematization 
springs lines of difference from any 'illusion of transcendence' and 
folds 'height' and 'depth' into a 'positive' distance: 
The idea of positive distance belongs to topology and to the 
surface. It excludes all depth and5gll elevation, which would 
restore the negative and identity. 
Positive distancing is neither opposition to or negation of existing 
self-relation but the production of immanent thought without, foundation 
or identity. The practice of problematisation offers a history of 
thought and the possibility of thinking otherwise. Thought is freedom 
in the immanent distance of the outside: 
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it is what allows one to step back from this way of acting or 
reacting, to present it to oneself as an object of thought, and 
question it as to its meaning, its conditions and its goals. 
Thought is freedom in relation to what one does, the motion by which 
one detaches oneself from it, 6Establishes 
it as an object, and 
reflects on it as a problem. 
To think is to problematise, to displace, to transform, to experiment. 
'Thought is Freedom' in the activity of problematising, displacing and 
distancing. Foucault's thought does not offer any 'ethics of 
liberation, ' it practices a distancing and detachment opening up a 'non- 
place', a heterotopic space, a theatre of multiplicities, any space 
whatever' that can be used and inhabited to produce a genealogy of 
thought and new forms of subjectivation, a thinking otherwise about the 
relation of self and thought. The problematization of ethical thought 
(of the self in thought) finds that processes of subjectivation are 
always dangerous. "My point", he says, "is not that everything is bad, 
but that everything is dangerous, which is not exactly the same as bad. 
If everything is dangerous there is always something we can do. " 
61 
Problematization is a hyperactive exposee of the dangers of 
subjectivation and in exposing these dangers opens little "spaces of 
freedom" to the outside, spaces of "care" in folding and for thinking 
otherwise. Knowledge, power and subjectivisation are the triple root of 
the dangers of problematic thought through which being is given: 
It was a matter of analyzing... the problematizations through which 
being offers itself to be, necessarily, thought- and the pEictices 
on the basis of which these problematizations are formed. 
The apparatus of thought in Foucault, as a problematization of the 
practices of knowledge, power and self is an attempt to ascertain "to 
what extent the effort to think ones own history can free thought from 
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what it silently thinks, and so enable it to think differently, "63 in 
order to invent new practices of individuation and collective 
subjectivation, new practices of thought. 
In the problematization and thinking otherwise of thought, through the 
difference and distance of problematic space, force is folded into the 
active creation of the new. For Foucault/Deleuze the new is the tension 
between the historical and the actual, the movement between what we are 
(no longer) and what we are becoming, between the not yet and the no 
longer. It is what Nietzsche called: 
the unseasonable, the uncontemporary, the becoming which bifurcates 
g1th history, the diagnostic which relays analysis with other roads. 
The new is the becoming-other of thought, its problematic resides in the 
need to locate for each system or apparatus, each map or diagram lines 
of breakage or fracture, lines of light and lines of enunciation, lines 
of force and lines of subjectivation. Problematization: 
does not establish the fact of our identity by the play of 
distinctions. It establishes that we are difference, that our reason 
is the difference of discourses, our6istory the difference of times, 
our selves the difference of masks. 
Problematic space establishes that we are difference through the 
affirmation of surfaces which are always in the process of becoming, 
practices that are purely relational and constituted in connectable, 
open and transformable series. The constitution of topological series 
dissipates negativity and identity by bestowing on surfaces ( the 
practices of knowledge,. power and self) an immanent differential ontology 
which is irreducible and not derivative or determined from something 
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secondary or lying outside them. The problematic space of interwoven 
distances and folded differences produces connections between its 
constituent parts allowing a line of subjectivation to develop which 
supports the archaeological/genealogical effort of making visible lines of 
fracture and breakage. 
Rapport a soi (the body of thought) 
This problematic and problematizing thought of the inside of the 
outside, then, first of all concerns forces and their differential 
relations: with what forces of the outside will thought come into 
contact with, what forms will be produced and synthesised as a result of 
this 'power relation' which is 'introjected' through practices creating 
a rapport a soi. With what other forces will the rapport a soi come 
into contact with forcing a 'problematisation' of those practices. On 
each occasion thought is 'complicated' by force, made to depart from an 
established path and a 'self-evident' image, forced 'outside' into a 
whole new series of impure mixtures. 
The fold of the outside makes thinking otherwise possible. The outside 
is the condition for the existence of the interiority of thought. There 
is nothing necessary or universal about the outside, it does not create 
the conditions for the possibility of thought but produces the real 
conditions of its existence through a historical and therfore 
transformable problematic. In a passage from the Use of Pleasure 
Foucault states that the rapport a soi explains thought and philosophy; 
thought is constituted through ä fold in the outside actualising an 
interior life of the concept through various historical practices. The 
rapport a soi is: 
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the living body of philosophy, at least if this latter is still now 
what it was ýg the past, that is an ascesis, an exercise of oneself, 
in thought. 
The rapport a soi rather than a form of self-reflection is a permanently 
activated mechanism of inflection such that the forces that produce it 
are acts, original actions of the fold. These actions are "not 
behaviours, nor ideas, nor societies, or their 'ideologies', but the 
problematizations through which being offers itself to be, necessarily, 
thought and the practices on the basis of which these problematizations 
are formed. " 
67 
The problematisation of thought, the 'clinamen' that swerves thought away 
from the 'self- evident' is always an affect of a bending of forces 
according to the practices in question. The folding of the forces of the 
outside creates a relation to oneself, an "ascesis", an activity of 
thought homologous to the relation with the outside. The rapport a soi is 
the anorganic life of thought, the abstract line of force (the inside of 
the outside) that keeps the living body of philosophy alive through an 
infinite becoming. The rapport a soi is not the progressive maturation of 
the body of thought (the model of the living organism) but the non-organic 
life of thought in between, the exercise or "working of thought upon 
itself" 68 that is continually begun again, that "always grows up from the 
midst", bifurcating and diverging. The rapport a soi is the immanent 
freedom of thought, the becoming other of thought that keeps it alive. 
"it was a philosophical exercise. The object was to learn to what 
extent the effort to think one's own history can free thought frogi9 
what it silently thinks, and so enable it to think differently. " 
Thought presents its own history, problematises its past through lines 
of 'breakage and fracture' in the present separating us from what we can 
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no longer say or see. The past is made actively present to the outside 
and accession, the possibility of 'thinking otherwise', of thinking the 
impossible not yet recurs: "it is the straight line of the future that 
repeatedly cuts the smallest width of the present, that indefinitely 
recuts it starting from itself. " 
70 
Foucault will go on to say that it is 
less like a cut than a "constant fibrillation. " These are the means by 
which "being can and must be thought. " 
71 The rapport a soi returns in 
thought as a repetition of difference, a history of thought as "a 
difference of times" continually dividing the present: 
and the present- split by this arrow of the future that carries it 
forward ýy always causing its swerving on both sides - endlessly 
recurs. 
The rapport a soi is the endless recurrence of the question of thought, 
each time displaced, the swerve of the being of thought- the eternal 
present forgotten yet retained in the outside, the doubling of the 
present as the memory of the past: the impossibility of return, the 
necessity of recommencement au milieu. This between time, a gap of dead 
time is the 'history of the present' "where one sees time as still to 
come and already arrived". 
73 The space-time of problematic thought is 
the folding of the outside, and, as such, forces every present into 
forgetting, but conserves every past in memory, forgetting as 
the imposgibility of return, and memory as the necessity of 
renewal. 
The eternal return of the rapport a soi as a fold in the memory of the 
outside "is the real name of the relation to self, or the affect on self 
by self". 
75 
It is the question of thought in an eternally displaced 
present. The question of our thought today, for Foucault, is the 
question of what it is possible for us to know, with what powers must we 
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struggle and through what folds must we resist: what is our rapport a 
soi today? What subjectivations are possible for us today? These are the 
questions of our actuality, of what is actual in our thought: 
This question is very different from what we call the traditional 
philosophical questions: what is the world? what is man? how can we 
know something? and so on. The question, I think, which arises at 
the end of the eighteenth century is: what are we in our actuality? 
76 
The Greek image of thought, with its complementarity between the city and 
Evclidean geometry is now a 'distant memory. ' If Euclidean knowledge 
functioned as the abstract machine for the relations between power, space 
and time in the Greek city (perhaps until our recent past? ), then Foucault 
will show the extent to which we are no longer Greek, but becoming 
something else, and there can be no return. This something else (our 
actuality) is governed by an image of thought dependent upon a non-linear 
geometry, an abstract machine that organises power, space and time as 
similutaneously individualising and totalising (Deleuze's 'societies of 
control'), increasingly microscopic and macroscopic. But there are also 
movements of change and transformation: 
do we not perhaps above all bear witness to and even participate in 
the 'production of a new subjectivity'? Do not the changes in 
capitalism find an unexpected 'encounter' in the slow emergence of a 
new self as a centre of resistance? Each time there is social change, 
is there not a movement of subjectiv97reconversion, with its 
ambiguities but also its potential? 
4. Non-linear geometries of the self 
Foucault's interiority of thought as the immanent topology of the actual, 
then, maps the processes of the self in the lines, points, intersections 
and overlaps that appear in the practical exteriorities of statements 
and visibilities and the forces that traverse them. Problematization 
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accesses our current problem (what are we today? ) by demonstrating its 
genealogical conditions of possibility (the past in the inside) and 
opens that problem to transformation (the advent of the future in the 
outside) and brings them together in a struggle "at the limit of the 
living present", at the threshold of our actuality. 
Foucault's 'torus' of thought - where inside and outside define two folded 
voids, internal and external - points to something actual in thought 
itself: an ab-sens, becoming or difference at the heart of thought, 
asymptotic lines meeting and intertwining in the folded space-time of an 
"indefinite knot. " Rather than knowledge (strata) filling an immobile 
subject container with itself as content, one finds the 'Borromean chain' 
operating the self as linkages, co-joinings, relations of separate 
orderings of different kinds of material in their "relation of non- 
relation. " The radical function of the fold, void or difference at the 
heart of this structure -a palpable density, a cutting, an involution, 
a compacity between unities - is that it prevents the totalisation, 
recognition or representation of any stable form, destroying all fixed, 
foundational identitarian positions. There is no return, only the 
continual re-activation of certain linkages in the chain, a memory of 
their forgetting. In the field of genealogy an activity of force or a 
power relation appears at the edges of cuts and folds made by 
separations that created knowledge in the first place, in cuts that 
constitute the distinction between statements and visibilities and the 
forces running through them. What Lacan said about his own work is even 
more apposite of Foucault: 
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I am trying to constitute another geometry, which would deal with 
the being of a chain. It has never, never been done. This geometry 
is not imaginary; cojhrary to the one of triangles, it is real; it 
is knots of string. 
Foucault's 'historical ontologies' of the self presuppose practices and 
strategies for refolding or retying the knots of the self in an outside 
element that will not permanently unravel or unfold the self (the 
forgetting of forgetting, death) but attach it to features of becoming 
and chance through lines of power and resistance that recreate, reknot 
and refold the self allowing a relation to oneself to emerge that is 
homologous to the relation with the outside. The knots of the self are 
topologically linked with the outside through the epistemic or stratic 
dimension (statements/visibilities) which function on each occasion as 
an intermediary, a go-between, an integrative mechanism continually 
producing new subjectivites. Some subjectivities will drift and fade, 
their power to act extracted and returned to them in the form of 
docility and subjection. Others will flourish in their capacity to 
attach themselves to other knots and lines developing their ability to 
resist and refuse capture, utilising resources from other spaces, 
reconstituting themselves in the "centre of cyclone.,, 
79 
Foucault's 
analysis offers the possibility of a moving, fluid, immanent typology of 
self- formations: The nobles, slaves, madmen, hermits, the bad, 
sinners, heretics, monastic communities, etc all invented and actualized 
through forms of subjectivisation that at one point offered potential 
resistance only to be assimilated and produced at other points elsewhere 
as part of powers deployment. What must be reconstructed on each occasion 
is the relation between the codes of behaviour and forms of 
subjectivation. Thus, for example, christian moralities must not be 
reduced simply to a 'pastoral' coding of behaviour. One must also take 
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into consideration the "many spiritual movements" that reacted against 
this coding. Between the code and practices of the self there are always 
"juxtapositions, rivalries and conflicts, and compromises. " There is a 
history of individual and collective subjectivations. 
80 
Thus, the self as synthetic matrix is assembled simultaneously in the 
register of the larger matrices (multiplicities) of power/knowledge but 
also irreducibly within the topological spaces left vacant by those 
forms (singularities), i. e. in the subjectivations affect of force on 
force, a power to affect itself and not just in the relation that forces 
have in affecting other forces or being affected by them (codifications). 
Thus, the basic force to act necessarily involves an action upon oneself, 
'an action upon an action' which is self-action. Self-action is an 
attempted synthesis with the outside, a disjunctive synthesis with the 
outside in the self. The self, then, emerges in Foucault's texts as a 
fluctuating meta-stable entity whose contours change as discrete 
components are shuffled through different combinations and into different 
configurations. We have already seen that knowledge/power regimes encode 
a folding and refolding of striated and strategic elements which traverse, 
connect and reconnect with a radical exteriority and an immanent outside. 
The final figure or dimension that Foucault offers for thought revolves 
around the possibilities of subjectivating the outside, an operation of 
subjectivity that interiorises the outside, makes it proliferate and 
multiply into a potentially unlimited set of combinations. Subjectivating 
the outside discloses "not so much what gives beings their foundation as 
what bears them for an instant towards a precarious form". 
81 
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The relations between knowledge and power and self open up a constantly 
folding interior of space-time, an involution of the curves and lines 
between these entities since the boundaries are fractal and interpenetrate 
and fold through one another in complex ways unrepresentable in 
conventional (Euclidean) spatial terms. Thus the interactions between 
statements and visibilities, forces and forms that constitute 
knowledge/power regimes enable the production of a remainder, a difference 
that differs only from itself which permanently reconfigures the 
interiorisation of space. Borne along for an instant towards a precarious 
form, the differential relation to oneself is "continually reborn, 
elsewhere and otherwise. " 
82 
Surface-folds (intensive/extensive) 
Force affects itself, differs from itself and this self-activity 
functions through space, flowing across scales from genetic mapping at a 
microbiological level where self-organising processes refold DNA coding 
mechanisms to the tracking of the large-scale flow of galaxies at a 
cosmological level, from the endocolonisation of the body to the 
exocolonisation of the cosmos: the world as the immanence of the fold. 
Foucault takes us on a journey to the interior where the self is 
assimilated to a complex and everchanging space of subjectivation and any 
distinction between an interior organism or system and an external 
environment breaks down as it changes in nature, is invaded and perforated 
by a singular form that folds its possibilities into itself. And this is 
not a static or immobile determination but a constantly folding and 
interconnected immanent 'matrix of transformation. ' 
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Surface-incursions. 
This differentiated and differentiating matrix of interiority, the inside 
of the outside as "the differentiator of the differends", 
83 
an infinite 
('endlessly reflexive') series of passages, caverns, labyrinths or 
surfaces plunged into the undifferentiated outside are indeed 'univocal' 
(non-individual singularity) but also multivalent, self-embedded and 
discontinuous (a multiplicity), an agglomeration of fold upon fold of 
self-similar surfaces produced by 'bundles of trajectories. ' These 
trajectories are the abstract dynamics of the outside that move around 
self-other positions reconfiguring their space, melting the scaling 
mechanisms that fix the interiority of selves. 
The vertiginous or dizzying effect of these transversal movements is, 
then, locked into an immanent topology, a topology of knowledge and power, 
of selves and subjectivation that essentially differs from itself in its 
incursions in or on this space. The linkage between words/things, 
subjectivity and space constantly changes in accordance with the emergency 
of new topologies of force: their 'semiotic' structure is above all a 
topological function. Lines of light and lines of the enunciable, lines 
of force and lines of subjectivisation function together as oscillators, 
effectors, tensors and nodes in a signifying or semiotic regime: a moving 
dispositif of subjectification. The dynamic of the regime is structured 
by stretching, squeezing and folding actions that interweave all the lines 
together in a composite space that realigns its own constitutive points 
in a 'simulation' or 'memory' of its own initial conditions. Statements 
become folded and foldable matter, etched to a point within visible 
strata. 
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Surface-recursion 
It is through memory that Foucault thinks the self as a topological 
structure of time. And this structure is thought as a non-linear, 
discontinuous iteration, an orbit traced by the discrete value of 
constitutive points, and the movement across scales. Each surface, with 
its own complex entanglements of scaled lines, knots, 'accumulations' and 
'remanences' has "it's own particular index of temporal 'viscosity" 
84 
that functions as a distribution network for the folds of the self. The 
final figure of Foucauldian space as an interiorisation of the outside 
reissues time as the dynamic immanent to the folding of spatial 
trajectories. There is thus in Foucault an oscillation, alternation or 
flickering through the spatialisation of time to the temporalisation of 
space: the endless folding of the no longer (the time of the past inside) 
into the not yet (the time of the future outside) in the struggle over the 
'now', what we are in our actuality, a history of the present as the 
folding of thought in space-time. 
every inside-space is topologically in contact with the outside- 
space, independent of distance and on the limits of the 'living'; 
and this carnal or vital topology, far from showing up in space, 
frees a sense of time that fits the past into the inside, brings 
about the future in the outside, and brings the tw95into 
confrontation at the limit of the living present. 
The topological texture of time incorporates an interior and an exterior 
aspect (intensive/extensive time) that merge and interpenetrate. Time 
is both an iterative process that generates shifting perameters and 
movements across scales (past) through the interior of the actual, (the 
patternings of subjectivation in an enunciable/visible series), yet, 
'internal time' is expressed as an 'outside' (future) in an immanence of 
the virtual as a bundle of criss-crossing trajectories. Time now 
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carries with it a three-fold relation involving the incursions of 
words/things, subjectivation and space ( as practices of thought) on 
each iteration and also the folding of these iterations through 
recursion. Incursion marks the relation between words/things, 
subjectivation and space and recursion produces the time that traces the 
pathways of self-relation across the 'living'. Individuation then 
becomes provisional or processual; a differential located at the seam 
dividing the stratified from the smooth space of the outside. 
Absolute memory 
When Deleuze names 'absolute memory' as the dimension that differentiates 
itself from and is irreducible to the dimensions of force relations and 
the forms of knowledge, he is referring to the function of folding and 
circling back which re-routes experiences or impressions into recursively 
connected loops. Memory operates through a system analogous to a 
recursive function in mathematics: a movement both forward and wrapping 
around itself where at the moment when looping back through reconnects 
with itself we arrive not at a coincidence of paths, or the full presence 
of consciousness but an internal, differential displacement against a 
system of meanings which could not be reconfigured as a dialectical move 
toward synthesis. Absolute memory mechanisms produce self-generating 
temporal loops that involute their own generative structure and the self 
becomes a forgetting retained in the fold of space-time - the memory of 
the ouside, folded and displaced in the inside, the asignifying, 
non-presence of the outside paradoxically retained as a forgotten memory, 
the unthought self of thought that insists through a 'non-relation' in the 
present opening it to a thinking-otherwise. 
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Counter Memory. 
Absolute memory is the space-time where 'counter memories' can be invented 
and actualised. The space of difference between absolute memory and 
counter-memory requires that the process of actualisation is a creation, a 
fiction. Absolute memory is the fold or splicing together of the archive 
and the diagram. It is the zone of the collision or 'battle', the 
'atmospheric element'or 'non-stratified substance' that stategically 
articulates the practices of knowledge, power and self together. If 
absolute memory retains this outside, it is like a retention of 
forgetting, a fold of the past that is activated and reactivated by 
counter-memory: it "is the true name of the relation to self, or the 
affect of self by self". 
86 'Counter-memory 'compels thinking to start 
again. ' It traces out and fictions other lines of visibility and 
enunciation, other lines of force and lines of subjectivation. In 
its folding with absolute memory, counter-memory produces forms of 
subjectivation which escape from the powers and forms of knowledge only 
in order to be reinserted into another dispositif of subjectivation and 
self-relation which has yet to come into being. Counter-memory links 
and relinks with absolute memory by reinscribing the virtual back into a 
materiality, force and becoming of the self. Only counter-memory as a 
memory of forgetting, as the unfolding or unravelling of the memory of 
the outside "recovers what is folded in memory (and in the fold 
itself)". 87 
The non-linear geometries of the self emerge as a fluctuating, metastable 
fold or relation of lines of force in space-time whose contours are 
constantly reworked as discrete components are shuffled about in different 
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combinations and configurations. Subjectivating self is, then, neither 
active or passive (neither determining the real through ideation nor 
receiving it through sensation) but a historically variable combination 
of relations of force that produce the real; it is an incursion of force 
in space-time that recursively folds into a machine capable of using 
this incursion, a practical and constantly problematising self that 
constitutes itself on a plane of consistency, an immanent, rhizomatic 
multiplicity without foundation, origin or end. 
Fractal subjects 
A number of recent discourses have deployed the metaphor of fractals. 
Fractals provide an appropriate metaphor for Foucault's idea of the self 
as subjectivating relation because they are structures without a centre; 
they are decentred forms immanent to and bound up with their own formative 
processes. Lyotard utilises this notion in characterising thought: 
"thoughts are clouds. The periphery of thoughts is as immeasurable as the 
fractal lines of Benoit Mandelbrot. " 
88 
The 'immeasurable periphery' 
captures some of the qualitative aspects of Foucauldian thought and 
subjectivation: boundaries are jagged yet edgeless and discontinuous 
within a single scale in a given series but also continuous in the 
self-activity of form across the scale of immanence. Thought is ruptured 
and fissured at one level yet takes on a distinctive shape of its own on a 
larger scale: the relation of singularities and multiplicities in the 
immanent plane of thought. Lyotard goes on to extend fractal thought to 
the element of time: 
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As postponement itself, time does not allow the full synthesis of 
the moments or positions the mind crossed through in approaching a 
cloud of thoughts, time is what blows a cloud away after we believed 
it was correctly known and compels thinking to start again on 99new 
inquiry, which includes the anamnesis of former elucidations. 
Lyotards notion of (anti) anamnesis presents time as an indefinite yet 
irreversible process, a bank of clouds carried by the wind, forming 
through chaotic convections. This is an analogous description of 
Foucauldian/Deleuzian 'absolute memory/counter memory. ' With the 
development of a memory of the outside in Foucault/Deleuze we can see the 
emergence of an encompassing topological ecology between knowledge, power 
and subjectivity: a series of symbiotic relationships which process the 
dynamic immanence and practical/functional ontology of Foucault's thought 
within the knowledge/power/subject matrix. They are continually 
interpenetrating and folding through one another in complex ways 
unrepresentable in conventional (euclidian) spatial terms because these 
entities (the relations between them) are fractal. 
Foucault's knowledge, power, self matrix profoundly resonates with 
Guattari's "three ecologies" (socius, psyche, 'nature'). Guattari's 'new 
aesthetic paradigm' links knowledge, power and self together in its 
"individual, collective and institutional instances" as the conditions for 
the possibility of chaosmosis, the development of existential territories 
as an intensive repetition of difference, an immanent 'encounter' with the 
outside, a collective assemblage of thought. 
90 
Ultimately, the non-linear geometries of the self are articulated through 
the outside as the abstract line of thought, the line without contour, or 
shape - non-geometries - the imageless plane of life. 
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S. Self- Resistance: making the multiple 
Forms of self-relation and processes of subjectivation are mapped each 
time in their continuous variations in relation to all the other 
variable lines that make up an apparatus, lines of strata (knowledge), 
lines of force (power), lines of flight (resistance): a moving, 
bifurcating dispositif of thought. Foucault shows that the thought of 
resistance to this apparatus is a problem of "transformable 
singularities" and heterotopic multiplicities. what exactly do we 
struggle against, in each situation, in order to "get free of oneself. "91 
This is the essential political dimension to subjectivation. 
Subjectivation in its continuous variation and folding with the outside 
endorses the primacy of resistance: 
there will always be a relation to oneself which resists codes and 
powers; the relation to eself is even one of the origins of their 
points of resistance. " 
The self bends forces, make them relate to one another through practice 
and discipline, the site of resistance: the folded inside of an outside, 
an inside "that lies deeper than any interior world.,, 
93 
'Crossing the line' in Foucault involves constituting and sustaining the 
multiple as a force of resistance, lines of flight the force of which is 
found "in those sorts of particles endowed with an energy that is all the 
greater for their being small and difficult to spot. " 
94 
Foucault's 
vitalism or force of life is that 'point of departure' that leaves a micro 
agitation, a micro-politics of life that is constantly on the move 
attempting to escape the great 'machines of capture. ' The machines that 
make visible and enunciable always contain gaps and holes through which, 
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for a time, the micro may move triggering off other lines to form a 
concerted network. Yet each time the variable mixes have to be 
decomposed, broken down and then recomposed perhaps even according to 
'aesthetic' criteria. Even at the macro level a few great binaries have 
managed to 'cleave the social fabric' opening up channels and nodes 
through which resistance might flow. Foucault admits that these have been 
few and that greater success may well be obtained at a more local or 
regional level since these levels can be attacked strategically in order 
to agitate the global, inflect it, and make it change its course. The 
point is not to complete a journey, arrive home, but to open new lines, 
allow them to proliferate, or at a certain points arrest their 
development, squeeze out their materiality, etch them to a spot. This 
would only be a necessarily temporary activity, certainly not 'free' of 
power, but a redistribution of its possibilites into the space of a 
'permanent provocation, ' the space of an immanent freedom of thought. 
Foucault, then, has never said that geopolitical lines of power simply 
subsume and dictate the internal lives of people. Lines of power 
structure individual selves, but selves do not remain dependent upon 
these lines but develop their own action and movement refolding and 
'hollowing out, these lines within the 'field of possible actions. ' 
Foucault fictions out of the network a multi-dimensional space of 
resistance, a topology of possibilities through which new forces of 
subjectivation might emerge. The problem for Foucault right from the 
beginning has always been "one for the subject who acts - the subject of 
action through which the real is transformed. " 
95 
The subject on each 
occasion is not 'given to us' but presupposes a basic force to act. 
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This force of action is relayed though points, lines, receptors, tensors 
and connectors which make up a matrix of power/knowledge regimes in 
continuous variation: subjectivating the outside. 
In all of Foucault's books selves are mapped as a permanently contested 
set of coordinates, plastic, modulated forces channelled through 
singular points that function as ideal or abstract forces, informal and 
infinite metastable states which may be actualised and counter- 
actualised in various ways. The singular points of the practices of 
subjectivation relayed through the multiplicities of the outside. This 
immanent 'metaphysical surface' places statements and visibilities 
together, presents their relations of force and articulates them "on the 
basis of their difference. " Thus two heterogeneous series of terms are 
produced and set in relation or resonance through a mobile and polyvalent 
outside. These supple mechanisms enable the mapping of the possible 
discursive and non-discursive spaces/sites where selves may emerge to be 
recognised or excluded. 
The disjunctive multiplicities of the self are articulated, then, as the 
splitting between the virtual idea multiplicity and the actual individual 
multiplicity and their fusion, splicing or folding together. The self is 
suspended over the void, a virtual reservoir of matter/energy, the caesura 
of space-time, filled with oneself. The space between preindividual 
singularities and the full-fledged self filled with forces from the 
outside is actively inhabited by the mechanism of the fold which creates 
an interior. Folding through practical exercises or technologies of the 
self thus opens up a unique topological formation, an interior that has 
its own historical apriori's and conditions of emergence, its own 
possibilities of liberation and domination. 
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Foucauldian subjectivation thus functions as an irreducible assemblage 
articulated onto the other assemblages of power and knowledge. Subject- 
assemblages are formed and deformed through an unformed element 
dissipated through an arrangement of bodies and visibilities and an 
organisation of signs and enunciables. The unformed element or abstract 
machine registers only affects on bodies and words and the process 
through which they are reciprocally affected. On the one hand the 
subject assemblage faces the strata of knowledge and power which gives 
it the form of an organism, a signifying system locked into a striated 
space of interiority and on the other the subject assemblage faces a 
'body without organs', flows of asignifying particles flooding the 
smooth space of the outside. Different subject assemblages are 
constituted on each occasion through 'capture' and the reciprocal 
interfacing with the outside. These articulations function together to 
produce the mechanism of the fold as subject: the outside as the 
'membrane' of the inside, the molar as the 'torsion' of the molecular. 
In all of Foucault's work 'subjectivation' is a process that links 
segments together, segments made up of energies, movements and 
capacities. The segments are assembled and 'produced' constituting 
together a temporary alignment of multiplicites. Foucault's cartography 
studies the activity of 'conduct, ' 'conduction' in this process. 
96 
Conduction does not produce permanent multiplicities, the stable, the 
self-same, the one. Conduct does not orchestrate the real through 
representation but constitutes it. Nietzsche's hypothesis ('my 
hypothesis: the subject as multiplicity' 
97) 
opposes the subject to ones 
or twos linking up the process of subject formation with dimensions in- 
between speeding up their proliferation. Above all "multiplicities are 
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defined by the outside, " 
98 
the conduction of multiplicities through an 
outside that ensures that their transformable potential is always 
actualised through their connections with other multiplicities. 
Foucauldian/Deleuzian subjectification is a process of becoming and 
multiplicity that can be disassembled into parts and segments and 
reassembled; unfolded and refolded into other immanent spaces that 
strategically offer more leverage in prizing open boundaries, 
problematizing them and distributing difference across their surfaces. 
Subjectivation, as a process of multiplicity never presupposes fixed 
states or finalised static points; it always refers to tendencies and 
trajectories that can be realigned, redistributed and related across the 
topological network. 
Di sposi ti f 
The lines, knots and folds of self- multiplicity run through the 
apparatus of subjectivity, each time dividing in nature. The multiple is 
knotted into an apparatus even as it resists it, changes it and is 
assimilated by it. The apparatus itself is "the system of relations that 
can be established between these elements. " 
99 
Power functions as the 
'empty centre' of the apparatus, blind and mute, operating through 
strategies that make the heterogeneous and multiple elements of 
subjectivation articulate together. 
In short, between these elements, whether discursive or non- 
discursive, there is a sort of interplay of shifts of posit }$$ and 
modifications of function which can also vary very widely. 
Processes of subjectivation take place across the surfaces of 
knowledge/power at varying speeds and modalities according to their 
distribution throughout the 'heterogeneous ensemble, ' 'the said as much 
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as the unsaid' effecting an alignment and disalignment (a dispositif) of 
their form with the forces through which they were produced. These (dis) 
alignments are an effect of force relations captured in strategies 
responding to an 'urgent need. ' 
The apparatus thus has a dominant strategic function. This may have 
been, for example, the assimilation of a floating population found 
to be burdensome for an essentially mercantilist economy: there was 
a strategic imperative acting here as the matrix for an apparatus 
which gradually undertook thelgintrol or subjection of madness, 
mental illness and neurosis. 
The 'urgent need' surrounding the space of subjectivisation is always 
bound up with the historical strategies, expressed through force 
relations, that constitute each apparatus. The apparatus is a moving 
heterotopic space made up of more or less co-ordinated lines and knots 
of which Foucault gives us multiply layered maps, lines disentangled and 
knots undone. It is, he says, 'working in the field'. 
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In Foucault's last works on the apparatus of subjectivation he 
concentrated on those lines of a continuous variation that actualise 
truth. If, in all of Foucault's previous works he had analysed the 
apparatuses of madness, punishment and sexuality in order to produce a 
cartography of the truth of knowledge and the truth of power (not, for 
all that, without having produced the truth of subjectivity in those 
apparatuses). Foucault in his last work elevates the search for a 
cartography of the apparatus of subjectivity in its relation to truth 
out of an 'urgent need' in the present. Foucault had mapped the truths 
of light and the visible making up knowledge and the truths of power and 
force that compose strategies whose lines all actualise together 
producing the truth of the apparatus. In previous analyses the lines of 
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subjectivity were not sufficiently disentangled from all the others in 
order to present them in their irreducibility as a separate, but 
interlinked, apparatus or ontology. 
At stake, then, in Foucault's apparatus of subjectivity or interiority of 
thought particularly in the last books and interviews, is how the 
possibilities (multiplicities) of self and subjectivation (for inhabiting 
a smooth space of thought) are defined (stratified and striated) in 
relation to apparatuses of knowledge, power and truth in given historical 
formations, and how these possibilities can be developed as resistance in 
the present through the formation of 'historical ontologies' of the self, 
a unique and irreducible apparatus of interiority, a history of resistance 
that is 'derived' from the apparatuses of knowledge and power, overlaps 
with them but is not dependent upon them. ' 
For Foucault the lines of the present that constitute the apparatus of 
subjectivity merge together in a knot of individuality that "categorises 
the individual, marks him by his own individuality, attaches him to his 
own identity, imposes a law of truth on him which he must recognise. It 
is these lines of force that makes individuals subjects. " 
103 
The present 
modes of subjectivation have passed into the Code, have been emptied out 
and reinscribed to the profit of the Code. This type of power, derived 
from Christian technologies of the self which link 'sexuality, 
subjectivity and truth' together as the terrain for self-discovery, 
assumes the function of individualising and penetrating the interior: 
first the pastoral powers of church, then their takeover by the state. 
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Tearing the subject 
If this 'individualising and modulating power' makes individuals 
subjects then Foucault will propose the task of 'tearing' the subject 
and folding it into new forms of subjectivity. ' Foucault attempts: 
the task of "tearing" the subject from itself in such a way that it 
is no longer the subject as such, or that it is completely "other" 
than itself so Jýat it may arrive at its annihilation, its 
dissociation" 
Tearing the self is a 'disubjectifying undertaking', a practice of 
dissociating the existing lines of relation to self, decomposing and 
refolding processes of subjectivation by taking them to their limit. The 
fundamental lesson of 'tearing' the self along the line of the fold, of 
tearing the self from itself so that it may fold and become other enables 
Foucault to open a space for a new 'experience' of subjectivity, a 
'limit-experience in the outside. ' 
in which the subject reaches decomm8 ition, leaves itself, at the 
limits of its own impossibility. 
The decomposition of the subject on the line of the outside and its 
recomposition on the plane of immanence is what Deleuze and Guattari have 
named a "body without organs. " The body without organs is the 
annihiliation of subjectivity at the limits of its own impossibility, ' 
the 'degree-zero' of being in the immanence of the outside. 
Tearing the self is a constantly re-experienced struggle or agon to 
destratify oneself in the assemblages of the present and reconstruct them 
in the 'not yet' or 'actuality' of the outside. We must "go further 
still, we haven't found our BWO yet, we haven't sufficiently dismantled 
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our self. " 
106 In fact, "you never reach the body without organs, you 
can't reach it, you are forever attaining it. It is a limit.,, 
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Foucault will designate this experience as a Nietzschean 'eternal return': 
Can it be said that the subject is the only form of existence 
possible? Can't there be experiences in which the subject, in its 
constitutive relations, in its self-identity, isn't given any more? 
And thus wouldn't experiences be given in which the subject could 
dissociate itself, break its relationship with itself, lose its 
identity? Wasn't this perhaps thi0xperience of Nietzsche, with the 
metaphor of the external return? 
Eternal return = terminal identity. 
Terminal identity is the fusion with multiplicity itself, the ever-renewed 
effort to reconnect one's assemblages in an exchange with the outside. 
Foucault/Deleuze think the contemporaneity of terminal identity through 
the dissolution of the apparatus of subjectivity and its insertion into 
the spaces of the machinic: 
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the points of disjunction on the body without organs form circles 
that converge on the desiring-machines; then the subject - produced 
as a residuum alongside the mnachine, as an appendix, or as a spare 
part adjacent to the machine - passes through all the degrees of the 
circle, and passes from one circle to another. This subject itself 
is not at the center, which is occupied by the machine, but on the 
periphery, with no fixed identity, fifaver decentered, defined by 
the states through which it passes. 
Terminal identity names the 'double-articulation' of the end of the 
apparatus of subjectivity and the construction of the new relations of 
subjectivation. All of Foucault's efforts regarding the apparatus of 
subjectivity are an attempt to intervene in the space of this 'double 
articulation. ' To bend, fold and tear at the lines of the self in 
order "to move towards something radically other", 
ill 
continual exchange 
with the outside to loosen the grip of the no longer and accelerate the 
becoming of the not yet: 
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it is a question rather of the destruction of what we are, of the112 
creation of something entirely different, of a total innovation. 
For Foucault it is the 'eternal return' of processes of 
destruction/creation that supplies the apparatuses of subjectivity with 
their historical dynamic. Foucault marks his reformulation of the 
'death of man' with this problematic: 
in the course of their history men had never ceased constructing 
themselves, that is, to shift continuously the level of their 
subjectivity, to constitute themselves in an infinite and multiple 
series of different subjectivities that would never reach an end and 
would never place us in the presence of something that would be 
'man. ' Man is an animal of experience, he is involved ad infinitum 
within a process that, by defining a field of objects at the same 
time changes hjn deforms him, transforms him and transfigures him 
as a subject. 
Foucault thinks the history of the apparatuses of subjectivation as 
interminable terminal identity, a thousand tiny 'deaths'. The analyses of 
the deaths of man show that man is just one stratification of the living, 
just one form of organizing processes of subjectivation in relation to an 
experience that 'changes him, deforms him, transforms him and transfigures 
him', a process of contact ad infinitum (eternal return) with the immanent 
plane of the outside, the constant questioning and transforming of the 
role of the self in thought that is freedom. 
G. The freedom of thought. 
We have seen then that the fold itself organises the relation between 
thought, subjectivisation and freedom in Foucault's apparatuses. The 
problematic unthought gives way to a thinking being that problematises 
itself in the freedom of the fold of the outside. This problematic 
freedom, agonism or sttuggle in relation to oneself is given by the 
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operations of the fold. The immanent plane of outside thought 
'encounters' the line of the fold and bends producing a relation 
with oneself homologous with the outside: 
it is not a doubling of the one, but a redoubling of the other. It 
is not a reproduction of the same, but a repetition of the 
different. It is not the emanation of an 'I', but something that 
places in immanence an always other or a Non-self. It is never the 
other who is a double in the doubling process, it is a self that 
lives me as the double of the other: I do not encounter myself on 
the outside, I find the other in me ('it is always concerned with 
showing how the Other, the Distant, is also the Near and the Same'). 
It resembles exactly the invagination of a tissue in embryology, or 
the act of doubling in sewing: twist, fold, stop and so on. 
The freedom of the self in thought is thus a problem of folding and 
detaching to the greatest degree possible, the stratified forms of 
power/knowledge from the subjectivating plane of the outside; it is the 
problem not of getting out of power but of folding the forces of the 
outside in order to resist organising techniques of the self. The 
dimension of the outside and the mechanism of the fold transport 
subjectivisation and any 'savage' experience from the domain of power into 
the strategic 'other' or stratosphere enabling the invention of new 
relations between forces which place subjectivisations within 'man, 'or 
'beyond' man. 
It is always a question of the extent to which selves are bound to the 
stratifications of the organism, of significance and of subjectification: 
the organisation of bodies in space-time; an allocation of significance or 
meaning linked to the semiotic system; the construction and fabrication of 
individuality (preferably as isolatable, 'private' and always in 
'competition'). It is always a question of resistance to this "white 
wall-black hole 'system'", 
115 
continually constructing lines and relays to 
the outside to think-otherwise and differently. 
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The freedom of thought (of the self in thought) is thus a problem of 
interlocking assemblages (lines, spaces, points, modes of individuation 
etc) and the extent to which they may be unfolded from the plane of 
organisation and refolded in the immanence of the outside. 
The 'self evidences' of the plane of organisation, of the forms of 
knowledge and the powers that traverse them require a 'freezing' of 
subject positions, their 'emplacement' within molar unities in order to 
ensure that spaces are stabilised, and striated according to the 'great 
binary aggregates. ' Thus the space of the system functions 
homeostatically, hermetically sealing in energies and intensities, 
asphyxiating processes of subjectivation, damming up forces in the form of 
'subjection. ' The disciplinary mechanisms that actualise this process are 
complimented by 'governmentalities, ' the dispersion of biopowers and the 
technologies of the self. All of these techniques and operations involute 
one another and overlap but equally allow points of leakage through which 
other lines might run and become entangled with others setting off other 
more fluid lines. 
The 'freezing' that enables subjection can be liquified through these 
lines affording the creation of passages, cracks and fissures that 
bifurcate to destinations unknown. The liquidation, or better still, 
the liquefaction of the subject does not vilify of empty it forcing it 
into 'a line of death and abolition. ' Liquefaction conducts that ration 
of subjectivity or strata, force or resistance that is the effect or 
difference of powers fold into new creative lines, molecular 
combinations or assemblages of the outside. 
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Attraction 
The problematic object of thought (freedom) that Foucault constructs, in 
relation to the apparatus of subjectivisation, is presented in its 
relation to the fundamental 'forces of attraction' through which specific 
practices are actualised and a specific 'rapport a soil is created. 
Foucault thinks attraction as utterly impersonal, inaccessible and without 
form. It is the virtual unseen and unsaid that subsists in processes of 
observation and procedures of expression - in 'technologies of the 
self. ' Attraction is "the pure, most naked experience of the outside. " 
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It dissolves interior identity by "infinitely unfolding outside any 
enclosure. " 
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In its folding with the outside attraction functions as a 
probability or tendency that invites both a 'hollowing out' and a 
'doubling', as Foucault constantly says. It is an "amorphous anonymity' 
- that divests iteriority of its identity, hollows it out, and divides 
it into non-coincident twin figures. " 
118 
If, in Foucault's earlier books he had shown the doubling of knowledge and 
power, the doubling of an exterior and an outside, in the last books he 
invents a doubling of the outside itself, the forces of attraction 
interiorising the outside creating "an inside that is deeper than any 
interior. " 
119 
Foucault models the apparatus of subjectivation as a 
'continuous transformation' whose geometry is multi-dimensional, fractal 
(with relative, intermediary insides/outsides) and 'determined' within 
variable 'attractors/attractions' of force relations. It is when 'the 
outside collapses and attracts interiorities" that the possibilities for 
new modes of subjectivation are opened. 
120 How can one attract 
the outside? How can we place ourselves within existing forces of 
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attraction in order to decelerate them, or speed them up? How can one 
construct new forces of attraction? On each occasion the questions will 
differ depending upon the relative danger of each arrangement of force. 
Dangers. 
The questions will be different on each occasion determined by the 
relative danger of each arrangements of forces. That "everything is 
dangerous" is a basic premise of Foucault's thought. The genealogist of 
problems cannot look to alternatives to answer these questions but must, 
in each instance, "determine which is the main danger. " 
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The dangers 
inherent in this enterprise can only be displaced if Foucault's own 
apparatus of thought distances and detaches itself from itself; in its 
analysis of the dangers of thought, Foucault's apparatus of thought must 
free itself from 'what it silently thinks' in order to 'think otherwise, ' 
'think differently; ' Foucault's immanent spatialised and spatialising 
logics and strategies generate this movement in his thought; 'dangers' in 
Foucault's apparatus of thought are displaced in the outside through the 
problematisation of their conditions of possibility. 
The knowledge/power/subjectivisation system that runs through the 
apparatus of thought in Foucault is subject to a "sort of open strategic 
game, where things can be reversed. " The possibility of reversal is a 
form of resistance that Foucault endorses in the dangers that he analyses 
and in the dangers of his own discourse. Reversibility is one move in a 
'game with oneself. ' It is also a move within a 'game of truth. ' 
122 
The 
radical discontinuity of Foucault's apparatus of thought with itself is a 
'permanent task' of displacement and transformation in order to provoke 
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the constant elaboration of 'games of truth' in his thought. The attempt 
to constantly distance and detach thought from itself in order to avoid 
becoming complicit and entrenched within the space of sedimented thought 
is one of the primary strategies and moves within Foucault's game with 
oneself. It is the game of freedom in the immanent thought of the 
outside. The space of thought is stretched, folded, doubled-up and 
reversed in Foucault's apparatus of thought, dissolving intentionality and 
exteriorising synthesis into a topological relation with the outside. The 
'interiority' of Foucault's apparatus of thought emerges as a hollowing 
out or involution of the outside which develops through its own 
proliferating self relations. 
Self-action or self-relation, subjectivation or inside of an outside 
is, then, the final figure of heterotopic space in Foucault's topology of 
thought. The introjection of force carves out an interior vertiginous 
space that expands or contracts on a scale that gauges the degree to 
which the diagram or apparatus is fulfilled. Like a Cartesian diver 
subjectivation rises or falls according to the powers that invest it, 
the resistances it creates and the knowledges that condition it. These 
are all original figures and spaces of the action of thought. The 
action of thought is purely relational an action upon an action' and in 
affecting itself it reveals the outside to be its own unthought element. 
For Foucault thought is flux, a constant movement and an action of flow, 
connection and distribution that traverses striated spaces, loosens and 
fissures them and carries off the released sediments to other folded 
spaces along its curvature. The curvature of thought is the fold of 
material(non-discursive) and discursive spaces. Subjectivation is the 
expression of these folded spaces and these folded spaces are the 
expression of subjectivation. 
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Autopoetic spaces 
123 
Foucault's 'aesthetics of existence' names the sites or spaces for "a 
new art of living in society. " 
124 
It names an 'autopoetic' space a space 
of self-creation, self-organisation and self production whose topology 
and dynamics constantly escape the codes and rules of knowledge/power 
apparatuses. Autopoesis names the process, though which forms of 
subjectivation are produced. It constitutes a system of relations that 
condition and are conditioned by an opening onto the outside and by the 
production of immanent components through these relations. Autopoesis is a 
practice, a practice that is the 'ontological condition' 
125 
of 
subjectivation. 
The autopoetic machinery of subjectivation defines it's relation to the 
outside as "an intensive relation of immanence" 
126 
that redefines the 
self through non-discursive asignifying and machinic components and their 
relations. Foucault theorises in 'aesthetics of existence' a 
heterogenesis of subjectivation, an ontological pluralism and an 
epistemological multiplicity: human subjectivity is an "autopoetic 
snowball. " 
127 
Foucault's texts utterly refuse any notion of subjectivity as given, 
already there, already formed, waiting for us to change it, understand 
it, or react against it. Foucault refuses "the idea that there does 
exist a nature or foundation which, as a result of a certain number of 
historical, social or economic processes, found itself concealed, 
alienated or imprisoned in and by some repressive mechanism. " 
128 
In fact 
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he says "I had to reject a certain apriori theory of the subject in 
order to make this analysis of the relationships which can exist between 
the constitution of the subject or different forms of the subject and 
games of truth, practices of power and so forth. " 
129 
Autopoetic space 
opens the possibility for subjectivation to create and produce itself 
through its relations with this space-time. It opens new possibilities of 
agency, agencement or assemblage. Autopoetic space is generated through 
the fold of the outside. It develops along the line of the fold itself. 
Auto-poetic space is a space of mutation and transformation, it is not 
a historically given 'form' but rather a space of becoming or a 
'probability of emergence' that is immanent to a historically given form 
of discourse and the power-knowledge relations they organise. 
Autopoetic space is the final figure of space that emerges out of 
Foucault's texts. It is a composite of archaelogical space 
(correlative, complimentary and collateral) and genealogical space 
(diagrammatic) that creates and produces out of itself an 'exposition' 
of the relation or self-relation of forces as they act on themselves 
producing so many subjectifications. It operates a mechanism of the 
fold that produces 'minor' subjects within a majoritarian subject. 
Foucault's spatialising logics aim to make possible "a reappropriation, 
an autopoesis, of the means of production of subjectivity. " 
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In the last volumes of the History of Sexuality Foucault attempts to 
give a response to the present mutable conditions under which 
subjectivity is produced. It attempts to offer the conditions to enable 
the construction of a full body, a heterogeneous subjectivity. The 
constitution of autopoetic. space requires a destratification of 'extreme 
276 
caution' a 'care of the self' that does not devolve into 'techniques' of 
the self that 'may be suicidal, or turn cancerous, ' plunging into a 
'blackhole. ' But the development of a resistance to the 
'blackhole/white wall' system through a care of the self that produces 
itself in the matrix through a specific strategy of folding in specific 
heterogeneous spaces. Not counter-attack or reaction but the double and 
the fold. Not striated space that captures strata in its grids, but the 
smooth space of autopoesis in the becoming of the outside. This is only 
possible "precisely on the condition of assuming the multiplicity within 
oneself. " 
131 
Foucault's interiority of thought sustains a "profound 
Nietzscheanism" from beginning to end and in the folding of the force, 
becoming and chaos of the outside there is no telling what a "living 
being" might achieve: 
I tell you: one must have chaos in one, to givelýjrth to a dancing 
star. I tell you: you still have chaos in you. 
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EPILOGUE 
THINKING-OTHERWISE: 
Freedom between life and thought 
11 To form concepts is a way of living... " 
1 
Foucault 
"Life - that means for us constantly transforming all that we are into 
light and flame. " 
2 
Nietzsche 
It all ends, then, "in the interior of the exterior and inversely, " 
Foucault's topologies of thought offering a series of interstitial and 
recursive maps for thinking-otherwise between knowledge, power and self: 
maps of space that fold between the inside and the outside and maps of 
time that fold between the not yet and the no longer "where one sees 
time as still to come and as having already happened"3, constituting a 
partial and fragmentary spatio- temporal "history of the systems of 
thought". Transgressive maps, archaeological maps, event-maps, diagrammatic 
maps and maps of the self are indefinite and reversible imageless images of 
the space-time of thought, lines of flight to the outside consisting of 
lines, points and surfaces in a relation of non-relation constantly 
moving and intersecting, cutting across and folding through one another, 
producing relays, connections and multiple points of entry and exit. 
They produce an experimentation in contact with the real', a potential, 
capacity or freedom actualised as the transformed and reconfigured 
space-time of thought. 
Foucault's mobile and constantly changing analytic frameworks are 
composite maps of immanence and multiplicity in an experimentation with 
thought, a strategy for connecting with the outside and transforming the 
real. Knowledge, Power and Self comprise a dynamic, 'open', and 
rhizomorphous system of relational spaces of thought that reconfigure 
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time as a topological multiplicity, a multi-valent durational space that 
distributes its elements throughout the coexisting 'lacuncary layers' of 
simultaneous, heterogeneous and juxtaposed series. Foucault thinks time 
as a distributive mechanism for a space in between and outside thought. 
The spaces of knowledge, power and self are no longer 'fixed, ' 
'immobile' and 'undialectical' but irreducible sites that condition and 
are conditioned by each other. Thus, we are to imagine a series of 
complex reciprocally interlaced spaces that inhere in a 'relation of 
non-relation. ' Knowledge, power and self-formations are 'complicated' 
topological spaces operating as a constitutive, mobile network whose 
metastability ensures its permanent transformation. These topological 
formations are in 'continual variation' across each other and through 
their own dimensions. They are 'matrices of transformation. ' 
Time is no longer thought as 'richness, ' 'fecundity, ' 'life' and 
'dialectic' since to release the topological potentials of space 
automatically short-circuits the linear, continuous and progressivist 
time lines of chronology. The space-time multiplicities of knowledge, 
power and self are always not yet, ' always of the 'outside, ' always in 
a process of becoming set loose from the identity and representation of 
a container-contained model of space formed by a continuist, linear 
chronos. Released from this model space 'informs' time offering thought 
a new image of space-time becoming, a topology of thought that opens 
onto a 'thinking - otherwise' about the relations of knowledge, power 
and self. 
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The Euclidean conception of an axiomatic spatial system is shattered 
into a non-euclidean space-time topology offering the possibility of a 
new image of thought an imageless image -a new philosophical thought of 
space-time. 
Euclidean and perspective space have disappeared as systems of 
reference, along with other former 'commonplaces' such as the town, 
history, paterjity, the tonal system in music, traditional morality 
and so forth. 
Foucault's system of spatial thinking attempts to speed up the 
recognition of this new category of 'space-time' relations so that 
"thought may become possible again. " Thought is erased in the fixed, 
static, closed and binary images of space kept in circulation by 
transcendental, dialectical, phenomenological and structural modes of 
thinking. For none of those permit a move away from taxanomic, 
categorical or totalising spaces in order to find 'other' spaces, 
heterotopic spaces for which no concept, form or abstract model is 
given. The heterotopic spaces of knowledge, power and self are both 
'larger' than the other systems allow (heterotopologies both precede and 
escape their abstractions e. g. forms, conditions, totalities e. t. c. 
heterotopologies are 'multiplicities') and 'smaller' than the 'types, ' 
'kinds, ' 'particulars' which are said to 'exemplify' or 'participate' in 
generalised forms (heterotopologies are 'singularities' i. e. events or 
'haecceities' of thought). In short, these other modes or systems of 
thinking space are too metaphysical, 'arboreal' and bound to the tree, 
root and branch that sanctifies and legitimates Western thought. 
The 'history of systems of thought' diagnoses the abstractions of space 
by showing that there is much more 'regularity' in the practices of 
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space than other modes of thought will allow but that this regularity 
conditions the existence for 'other' spaces outside thought that open 
space and thought to change and transformation. There is much more 
freedom in the practices of space which other systems of thought cannot 
see, cannot accept. 
I think it is somewhat arbitrary to try to disssociate the effective 
practice of freedom by people, the practice of social relations, and 
the spatial distributions in which they find themselves. If they 
are separated, they become impossible to understand. Each can only 
be understood through the other. 
Ultimately, Foucault's strategies of spatial thinking are aimed at 
producing new thought by showing that the 'effective practice of freedom 
by people' can only be understood in the present by pushing beyond the 
old Euclidean universe with its oppositions between subject and object, 
power and knowledge, space and time and the image of thought that 
authorises and conditions these oppositions. Foucault's spatial 
strategies allow a thought of difference from these oppositions (freed 
from making opposition, distinciton, categorisation) by constructing a 
complex 'complicated' space that reconfigures the abstract spaces of 
knowledge, power and self in terms of the 'unthought' difference that 
precedes them, makes them possible and yet escapes them. The knowledge, 
power and self-organising system of spaces is reconfigured in terms of 
the (nomadic) chance, becoming and forces of thought that traverse them. 
Foucault's topologies aim at inducing a panic and crisis, a 
problematisation and a collapse in the present: thought must shock 
itself into something new, shock itself into the space of difference 
outside. Thought must become a problem for itself and not a solution 
for something 'interior' or internal to it. Thought must create a whole 
new theatre: 
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A theatre of multiplicites opposed in every respect to the theatre 
of representation, which leaves in tact neither the identity of the 
thing represented, nor author, nor spectator, nor character, nor 
representation which, through the vicissitudes of the play, can 
become the object of a production of knowledge or final recognition. 
Instead a theatre of problems and always open questions. 
In Foucault thought becomes a theatre of problematic multiplicities in 
topological proximity stretched and folded across the knowledge, power, 
self system. Within this system thought is problematised as rare, 
diffuse, acategorical yet selective (creative), operating on the 
principle of a central breakdown, a kind of atrophy or collapse in its 
action, so that something new may come about, so that thought may 'think 
otherwise. ' 
Thought should not be directed toward establishing a central 
certitude, but should be directed towards the limits, 7 
the exterior - 
towards the emptiness, the negation of what it says. 
And this because thought is the positive creation of a problem, not the 
recognition or agreement of a solution. And in the creation of a problem 
thought escapes the fixed images of identity and representation, 
anchored by the models of ideology and repression, into 'something 
else', something other and 'not yet'. Knowledge, power and self in 
Foucault escape the fixed, immobile, passive and receptive spatial 
images that imprison them by breaking open the foundational and 
universal forms which depend on them and taking them to their limit and 
displacing them. Thought is at once constitutive of and inimical to the 
spatial limits of knowledge, power and self and as an atotalising and 
acentred system releases itself as a positive, productive and creative 
force in order to enter into the formation of new social processes. 
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Thought derives and 'invents' its 'freedom' within this positive 
movement by problematising its own constitutive activity within the 
space-time multiplicities of knowledge power and self. Thought is a 
relation of immanent freedom: 
it is what allows one to step back from this way of acting or 
reacting, to present it to oneself as an object of thought, and 
question it as to its meaning, its conditions and its goals. Thought 
is freedom in relation to what one does, the motion by which one 
detaches oneself froW it, establishes it as an object, and reflects 
on it as a problem. 
The space of freedom enables the immanent thought of the outside to both 
precede and escape representation. Thought "does not go from one point 
to another, but passes between the points, ceaselessly bifircating and 
diverging.,, 9 Thus in Foucault, thought does not explain the formation of 
the spaces of knowledge, power and self and ask how these spaces are 
realised but asks under what conditions can something other be produced 
'outside' or alongside them. Thought in Foucault is not known, a virtual 
'thinking-otherwise' within thought that takes singular elements from 
knowledge, power and self and mixes and reassembles them into a new 
'abstract machine' or multiplicity of thought that churns up and 
redistributes space and time as abstract virtualities. 
Thinking-otherwise in Foucault depends upon the abstract 'virtualities' 
of space, space and time and the 'image' they produce. The image of 
thought is determined by how space is composed and held together and how 
it is decomposed and comes apart. There are thus different topological 
figures of thought determined by the relations of forces that run 
through the compositional/decompositional system. And for Foucault 
prior to and subsisting within these differing figures lies the tendency 
for these spaces to leak, become indistinct, imperceptible, and 
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formless, crossing and folding through each other, losing their limits 
'in-between' creating the possibility of a multiplity of exits and 
entrances. Foucault discovers a sort of 'catastrophe' in thought, a 
force or potential inherent in its relations with space. Thought passes 
through a collapse of its enunciable and visual co-ordinates, as a 
condition for it to see and say otherwise - for it to think otherwise. 
Foucault is the proper name for a blind and mute machine of thought that 
shows the unseen and describes the unsaid. 
What matters in Foucault's abstract spacing of thought are the lines, 
series, folds and doubles which are unlimited, have no inside or outside 
and abandon geometric shape in an active, productive, expressive 
decomposition and recomposition of thought. The contourless, shapeless 
infinite space of thought reposes on a surface from which it constantly 
flees and attempts to escape as though bombarded by the violence of 
invisible forces which undo its identity and expose its monstrous un- 
form. Foucault thinks the otherwise unseeable and unsayable abstract 
forces of space that condition thought, showing that the contours and 
forms of knowledge, power and self are merely limitations of an infinite 
potential in thought, of an acenterd, shapeless, boundless, formless 
space of 'thinking-otherwise. ' 
Thought in Foucault is a process of saying and seeing otherwise - "that 
does not legitimate what is already known, but attempts to think 
differently, " 10 thinking differently outside of the knowledge, power and 
self that is given. Thought is irreducible to the forms of the given, 
since it is (topologically) in immanent contact with the forces of the 
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'outside' which gives them their conditions of possibility. Foucault's 
reconfiguration of the spaces of knowledge, power and self shows them as 
volumes that perpetually process these forces and conditions 
reinscribing them into the chance and becoming of history. Thought is 
this action and process, one of freedom and resistance to those spaces 
that imprison it. 
Foucault's thought is ultimately devoted to life. It is a thought "that 
discloses not so much what gives beings their foundation as what bears 
them for an instant towards a precarious form. " 
11 
Thought as Foucault 
conceives it is an action and practice directed toward the 
transvaluation of life, "an introduction to the non-fascist life", 
12 
the 
ethos of a Nietzchesan philosophical life lived in the force, chaos and 
becoming of the outside, the only philosophical life that is worth 
living: 
is not the force that comes from the outside a certain idea of Life, 
a certain vitalism in which Foucault's thought culminates. 
The key to the personal poetic attitude of a philosopher is not to 
be sought in his ideas, as if it could be deduced from them, but 
rather #j his philosophy-as-life, in his philosophical life, his 
ethos. 
The immanent freedom of thought in Foucault emerges through a topology 
of enclosures, making visible those spatial images of thought (bound to 
the knowledge/power/self system) that imprison life by opening them to 
other spaces, the heterotopic spaces of thinking-otherwise. "It was a 
philosophical exercise. The object was to learn to what extent the 
effort to think ones own history can free thought from what it silently 
thinks, and so enable it to think differently". For Foucault, the 
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immanent freedom of thought is "the living substance of philosophy", 
reconnecting life and thought through an "exercise of oneself in 
thought". 
14 
Man imprisons thought and confines freedom in his own self 
images of life and so life must be freed from wtihin man - "to the 
benefit of another form" - by constructing a life 'outside' of man, life 
within the folds, a space that "absolutely does not yet exist", 
15 
a space 
otherwise and beyond, yet folded and co-present in an immanent extimacy. 
Man is only one stratification of the living and Foucault's topology of 
thought accelerates his departure. 
Foucault gives us a theoretico-practical framework for an opening onto 
the life and thought of the post-human, a way of thinking through the 
possibilities of liberation and domination in an experience that we do 
not yet have a name or a concept for. A thought of relation with a non- 
organic life without origin, essence or foundation. Foucault constructs 
a 'force of flight' for the spaces of life that maximizes, to the 
greatest degree possible, the loosening of its fixations in the 
confinements of knowledge, power and self in order to connect and 
assemble them in the abstract, immanent space of thought outside: the 
mutant, chaotic line of thought that passes between knowledge, power and 
self triggering a thinking otherwise about what we are, say and do. 
Foucault's 'force of flight' is not any simple stepping outside or 
flight from life, but a "twist, fold, stop" into the outside within, 
again and again, not a pure destruction but a positive production of the 
real: "to flee is to produce the real, create life, to find a weapon.,, 
16 
Thought produces the real and creates life by collapsing its interior 
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foundations and certitudes and inserting itself into the reconfigured 
exterior relations of knowledge, power and self, into those spaces 
between and outside that condition their emergence. When thought 
reaches the outside, immerses itself in the 'non-place' of force- 
relations, goes beyond experience in an immanent connection and folding 
with the conditions of real experience, only then does thought attain an 
irreducibility, an independence from the knowledge, power, self system 
since it can grasp them in terms of their functions of existence and 
forms of relation. And thought is thereby "flung into the categories of 
life.,, 17 Foucault's thought is an abstract relay/connection-device plunged 
into the immanent, multiple, formless and chaotic spaces of the outside 
within, and it is in the inside of the outside that we must nourish 
little 'thoughtlets, ' little open rhizomes of thought that will branch 
out, bifurcate, and diversify into the 'not yet' thought of our 
becoming. And at the very heart of that becoming, in the eye of power 
there lies "the centre of the cyclone where one can live and where life 
18 
exists par excellence. " 
Paraphrasing Deleuze on Spinoza we might say that: 
In his whole way of living and thinking, Foucault posits the image 
of a positive, affirmative life, against the simulacra with which 
men content themselves... Life is not an idea, a matter of theory for 
Foucault. It is a manner of being, one and the same eternal mode in 
all its attributes. And only from this viewpj; nt does the 
topological method assume its full meaning. 
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POSTSCRIPT 
There is no doubt that all of Foucault's major preoccupations (madness 
and death, language and visibility, crime and punishment, sex and 
subjectivity, history and truth, power and resistance) are radically 
transformed by, or are on the threshold of being transformed by, 
cybernetic or technological discourse. A 'history of the present' in 
Foucault's sense (as a strategy of refusing, creating and inventing who 
we are), a post-humanist topology of thought, is of inestimable value in 
coming to grips with the abolition of real or material space and time in 
the frenzy of the 'informatics of domination, ' of coming to grips with 
the cybernetic 'stranger' knocking at the door of our present. 
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